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Abstract 
Why do some ethnic minority groups in Europe form political parties of their own 
in order to obtain political representation, whereas others choose to work within the 
confines of established, mainstream political parties? Further, why do some ethnic 
minority parties (EMPs) achieve electoral success, whereas others fail? 
 
In addressing these questions, I incorporate insights from history and social 
psychology to develop an original theory of EMP emergence and success. I argue that an 
ethnic minority group’s historical background influences its political engagement 
strategies through sociopsychological processes. I propose that native groups (those that 
inhabited the territory of the modern-day state in which they reside prior to that state’s 
establishment) and groups with historical experiences of autonomous self-rule are more 
likely to form ethnic minority parties, and that EMPs formed by such groups are more 
likely to enjoy electoral success. I argue that groups possessing one or both of these 
characteristics are more likely to exhibit the traits of positive distinctiveness and shared 
grievances, contributing to the development of a salient collective political identity. 
Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as native to their state and that have enjoyed 
autonomy are more likely to feel entitled to the unique form of representation provided 
by an ethnic minority party, and more likely to generate sufficient electoral support to 
sustain such a party. In contrast, groups lacking these traits are likely to either have non-
politicized identities or to approach the political process from an individual, rather than 
collective, perspective. This makes them more prone to seek participation in established, 
mainstream political parties. In addition to this original theory, I consider existing 
theories regarding the role of the political opportunity structure and the role of 
international organizations such as the European Union. 
 
I test my predictions with a mixed-methods approach combining a large-N, cross-
national quantitative analysis with a detailed case study focusing on Bulgaria. The 
quantitative portion of my analysis uses an original dataset of European elections in the 
period 1990-2012. I test my predictions regarding the determinants of EMP entry and 
success using generalized linear mixed models, finding substantial support for the 
influence of the two historical variables. For the qualitative case study, I performed a 
month of field research, conducting semi-structured elite interviews with leading 
Bulgarian political figures with expertise in the country’s ethnic politics. I sought to 
determine why the country’s Turkish minority has produced one of the most successful 
ethnic parties in Europe, whereas the country’s Roma population remains without a 
notable political party. The case study confirms many of the findings of the quantitative 
analysis and allows a deeper exploration into the complex causal mechanisms behind 
EMP emergence and success. 
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I. Introduction 
 Contemporary Europe, Eastern and Western alike, is characterized by the 
presence of sizable ethnic minority groups living within otherwise ethnically 
homogenous nation-states. Although there is great diversity among these minority 
populations, one nearly universal trait they share is concern over the protection of their 
rights and interests within their host nation. This concern is motivated by an actual or 
perceived inequality of treatment between the majority ethnic group of the state and its 
ethnic minorities, and allegations of both de jure and de facto discrimination are 
commonplace. 
 In Western Europe, Muslim immigrants have objected to a number of legislative 
initiatives limiting freedom of religious expression, arguing that such laws discriminate 
against adherents of Islam in particular. In Eastern Europe, the fall of Communism 
introduced political pluralism into many states with unresolved ethnic tensions, and 
numerous governments have enacted laws regarding language, religion and citizenship 
that are argued to constrain the liberty of the ethnic minorities residing within them. 
Further, ethnic minorities in this region—particularly the Roma—suffer considerable de 
facto discrimination even in the absence of de jure discrimination. 
 To combat these real and perceived threats, ethnic minorities across Europe have 
sought to engage the political system of their state and influence government policy. The 
democratic systems of most European countries offer opportunities for minority groups to 
attempt to achieve their goals through electoral politics. However, different minorities 
have sought to accomplish these goals in strikingly different ways. At the most basic 
level, two broad models of ethnic minority political mobilization can be distinguished. 
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 The first model is more prevalent in Western Europe and is epitomized by the 
case of the United Kingdom, where migrant minority groups (Indians, Pakistanis, Afro-
Caribbeans) have sought to influence politics by working within the already existing 
party system of the state. Since the 1970’s, there has been a concerted effort by these 
groups to participate in the politics of the Labour party, and to use the party as a promoter 
of minority rights. As a consequence, the number of UK members of parliament (MPs) 
belonging to these minority groups rose substantially, and the political discourse of the 
state shifted from one generally dismissive or apathetic toward the rights of immigrants 
to one more accepting of multiculturalism (Garbaye, 2003). More recently, however, 
British Prime Minister David Cameron has advocated for a “muscular liberalism” 
entailing more restrictive and assimilative policies toward migrants,1 and the 
representation of ethnic minorities in the UK parliament still falls considerably short of 
their share of the general population.2 
 Similar patterns of ethnic minority participation are present in much of Western 
Europe (Turks in Germany’s Social Democratic Party, Muslims in the Netherlands’ 
Labour Party), as well as parts of Eastern Europe (for instance, Russians in the Estonian 
Centre Party). The general pattern is one of ethnic minority participation almost 
exclusively within the most popular existing center-left or liberal party of the state. This 
entails a symbiotic relationship where on the one hand liberal and left-of-center parties 
solidify their support among certain sectors of the electorate, and on the other ethnic 
minorities obtain some (usually limited) parliamentary representation and government 
                                                           
1 “State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron.” BBC News. 5 Feb 2011. Web. 30 May 2014. 
2 Anwar, Muhammad. “The participation of ethnic minorities in British politics.” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 27.3 (2001): 533-49. 
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policy influence. 
 An alternative model of ethnic political mobilization is evident predominantly in 
Eastern (but also some Western) European states. In former Warsaw Pact states, many 
minority groups quickly adapted to the collapse of Communism. Making full use of the 
nascent political pluralism, they formed political parties that would exclusively represent 
their interests in government. Although the magnitude of electoral support ethnic 
minority parties (EMPs) enjoy is naturally limited by the size of the ethnic groups they 
represent, these parties have gained prominence as pivotal coalition partners for 
mainstream parties in states like Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. As such, they have 
seized control of numerous ministerial positions and have had substantial influence over 
government policy-making. Further, successful EMPs have enabled ethnic minority 
groups to achieve levels of parliamentary representation not generally observed in states 
without such parties. For instance, ethnic Turks control 14.6% of seats in Bulgaria’s 42nd 
National Assembly,3 well above their 8.8% share of the country’s population, whereas 
Turks in Germany control only 1.7% of seats in the 18th Bundestag4 despite comprising 
5.2% of total population. Similarly, Swedes control 4.5% of seats in the 36th Finnish 
Eduskunta through the Swedish People’s Party,5 slightly higher than their 4.3% share of 
population, while ethnic Finns constitute only 1.5% of the current Swedish Riksdag,6 
                                                           
3 “Members of Parliament,” National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria. Web. Accessed June 10, 2014. 
<http://www.parliament.bg/en/MP> 
4 Varli, Ali. “Eleven Turks Enter German Parliament,” Hurriyet Daily News. Web. Accessed June 10, 
2014. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eleven-turks-enter-german-parliament-
.aspx?PageID=238&NID=55013&NewsCatID=351> 
5 “Dataset: Finland: Parliamentary Election 2011,” European Election Database. Web. Accessed June 10, 
2014. <http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2 
Fobj%2FfStudy%2FMAPA2011&mode=cube&cube=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.166%3A80%2Fobj%2
FfCube%2FMAPA2011_C1&top=yes> 
6 “Members and Parties,” Sveriges Riksdag. Web. Accessed June 10, 2014. 
<http://www.riksdagen.se/en/Members-and-parties/> 
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despite constituting 4.5% of Sweden’s population.  It appears that in some cases the EMP 
approach to ethnic political mobilization may produce superior results to working within 
mainstream political parties. Yet at the same time, many ethnic minority parties have 
failed to obtain a large following and to influence the politics of their state. For instance, 
Russian minority parties in Estonia such as the Russian Party in Estonia and the Estonian 
United People’s Party enjoyed some brief success in the late 1990s before their electoral 
fortunes declined, forcing them to merge with more viable, ideologically-based parties. 
The various parties representing Roma minorities in countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia have fared even worse in national 
elections. 
 The questions I seek to answer are therefore as follows: first, why do some ethnic 
minority groups form ethnically-based political parties to represent their interests, 
whereas others do not? Second, why are some ethnic minority parties successful, whereas 
others are not? 
 These questions have not heretofore been extensively studied, yet they bear 
considerable real-world relevance. This relevance is particularly pronounced for Western 
Europe, where immigration and demographic trends have steadily amplified the salience 
of ethnic politics, and will continue to do so in the future. Exploring the determinants of 
ethnic party formation and success could be instructive not only to ethnic minorities 
themselves, but also to national and supranational statesmen concerned with political and 
societal stability. Existing literature reveals that ethnic minority parties can be highly 
influential actors in domestic politics (Jiglau and Ghergina 2011), boost political 
participation among the ethnic group they represent (Ishiyama 2009), prevent minority 
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ethnic conflict (Ishiyama 2009, Johnson 2002, Birnir 2007), help manage interethnic 
relations during democratic transitions (Mihailescu 2008) and help stabilize and sustain 
democracy (Chandra 2005, Birnir 2007). With so many studies pointing to the 
influence—on minority groups and on the broader society alike—of ethnic minority 
parties, it is imperative that we examine what factors contribute to their emergence and 
success. 
 There are two main bodies of literature to which my research speaks. The first of 
these is the literature on ethnic politics. Existing research on the subject is primarily 
concerned with the developing world, and understandably so. However, the fall of 
Communism in Eastern Europe and the rise in immigration to Western Europe has made 
the study of ethnic politics increasingly relevant for these regions of the world. The work 
which has been done on Europe so far deals primarily with violent ethnic conflict in 
regions like former Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland; relatively little attention has been 
paid to the more subtle and political forms of ethno-nationalism which have emerged on 
the continent in the past two decades. 
 Existing cross-national research on the emergence and effects of ethnic minority 
parties has focused either on Eastern Europe exclusively (Bernauer and Bochsler 2011) or 
on Eastern Europe in conjunction with regions other than Western Europe (Ishiyama 
2009). There also exists a literature on ethnoregionalist parties in Western Europe (De 
Winter and Tursan 1998, Heller 2002), but it has thus far remained largely disconnected 
from work on Eastern Europe. My research bridges this divide and presents the first 
cross-national study of the presence and absence of successful ethnic minority parties in 
Europe as a whole. 
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 The second relevant body of literature is that on parties and elections, and more 
specifically the emergence and success of niche parties. Niche parties are those parties 
which defy traditional class-based, left-right or liberal-conservative policy dimensions 
and instead focus on a specific issue (or narrow set of issues) which cross-cuts these 
dimensions. Such parties tend to be anti-establishment and critical of “major” political 
parties within their state. 
 Due to their tendency to emphasize a narrow set of issues which have high 
salience for only a small portion of the population, and which generally fall outside of 
traditional dimensions of political competition, EMPs can be considered to be a type of 
niche party. Labeling EMPs as niche parties is consistent with definitions of niche parties 
commonly found in existing research. For instance, Wagner (2011) defines niche parties 
as those which “compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues.” Meguid 
(2005) similarly defines niche parties as those which defy traditional class-based politics 
and focus on a small group of issues. Both authors argue that ethno-regional political 
parties ought to be considered niche parties under these definitions of the term. 
 Within the context of European politics, most of the work on niche parties has 
focused on green (Müller-Rommel, 1985; Dolezal, 2010; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke, 
2013) and right-wing populist (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003; Arzheimer and 
Carter, 2006; Oesch, 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2010; Luther, 2011) parties, while 
very little has been done on ethnic minority parties. The only quantitative cross-national 
study of EMP formation in Europe to date is the one conducted by Bernauer and Bochsler 
(2011). Although this study is commendable in many respects, it is hampered by its 
limited geographic scope and the flawed operationalization of key independent variables. 
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Thus, despite the fact that they fall under the niche party category, and despite their 
increasing relevance and influence in parts of Europe, European EMPs remain seriously 
understudied, and we know little about the conditions which facilitate their formation and 
electoral success. 
 My research builds on existing work on ethnic politics and niche parties as a 
starting point, yet makes a significant contribution by examining the role of historical 
experience and social psychology in ethnic groups’ political engagement strategies. I 
argue that a minority group’s historical background influences its political engagement 
strategies through sociopsychological processes. I propose that native groups (those that 
inhabited the territory of the modern-day state in which they reside prior to that state’s 
establishment), groups with territorial attachment (those that have been historically 
concentrated in particular regions of their state) and groups with historical experiences of 
autonomous self-rule are more likely to form ethnic minority parties, and that EMPs 
formed by such groups are more likely to enjoy electoral success. I argue that groups 
possessing these characteristics are more likely to exhibit the traits of positive 
distinctiveness and shared grievances, contributing to the development of a salient 
collective political identity. Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as native to their 
state and region, and that have enjoyed autonomy are more likely to feel entitled to the 
unique form of representation provided by an ethnic minority party, and more likely to 
generate sufficient electoral support to sustain such a party. In contrast, groups lacking 
these traits are likely to either have non-politicized identities or to approach the political 
process from an individual, rather than collective, perspective. This makes them more 
prone to seek participation in established, mainstream political parties. 
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 Additionally, I consider several alternative explanations for the emergence of 
ethnic minority parties. Drawing on Kitschelt (1985) and Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), I 
construct a formulation of the political opportunity structure theory which proposes that 
minority groups are most likely to form ethnic parties when mainstream political parties 
are hostile or apathetic toward the group’s concerns, and when the group believes it has 
the capacities (numeric size and human capital) to create and sustain such a party. I 
further consider the influence of international actors in domestic politics, proposing that 
we are more likely to observe EMP formation when the ethnic group in question has a 
valuable international ally—either a geographically proximal kin state or an international 
organization such as the European Union—interceding on its behalf and acting as a 
whistleblower for unfair barriers to electoral entry. 
 With respect to ethnic minority party success, I propose that the presence of a 
successful right-wing populist or nationalist party will contribute to an EMP’s ability to 
mobilize its base, and therefore maximize its electoral performance. Additionally, I 
suggest that political culture based on clientelistic (rather than programmatic) appeals 
tends to favor ethnic minority parties, as such parties often have access to built-in patron-
client networks already existing within the ethnic communities they represent. Lastly, 
drawing on previous scholarship (Chandra 2004, Tavits 2012, Bolleyer and Bitzek 2013) 
I argue that three party organization characteristics—the professionalization of the party’s 
central organization, opportunities for intra-party advancement and connectedness to 
societal groups—enable ethnic minority parties to achieve electoral success once they are 
formed. 
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 In order to test my theoretical expectations, I employ a mixed-method approach 
combining a large-N quantitative analysis and a detailed case study of ethnic politics in 
Bulgaria. The quantitative analysis utilizes an original dataset of European elections in 
the period 1990-2012 (N=409) containing several variables that have not been previously 
incorporated into the study of EMP emergence and success. Using various statistical 
methods, including generalized linear mixed models, I find substantial evidence for many 
of the proposed relationships. Most notably, I find that two of the three factors in my 
historical explanatory framework—historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are 
the two strongest predictors of ethnic minority party entry and success. The Bulgaria case 
study complements the quantitative findings by providing an in-depth analysis of the 
processes contributing to the emergence of successful ethnic minority parties. I examine 
the rise of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a Turkish ethnic party that is 
among the most successful in Europe, and compare it to the feeble and futile efforts of 
the Roma community to establish a successful party of its own. I find that many of the 
proposed historical, international, political system and party organization variables have 
played a role in bringing about the MRF’s remarkable success. 
My dissertation proceeds as follows. 
In Chapter II, I develop a theoretical framework for the study of the emergence 
and success of EMPs. I first lay out the reasoning behind my central thesis regarding the 
role of history and social psychology in the political engagement strategies of ethnic 
minority groups. Next, I consider alternative explanations for the emergence of ethnic 
minority parties dealing with the political opportunity structure and influences from 
international actors. Lastly, I discuss a host of party system, political culture and party 
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organization factors I believe ought to influence EMP success, which I define as the 
ability to obtain legislative representation. 
In Chapter III, I test the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter II on a 
large-N quantitative analysis of European elections in the period 1990-2012. Employing a 
variety of statistical techniques, I find substantial evidence that two of the variables in my 
historical framework—historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are the strongest 
predictors of EMP entry and success. Further, I find some evidence that candidacy for EU 
accession improves the likelihood of minority party entry in the candidate state, and that 
the presence of a strong right-wing populist party increases the probability that an EMP 
will achieve electoral success, although neither of these effects is especially strong. In 
contrast, I find no evidence that the attitudes of the major political parties in the state 
toward ethnic minorities influence those minorities’ decisions of whether or not to form 
an EMP. 
In Chapter IV, I complement the findings of my quantitative analysis with a 
detailed case study of the emergence and success of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms in Bulgaria, as well as the failure of the country’s Roma parties to obtain the 
same level of success. This case study allows me to examine the emergence of EMPs on 
a deeper level and to perform process tracing in order to determine more precisely the 
mechanisms by which initial conditions favorable to EMP formation and success lead to 
the realization of these outcomes. I find that the Turkish minority’s historical heritage 
produced a sense of entitlement to fair treatment and cultural autonomy, which, when 
paired with the dehumanizing ethnic policies of the Communist regime, paved the path 
for the formation of the MRF following the country’s democratic transition. In contrast, 
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the Roma minority’s historical background did little to inspire a similar sense of group 
rights and did not instill a sense of pressing need for collective political action. I find 
little support for the notion that the contrasting political strategies of the two ethnic 
groups can be explained by the openness of mainstream parties to their input. On the 
other hand, international support for an ethnically Turkish party (and lack thereof for a 
Roma party) in the early 1990’s may help to explain why the MRF was allowed to 
contest elections while parties representing other ethnicities were initially deemed 
unconstitutional. I further find evidence that the MRF’s skillful employment of 
clientelistic networks, and the perceived threat posed by the nationalist party Ataka, have 
contributed to the party’s success. Lastly, I determine that the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms has been aided in its electoral success by its extensive, professional and rigidly 
hierarchical organizational structure that nevertheless offers opportunities for intra-party 
advancement, as well as by the quality of its leadership.  
Finally, in Chapter V, I offer a summary of this dissertation’s most important 
theoretical contributions and empirical findings, discuss the significance of these findings 
within the broader literatures on ethnic politics and niche parties, and suggest areas for 
future research.
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II. Theory 
 I. Introduction 
 Why do some ethnic minority groups in Europe form parties of their own to 
contest national legislative elections, whereas others choose to participate in the politics 
of their state through established, mainstream parties? Further, why are some ethnic 
minority parties (EMPs) successful in obtaining legislative representation for the people-
group they represent, whereas others fail to do so? 
 While the limited number of existing studies addressing EMP emergence and 
success have made some valuable theoretical contributions, they are ill-suited to 
adequately explain the ethnic minority party phenomenon in Europe, for two primary 
reasons. First, the focus of such studies has tended to be on the developing world, and 
they have consequently employed a theoretical framework tailored to the conditions and 
circumstances of these kinds of states. Second, and more importantly, previous studies 
have failed to take into account a crucial category of variables—those pertaining to the 
historical background of ethnic groups—that ought to hold significant explanatory power 
in addressing these questions. 
 In this chapter, I use insights from history and social psychology to develop a 
unique theory for the emergence and success of ethnic minority parties. I argue that an 
ethnic minority group’s historical background influences its political engagement 
strategies through sociopsychological processes. I propose that native groups—those that 
inhabited the territory of the modern-day state in which they reside prior to that state’s 
establishment—and groups with historical experiences of autonomous self-rule are more 
likely to form ethnic minority parties, and that EMPs formed by such groups are more 
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likely to enjoy electoral success. I argue that groups possessing one or both of these 
characteristics are prone to exhibit the traits of positive distinctiveness and shared 
grievances, contributing to the development of a salient collective political identity. 
Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as native to their state and that have enjoyed 
autonomy are more likely to feel entitled to the particular form of representation provided 
by an ethnic minority party, and more likely to generate sufficient electoral support to 
sustain such a party. In contrast, groups lacking these traits are likely to either have non-
politicized identities or to approach the political process from an individual, rather than 
collective, perspective. The absence of a salient collective political identity can render the 
ethnic party idea unappealing and/or unfeasible. Therefore, such groups are more likely 
to accept working within (and, in a sense, integrating into) established, mainstream 
political parties as the best strategy for advancing their interests. Major parties can lend 
an air of legitimacy to the concerns of a minority group with weak historical ties to its 
state, and they possess the influence and expertise necessary to address those concerns. 
In addition to developing this original theory, I synthesize various existing 
theoretical approaches to the study of electoral politics, re-formulating them to the 
particular context of this study in order to develop a comprehensive framework 
addressing ethnic minority party entry and success in Europe. I adapt insights from 
theories regarding the political opportunity structure, the influence of international actors 
in domestic politics, the role of clientelism in electoral outcomes and the impact of party 
organization characteristics on electoral success. Ultimately, I argue that we are more 
likely to observe EMP entry for sizable minority groups whose concerns are not 
adequately addressed by the major political parties of their state, as well as for groups 
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that have valuable international allies in the form of the European Union and/or a 
bordering kin state. With respect to EMP success, I argue that the presence of a 
prominent right-wing populist party in the political system, the prevalence of clientelistic 
practices in the state, the existence of nearby kin state and the presence of an extensive 
organizational party structure with ample opportunity for intra-party advancement are all 
factors bolstering the electoral performance of ethnic minority parties. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section II, I discuss some previous 
approaches to the study of ethnic minority party emergence and success, highlighting the 
valuable insights we can draw from them while simultaneously drawing attention to their 
limitations. In section III, I outline in broad strokes my approach to the two questions this 
dissertation is concerned with: 1) under what conditions are we likely to observe EMP 
formation and entry and 2) under what circumstances are EMPs likely to thrive in 
electoral politics? Section IV discusses my theoretical framework in exploring the 
question of ethnic minority party entry, whereas Section V deals with the question of 
minority party success. Finally, I conclude in Section VI. 
II. Previous approaches to the study of ethnic minority party success 
Chandra (2004) offers perhaps the best-known study on the determinants of ethnic 
minority party success. Chandra’s book is concerned specifically with EMPs in 
patronage-democracies, which she defines as those states that 1) possess a large public 
sector and in which 2) elected officials are able to appeal to voters on an individualized 
basis (p. 6). Chandra argues that in patronage-democracies, limited information forces 
most voters to use ethnicity as a cue in determining who to vote for. In such conditions, 
voters will vote for those parties that place a large number of their co-ethnics into 
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positions of power. They will do so because they either expect to benefit materially as 
state goodies are distributed through ethnic networks, or they derive some psychological 
benefit from seeing co-ethnics in power (p. 8). Thus, for a political party to capture the 
vote of an ethnic minority, it must incorporate more elites from that ethnic category than 
any other party (pp. 12-13). 
 Chandra further contends that in order for a party to attract elites from a particular 
ethnicity, it must offer them the promise of ascent within its party organization (p. 13-
14). In order to credibly promise such benefits, a party must have competitive—rather 
than centralized—rules for party advancement (p. 14-15). In other words, the party must 
be fluid and flexible enough that those who join its ranks can have reasonable 
expectations about rising to positions of greater power in the future. Ultimately, Chandra 
argues that “ethnic parties are most likely to succeed in patronage-democracies when they 
have competitive rules for intraparty advancement and the ethnic group they seek to 
mobilize is larger than the threshold of winning or leverage imposed by the electoral 
system” (p.15). 
 While Chandra’s book is an invaluable contribution to the study of EMPs, it is 
also naturally limited in the scope of its analysis and in the applicability of its findings. 
First, its theory is derived exclusively from and for the framework of patronage-
democracies. Most states in the world are not patronage-democracies, and although many 
European political systems exhibit some clientelistic practices, it is hard to consider any 
European state to be a patronage-democracy. Further, Chandra’s empirical findings are 
derived from a single patronage-democracy (India), rather than from a cross-national 
analysis of the collectivity of such states. Therefore, as valuable as Chandra’s work is, it 
16 
 
 
does not speak to EMP success in many states—and even regions—of the world. 
 That being said, we should not discount the possibility that some elements of 
Chandra’s theoretical framework could travel to non-patronage-democracies. In 
particular, the notion that intra-party rules matter for EMP success could easily hold true 
for European states. There is nothing inherent in this notion which suggests that it ought 
to be more true in patronage-democracies than in other political system. Cox (1997) also 
lends support to the thesis that opportunities for intra-party advancement matter, although 
it is the permeability of established mainstream (rather than incipient ethnic) parties that 
he is primarily concerned with. I explore the effect of intra-party advancement 
opportunities in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 Thus far, the only study to examine the formation and success of EMPs 
quantitatively and cross-nationally is that of Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), who examine 
the electoral success of 130 minorities in 19 post-communist democracies. The authors 
synthesize political opportunity structure and rational-choice party formation theories to 
inform their theoretical expectations, and elect to examine EMP formation and the 
electoral success of EMPs separately. On the question of EMP formation, the authors 
hypothesize that: 
 1. If demand for minority representation is low, restrictive electoral rules will 
reduce the probability of electoral entry. 
 2. Accommodative reactions by established political parties to ethnic minority 
demands will diminish the probability of electoral entry, whereas dismissive or 
adversarial reactions will increase this probability. 
 With respect to EMP success, Bernauer and Bochsler expect that: 
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 1. If demand for minority representation is low, restrictive electoral rules will 
reduce the probability of electoral success. 
 2. Adversarial reactions by the political establishment will increase the probability 
of electoral success of EMPs, while dismissive reactions would decrease it. 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the authors find that high electoral thresholds do inhibit 
both the electoral entry and the electoral success of EMPs, but only when the size of the 
ethnic minority group is small. In contrast, they find no evidence that the reaction of 
established political parties has an influence either on the formation of EMPs or on their 
electoral success. 
 Although Bernauer and Bochsler present a solid foundation for the study of the 
emergence and success of EMPs, their study has several limitations.   
 First, the operationalization of “electoral demand” is problematic. It is comprised 
of two variables—the first is the numeric size of the ethnic minority group, and the 
second is the average salience of nationalism for political parties in the state. It is this 
second measure that is problematic, since it measures the extent to which nationalism is 
important in the state as a whole, not the extent to which ethnicity is important for a 
particular ethnic group. 
 Second, there is also a problem with the operationalization of the reactions of 
established parties. The authors only consider the reactions (measured by content analysis 
of party manifestos) of one of the two largest parties in the state—the one which has the 
most “intense” overall reaction (the greatest sum of accommodative and adversarial 
reactions). This means that they are presumably measuring the response of the most 
popular anti-minority party in some states, and the response of the most popular pro-
18 
 
 
minority party in others. It would have been more consistent to simply look at the more 
pro-minority of the two largest parties of each state, and to measure how favorable it is to 
minority claims. 
 Thus, it is unclear whether the null findings of the study with respect to the 
influence of mainstream parties is a product of flawed operationalization, or if there is 
simply no such relationship. Later in this chapter, I propose an alternative framework for 
incorporating political opportunity structure theory into the study of EMP entry and 
success that offers a more accurate test of mainstream party effects on the fortunes of 
minority parties. 
III. The Determinants of EMP Success: Two Questions 
Why do we observe EMPs for some ethnic minorities, but not others? In order to 
answer this question, we must break the question down into two components. We must 
first examine why members of some ethnic minority groups deem it necessary or 
advantageous to form political parties and contest national elections, whereas others 
choose to engage the political system of their state differently (or not at all). That is, we 
must establish what drives the demand for establishment of an ethnic minority party. The 
second question we need to answer is, what are the factors that enable a party, once 
established, to attract sufficient electoral support among the ethnic group it seeks to 
represent? Under what conditions will an EMP obtain sufficient support to become a 
politically relevant actor in its state? 
We must, of course, not overlook how interrelated the answers to these two 
questions actually are. It seems intuitive that EMPs are less likely to be formed in states 
where they do not have the potential for electoral success and political relevance. 
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Therefore, many of the factors that determine the extent of electoral support for EMPs 
will also inevitably exert some influence on the decision of whether or not to contest an 
election through an EMP. 
Having said that, there are factors pertaining uniquely to the entry of a particular 
type of party without which no such party would be formed at all, no matter how 
favorable the institutional conditions might be. After all, no one asks why we observe no 
political parties representing the interests of left-handed people, Mazda drivers or soccer 
fans. It makes no sense to ask such questions since there is no apparent reason why these 
groups should wish to organize politically. Likewise, there are other variables that exert 
an influence on the success of parties but cannot be used as explanations for their 
establishment.  
IV. Ethnic Minority Party Entry 
 Under what conditions does demand for an ethnic minority party develop? 
Scholars since Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have argued that the types of parties generated 
in a state’s political system are to a great extent determined by the social cleavages within 
that state. In order for demand for a particular type of party to emerge, there must first be 
politically salient divisions in society along one or more dimensions. It is these social 
cleavages that shape the character of the political system. It seems straightforward then, 
that the first prerequisite for the electoral demand of an EMP is the presence of a clear 
ethnic cleavage. At the same time, we observe a multitude of ethically heterogeneous 
societies which do not produce ethnically-based parties. If the presence of ethnic 
diversity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for ethnic party demand, how can we 
distinguish between ethnic divisions that lead to such demand and those that do not? 
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1. A Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) Approach 
 Existing research on the emergence of ethnic minority parties has ignored what I 
believe to be the most important set of variables accounting for this phenomenon. I 
propose here that the primary factors influencing EMP formation are historical in nature, 
and that the mechanism through which they bring about this effect can best be understood 
by utilizing concepts from social psychology. My central thesis is that the unique history 
of each minority group plays a significant role in shaping the political attitudes and 
behaviors of members of that group. I argue that there are certain historical legacies that 
motivate and empower minority groups to establish political parties of their own, while 
the absence of such historical legacies inhibits and discourages such a form of political 
engagement. I focus on three distinct (but often related) factors—historical presence, 
territorial attachment and past dominance/autonomy—to explain what drives the demand 
behind EMP formation. 
The first important factor in my Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) 
framework is the historical presence of ethnic minorities. Most broadly, I distinguish 
between two types of minorities—those that have deep historical linkages to the lands on 
which they currently reside, and those which do not have such a background. The first 
group is comprised primarily of those ethnic minorities whose inhabitance of the lands 
where they currently reside predates the formation of the modern state in which they live. 
One example of this would be the Basques, who lived in the geographic region of the 
Western Pyrenees known as the Basque Country for centuries before that region was 
incorporated into the modern Spanish and French nation-states. 
In contrast, non-native ethnic minorities are those that emerged primarily as the 
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result of migration following the establishment of the modern nation-state in which they 
live. This includes not only first and second-generation members of the recent migration 
wave from Asia, Africa and the Middle East to various states in Western Europe, but also 
Russians who migrated to the Baltic states following those states’ incorporation into the 
USSR, and the 20th century migration of Finns to Sweden. It does not, on the other hand, 
include groups such as the sizeable Roma minorities currently residing in many Central 
and Eastern European states. While such groups remained semi-nomadic for centuries 
following their arrival on the European continent, historical records indicate that they 
were largely sedenterized—in part voluntarily and in part by force—well in advance of 
the emergence of the modern nation-state in the region (Crowe 1994). 
 What makes these two types of ethnic minorities different, and how does it 
influence the demand for EMP formation? Native minorities have a much stronger moral 
basis for resisting assimilation efforts and fighting for the preservation of their culture 
than do non-native minorities. It is clear in the consciousness of these minorities that they 
did not come to live in their current state of residence as a consequence of choice, but 
rather as the consequence of distant geopolitical events outside of their control. Indeed, 
they see themselves as preceding this state, and this fact both emboldens and legitimizes 
their desire for influence on its politics. Further, this desire for political influence is most 
likely to be pursued in the formation of an EMP. The other alternative—working within 
mainstream political parties—would be, in a sense, to surrender to assimilation into the 
titular ethnicity of the state. Since such communities are likely to possess a strong sense 
of group rights (e.g., the right of the community to be educated in its own language, or to 
exercise some degree of autonomy over its own affairs) in addition to individual rights, 
22 
 
 
political action that entails assimilation may be frowned upon and viewed as a 
problematic concession. 
 On the other hand, non-native minorities realize that the fact that they are 
minorities is the consequence of personal or family choice. Somewhere down the line, 
members of a certain ethnic group chose to migrate to a state with a dominant ethnicity 
other than their own. In their consciousness, this was a price they (or their parents, or 
even their grandparents) were willing to pay for the perceived benefits of migrating to 
this new state. Since such minorities do not have an extended historical presence in their 
state of residence, it is more difficult for them to make the case that they ought to be 
granted any level of autonomy as an ethnic group. They certainly believe in their 
entitlement to individual rights (e.g., protection against discrimination in employment 
and education, access to public and private services), but their claims to group rights are 
weak. This predisposes such ethnic minorities to working within the major political 
parties of their state in order to accomplish their goals, rather than forming particularistic 
and exclusivist parties of their own. Indeed, they may perceive that forming such parties 
will only further drive a wedge between them and the titular ethnicity, since its members 
already view them as “foreigners” and “visitors.” Since the primary goal of these ethnic 
groups is the protection of individual rights, and since individual rights are predicated on 
belongingness to (rather separateness from) the state, established major parties may be 
the best vehicles for accomplishing that goal. 
 To illustrate these differences in ethnic group mentality, it is instructive to 
compare the claims of native and non-native minority groups in the United Kingdom. An 
examination of the mission statements of organizations representing the country’s 
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migrant South Asian minority groups (Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) reveals 
concerns such as “establishing a safe, tolerant Britain in which Islamophobia and racism 
have no place,”1 enabling Muslims to “live as equal and valued citizens, free to practice 
their faith and free from discrimination and demonization,”2 and “[eradicating] 
disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by Muslims.”3 Examining materials 
produced by such organizations reveals a focus on the protection of civil liberties of 
individual citizens, legitimated by those citizens’ belongingness to the state and equality 
with other residents. 
On the other hand, organizations representing the native Scottish and Welsh 
minorities explicitly pursue independence and autonomy, grounded in a communal right 
to self-determination. Thus Alex Salmond, leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), in 
urging voters to back Scottish independence in a 2014 referendum declares that “…it is 
fundamentally better for all of us if decisions about Scotland’s future are taken by the 
people who care most about Scotland—that is, the people of Scotland.”4 The SNP has 
invoked Scottish history to legitimize independence, describing the 1999 establishment of 
the Scottish Parliament as a continuation of the parliament abolished by the 1707 Act of 
Union with the Kingdom of England.5 Plaid Cymru (“Party of Wales”) declares in its 
constitution that among its primary aims is “to secure independence for Wales in 
Europe,”6 and to “create a bilingual society by promoting the revival of the Welsh 
                                                           
1 Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism, http://www.asianecho.co.uk/?page_id=488 
2 Muslim Public Affairs Committee, http://www.mpacuk.org/about-mpacuk.html 
3 Muslim Council of Britain, http://www.asianecho.co.uk/?page_id=488 
4 Choice: A Historic Opportunity for Our Nation, 
http://www.snp.org/sites/default/files/issue/documents/yes_-_choice.pdf 
5 Scottish National Party – About Us, http://www.snp.org/about-us 
6 Plaid Cymru Constitution, http://www.plaidcymru.org/uploads/Cyfansoddiad_Nov_2012.pdf 
24 
 
 
language,”7 drawing on Welsh history and culture to support its campaign for political 
and cultural autonomy.8 It is evident from examining the reasoning behind the objectives 
of both Plaid Cymru and the SNP that their claims are based on a sense of historically-
grounded legitimate separateness from the United Kingdom, in sharp contrast to South 
Asian organizations, which base their claims on the belongingness of their members to 
the state. 
 A second historical factor that ought to play a role in creating demand for an EMP 
is the territorial attachment of the ethnic minority—a historical connection between the 
minority group and a particular territory (or territories) within the boundaries of the 
modern-day state. Territorial attachment can best be thought of as a special kind of 
historical presence that is characterized by a long-standing spatial concentration of the 
minority group. In other words, historical presence is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for territorial attachment. There are ethnic groups that have a long-standing 
historical presence on the territory of a modern-day state, which, due to their nomadic 
lifestyle or simply their geographical dispersion, never formed a particular attachment to 
any one geographic region (or regions) within that territory. 
The best example of such a group are the Roma, who have had an extensive 
historical presence in most of Central and Eastern Europe since the 15th and 16th 
centuries, yet do not closely associate themselves with any specific regions within the 
borders of the states that they currently inhabit. This is partly the result of the semi-
nomadic character of this group during the earlier part of its historical presence in the 
region, as the reluctance to settle down precluded territorial attachment. Of course, the 
                                                           
7 Ibid. 
8 Plaid Cymru, “Our Vision for Culture, Heritage and Language” http://www.partyofwales.org/our-vision-
for-culture-heritage-and-language/ 
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East European Roma did experience a gradual but steady sedentarization between the 15th 
and 19th centuries, with the nomadic lifestyle becoming nearly extinct by the beginning of 
the 20th century. However, throughout this process the Roma remained geographically 
dispersed, as they did not settle in specific regions but remained spread out across the 
territory of their states. 
Why should territorial attachment lend support for the formation of an EMP? 
Once again, it is helpful to think of territorial attachment as a stronger case of historical 
presence. As such, the factors proceeding from the historical presence of the minority 
will play a role in its preferred mode of political participation. However, territorial 
attachment lends an even stronger support to an ethnic community’s belief in group rights 
and group autonomy. The attachment to a piece of land as the historical abode of a 
people-group promotes a sense that this group has a right to exercise self-determination at 
least within the boundaries of that region. If the ethnic group has historically comprised a 
majority, plurality or even a sizable minority within a particular region, this lends support 
to the idea that this region belongs at least as much to the group as it does to the modern 
nation-state, and that the group ought therefore to play a unique role in its governance. 
Ethnic groups with territorial attachment are more likely to conceive of themselves as a 
separate nation that demands the tools for some degree of self-governance—tools that an 
EMP can at least partially offer. Political participation within major mainstream parties 
would be a tacit denial of this separate nationhood. 
In contrast, native but geographically dispersed people-groups are less likely to 
have a sense that they constitute a nation, or to hold the accompanying belief in group 
rights and the right to self-rule. Such groups may be more willing to compromise by 
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participating in the political process through mainstream parties that promise some 
benefits (the protection of individual rights, the improvement of socio-economic 
conditions, etc.) to members of the group, yet do not offer it a substantial role in the 
governance of the state. However, as these ethnic groups are nonetheless native, one 
would expect that some demand for an EMP would exist, though this demand is unlikely 
to be sufficient to sustain a political party, especially over the long run, as mainstream 
political parties may find a way to co-opt such support before it reaches critical mass. 
A third historical factor contributing to EMP formation is a history of 
dominance/autonomy. I distinguish here between those ethnic minority groups that have 
had some historical experience with autonomous self-rule (within the boundaries of their 
present state) and those that have not. Such autonomy could have occurred in one of two 
possible contexts. The first involves the ethnic group having once constituted a separate, 
independent political entity where it was able to rule itself. An example of this would be 
the kingdoms of Ireland and Scotland and the corresponding minority groups in the 
present day United Kingdom. The second involves the ethnic group having once 
constituted the dominant people-group in an ethnically heterogeneous political entity. 
This arrangement is exemplified by the Turkish minorities in modern-day states that were 
once in the dominion of the Ottoman Empire, as well as Hungarian minorities in states 
once ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In both types of cases, the ethnic group in 
question has had some (even if limited, or temporally distant) experience in governing 
itself, whether through enjoying its own separate state or exercising political hegemony 
over a larger, multi-ethnic state. 
The experience of autonomous self-rule encourages the formation of EMPs 
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through its influence on the political consciousness of the ethnic group in a similar 
manner to the other two historical factors described above. A previous experience of 
autonomy strengthens the notion of a right to some level of group autonomy in the 
present day. It encourages members of the group to conceive of themselves as a 
politically separate group, engaged in a struggle for group (rather than individual) rights. 
With such an historical background, attempts by mainstream parties to assimilate the 
group’s concerns into their broad political platforms may prove less palatable than 
forming a separate party asserting the separateness of the group and its right to some 
degree of self-governance. 
Here again, one would expect that the interaction between this and the other two 
historical variables would shape the mode of political participation the group chooses. 
Ultimately, we ought to find the strongest demand for an EMP in ethnic groups 
characterized by the presence of each of the three variables; that is, those ethnic groups 
that are native to their state, attached to a particular territory within that state, and who 
have had some past experience with ruling themselves. 
 The case that most clearly illustrates my theoretical argument is that of the 
contrast between Swedes in Finland and Finns in Sweden. These two ethnic minorities 
are similar in just about every way. Finns make up 5.1% of the population in Sweden 
whereas Swedes make up 5.4% of the population in Finland. The two groups are quite 
similar in their demographic composition (education, income, etc.) and live in 
neighboring states which are quite similar to each other on just about any relevant 
variable one could think of (demographics, culture, politics, etc.). Both minority groups 
have a neighboring state in which they comprise the largest ethnic group. Both minority 
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groups are geographically concentrated in a specific region of their respective state—
Finns in the southeastern part of Sweden, and Swedes in the southwestern part of Finland. 
 Yet despite all the similarities, Swedes in Finland have a successful EMP of their 
own, and Finns in Sweden do not. What could account for this difference? 
The Swedes have had a sizable historical presence on the territory of modern-day 
Finland since medieval times, when they first colonized the region. Swedish settlement of 
the region far precedes the inception of Finnish nationalism and the formation of the 
modern Finnish state. Further, Swedish settlement was geographically clustered in 
particular regions, located in the southwest of modern-day Finland, along the Swedish 
border. Lastly, the fact that the Swedes have historically played the role of conquerors in 
the region means that they have enjoyed a rich history of autonomy and self-rule within 
its confines. 
In contrast, the vast majority of Finns currently residing in Sweden came to the 
country as part of a migration wave originating in the middle of the 20th century, long 
after the formation of the modern Swedish state. Since the Finns cannot be thought of as 
native to Sweden, it makes no sense to ask the question of whether they exhibit a 
particular territorial attachment. Lastly, in contrast to Swedes in Finland, Finns in 
Sweden have no history of autonomous self-rule within the territorial confines of the 
modern-day Swedish state. 
With all the overwhelming similarities between these two groups on other 
dimensions, it does not seem like a stretch to suggest that these crucial differences along 
the three historical dimensions—historical presence, territorial attachment and 
dominance/autonomy—account for the presence of an EMP in the case of Swedes in 
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Finland, and its absence in the case of Finns in Sweden. 
 1.1 Historical factors and social psychology 
 The causal mechanisms through which historical factors influence the formation 
and success of EMPs can be more clearly understood by incorporating insights from 
social psychology, and more specifically Social Identity Theory (SIT). Emerging from 
the work of Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986), SIT posits that salient group memberships 
steer people’s attention toward their collective, rather than individual, identities. It is then 
these collective identities that primarily shape the social behavior of individuals. The 
underlying cause for this human tendency toward social identity formation is the desire 
for a positive self-image; people derive self-esteem from making favorable comparisons 
between their in-group and the out-group. 
 Ethnic identities can be recognized as a form of collective (or social) identity that 
influences the social behavior of individuals, and since politics is inherently embedded in 
a social context, this influence must certainly extend to the political sphere. It is evident 
that the nature and salience of these social identities should exert an influence on the 
strategies employed by ethnic minorities in their pursuit of adequate political 
representation. What remains to be examined is how the history of a people-group shapes 
that group’s collective identity, in turn encouraging it to pursue specific political 
strategies. 
I posit here that three variables outlined above—historical presence, territorial 
concentration and autonomy/dominance—exert an influence on the politicization 
potential of a group’s ethnic identity, as well as differences in its character, should it 
become politicized. These differences in the intensity and nature of politicization lead to 
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variation in the strategies ethnic groups employ in engaging the political system of their 
state. I argue that native groups with territorial attachment and experiences with 
autonomy will be more likely to form strong social identities. Further, the social identities 
of such ethnic minorities are more likely to become politicized and their politicization is 
more likely to provide the thrust for the formation of an ethnic minority party. 
Under what conditions do strong ethnic identities form? Tajfel pointed to the need 
for positive distinctiveness as the driving force behind social identity. In identifying 
themselves with a group, individuals seek to improve their self-image and heighten their 
self-esteem. The implication of this theoretical insight is that we are more likely to 
observe social identity formation among members of high-status groups than among 
members of low-status groups. The former can use group membership to positively 
distinguish themselves from others; the latter, meanwhile, must work hard to improve the 
group’s negative image before they can reap the rewards of membership (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). Members of low-status groups engage in what Tajfel and Turner termed 
“social mobility,” where individuals either reject their group membership or seek to 
identify with a higher-status group. 
The implications of Tajfel and Turner’s argument for ethnic identity formation—
that we should be least likely to observe strong ethnic identities among minority groups 
which occupy the lowest levels of the social hierarchy in their state—have received 
empirical support. For instance, Huddy and Virtanen’s (1995) study of Latino groups in 
the United States found that national identity was more prominent for Cubans than 
Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans. This difference was grounded in Cubans’ 
perceptions of their status in society as greatly exceeding that of other Latinos. Research 
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in sociology (Jackson et al, 1996; Taylor et al, 1987; Wright et al, 1990) has further 
confirmed the existence of social mobility among low-status groups. In the realm of 
ethnicity, this strategy is evidenced in the case of the Roma. One of the reasons why 
census figures of the size of Roma populations in Central and Eastern Europe are 
generally believed to be underestimated is that the Romani sometimes do not self-identify 
as such. They either reject any special group identity or assume an alternative identity 
(e.g., “Turks” in Bulgaria9 or “Egyptians” in Kosovo and Albania).10  
An ethnic group’s position within the social hierarchy of the state is very much 
contingent on its historical background. Even though factors such as educational 
attainment, income and discrimination experienced can be invoked to describe a people-
group’s social status, these factors themselves have historical roots. It seems intuitive that 
ethnic groups with a historical and territorially-concentrated presence would be more 
likely to develop the tools to protect themselves from the social exclusion and systematic 
denial of opportunities for advancement that often befalls more recently arrived and 
geographically dispersed groups. A previous experience with autonomy ought to further 
strengthen a group’s capacity to fend for itself and ensure it does not significantly lag 
behind the majority ethnic group in socio-economic development. 
However, history can influence a group’s perceived social status in a more 
fundamental and direct manner. An ethnic group’s conception of its position in society 
can have as much to do with the popular imagination as with the cold socio-economic 
                                                           
9 Vassilev, Rossen. "The Roma of Bulgaria: A pariah minority." The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 3.2 
(2004): 40-51. 
10 See Marushiakova, Elena, and Vesselin Popov. "New ethnic identities in the Balkans: the case of the 
Egyptians." Facta universitatis-series: Philosophy and Sociology 2.8 (2001): 465-477, and Ferri, 
Gianmarco, et al. "Y-STR variation in Albanian populations: implications on the match probabilities and 
the genetic legacy of the minority claiming an Egyptian descent." International journal of legal 
medicine 124.5 (2010): 363-370. 
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realities. One of the revelations in the SIT literature is that economically disadvantaged 
persons can engage in creative re-imaginings and re-framings of their collective identity 
in order to improve their social image. With respect to ethnic groups in particular, such 
efforts are most likely to be successful when grounded in history. Even an economically 
disadvantaged ethnic group can feel pride in its collective identity when it can call on 
some glorious (or at least respectable) past. Here the role of past autonomy or dominance 
plays a particularly important role in strengthening a group’s self-image, but a historical 
presence and territorial ties can also help enhance its status in its own eyes. 
To summarize, I argue that the ethnic groups most likely to either possess, or to 
be able to engineer the positive distinctiveness necessary for a strong ethnic identity, will 
be the ones that possess the favorable historical background on the three dimensions 
presented here. Ethnic groups of a less favorable background will be more likely to have 
a low social status, and therefore less likely to enjoy a strong ethnic identity. The absence 
of a strong ethnic identity will in turn limit a group’s ability to act collectively and 
politically to accomplish its goals; it will be detrimental to effective political participation 
in general, but particularly to the strong group identification and unified political action 
required to support an EMP. 
1.2 The politicization of ethnic identities 
 In addition to shaping the strength or salience of ethnic identities, historical 
factors could play a role in the extent to which these identities become politicized. Simon 
and Klandermans (2001) identify three steps leading to the politicization of collective 
identity. First, there must exist within the group an awareness of shared grievances—a 
sense that the group is suffering certain injustices or disadvantages compared to other 
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groups in society. Next, the group must find an external enemy to blame for its position 
of disadvantage. Finally, the group must appeal to a more powerful actor (such as 
national or supranational institutions, or the public at large) as an ally in its struggle. In 
the following paragraphs, I will discuss each of these steps in detail, and elucidate the 
role an ethnic group’s historical background could play in enabling or discouraging this 
progression toward politicization. 
 Within the field of social psychology, there exists a consensus that the presence of 
shared grievances is a necessary prerequisite for individuals to act on behalf of their 
group in a power struggle (Lalonde and Cameron 1994, Smith et al, 1994, Tajfel and 
Turner 1979, 1986; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984; Wright et al, 1990). Shared grievances 
are most often present where there is 1) a sense of illegitimate injustice or inequality, 2) a 
sudden, dramatic and unexpected event that heightens the group’s sense of being 
aggrieved and 3) a perceived threat of the loss of privileges enjoyed by the group. Simon 
and Klandermans (2001) stress that these grievances must be perceived as communal and 
not individual in order to facilitate politicization. 
 Minorities with a primarily native background are more likely to experience 
shared grievances than those with a primarily migrant background. While it is true that 
both native and non-native minorities can suffer injustice and inequality, it is the former 
group that is more likely to perceive unequal treatment as unjust. Relative Deprivation 
Theory (Runciman 1996, Gurr 1970, Olson et al 1986) proposes that the driving force 
behind feelings of dissatisfaction (and the collective action such feelings inspire) is a 
sense of discrepancy between what the group feels entitled to and what it is currently 
experiencing. Members of minorities with substantial historical roots are more likely to 
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feel entitled to be treated as fully equal members of society, and are more likely to feel 
aggrieved by treatment that falls short of that. In contrast, immigration often entails a 
sense of trade-offs, where migrants are more likely to accept an unequal status in society 
(at least temporarily), recognizing that migration will nevertheless produce an 
improvement on their previous living conditions. 
The different baselines of comparison for native and non-native groups will likely 
produce grievances that are of a different salience and intensity. Similarly, a past 
experience with autonomy may influence what an ethnic group perceives to be “the 
norm” regarding its position in society, setting a higher standard and provoking 
grievances if that standard is not met. 
Minorities with a native and autonomous background are also more likely to have 
experienced a sudden, dramatic event impacting their standing in society. For most of 
these groups, that event was the establishment of the modern state in which they reside. 
For groups such as the Turks in Bulgaria and the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, 
this represented a radical inversion of the hierarchy of ethnic relations and involved a 
sudden loss of power and status in society. Not all native/autonomous minorities have 
experienced dramatic events of a similar nature and magnitude, but the experience of 
suddenly finding oneself on “the wrong side of the border” is shared by many such 
groups. Since native/autonomous minorities were once “in charge,” their subsequent loss 
of power presents just the kind of dramatic and formative event that has been associated 
in the social psychology literature with a heightened sense of grievance.  
Similarly, we ought to find that the fear of the loss of privileges is more powerful 
for minorities of native/autonomous backgrounds. In order to be concerned with the loss 
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of privileges, one must have enjoyed privileges to begin with. Migrant groups rarely 
experience a position of privilege, whereas native groups are likely to not only have 
enjoyed a privileged status (whether through autonomous self-rule or through a more 
favorable position in the social hierarchy) at some point in their history but also to feel 
entitled to it based on historical precedent. 
Lastly, the grievances of native groups with territorial attachment are more likely 
to be perceived as collective in nature, whereas the grievances of non-native or non-
territorially concentrated groups are more likely to be perceived as individual. A 
historical presence on the territory of a given state, particularly when accompanied by a 
geographic clustering in a specific region (or regions), ought to engender a sense of 
community and collective rights within an ethnic group. This sense of group 
belongingness and interconnectedness will then influence how the ethnic minority frames 
grievances. 
In contrast, migrant groups may be less likely to view perceived mistreatment as a 
collective problem. Migration is primarily an individual or familial, not a collective act; 
the large-scale migration of a people group from one state into another is the result of an 
aggregation of a multitude of individual decisions. Migration is inextricably linked to 
individualism and the opportunity-seeking behavior of individuals. With such an 
historical background, an ethnic group’s members may be more likely to formulate their 
grievance at an individual, rather than collective, level. 
In addition to fostering the development of shared grievances, possession of the 
three historical characteristics ought to aid in the identification of an external enemy 
responsible for a group’s disadvantages. For instance, a group that once enjoyed 
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autonomy but had it taken away can identify the people-group (or at least its governing 
elite) that perpetrated this as its enemy. Similarly, a group with deep historical roots can 
more legitimately identify the majority ethnic group of the state (or the government 
apparatus acting on its behalf) as a domineering adversary, since such a group never 
consented to living in a state dominated by that particular ethnicity. In contrast, a 
predominantly migrant group did consent to such an arrangement, and therefore cannot as 
credibly cast the majority ethnic group as its enemy. Instead, non-historical minorities are 
more likely to rally against social ills like “racism,” “xenophobia” or “Islamophobia.” 
But equating “the enemy” with a concrete people-group (the dominant ethnicity) or 
institution (the state acting on behalf of that ethnicity) appears to be a much more 
powerful resource than equating it with an ambiguous concept. 
The last stage in the politicization of collective identity occurs when a group that 
believes it has been aggrieved by a particular adversary takes actions that involve an 
appeal to state institutions or the society at large to adjudicate the group’s grievances; in 
other words, the group adopts strategies (petitions, protests, acts of civil disobedience, 
etc.) which force these actors to “take sides”. I do not believe that there is anything about 
native minority groups that makes them inherently more likely to adopt such strategies 
than a migrant group in a similar position. Rather, I feel that the recourse to involving the 
state and society at large is nearly inevitable once a group with a strong ethnic identity 
has been able to identify both major grievances and a clearly defined “enemy”. Thus, it is 
simply because native minority groups are more likely to exhibit these characteristics 
(strong ethnic identity, shared grievances, common enemy) that they are also more likely 
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to seek to involve the state in their dispute, and consequently to give a distinctly political 
significance to their struggle. 
 2. Political opportunity structure 
 An alternative approach to answering the questions of why some ethnic minorities 
form their own parties is to appeal to concepts from political opportunity theory. Drawing 
on previous social movement scholarship, Kitschelt (1986) argues that the shape social 
movements in democratic states will assume is contingent on the political opportunity 
structure. He theorizes that the strategies employed by such movements are influenced by 
two factors—the open-ness or closed-ness of established political actors in the state to the 
input of the social movement, and the strength or weakness of the capacities of the state 
to implement the policies advocated by the movement. Characterizations based on these 
two dimensions lead to four possible pairs—open and strong, open and weak, closed and 
strong, closed and weak—each of which has implications for the strategies social 
movements adopt. Where the state is open to the social movement’s input, we are likely 
to observe an accommodative and cooperative relationship between the state and the 
social movement. However, when the state is closed to a movement’s input, the 
movement is likely to adopt a confrontational approach, particularly when the state’s 
capacities are strong (Kitschelt 1986: 66). 
 Although Kitschelt’s study focuses on the emergence of political movements, its 
theoretical insights shed light on the emergence of political parties as well. Kitschelt’s 
formulation of the political opportunity structure has been incorporated into studies of the 
formation and success of right-wing populist parties (Arzheimer and  Carter, 2006) and 
ethnic minority parties (Bernauer and Bochsler 2011).  
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While Kitschelt’s framework is adaptable to the study of ethnic party formation, I 
amend it in one way. While I incorporate a similar idea of an openness-closedness 
dimension—in this case describing the willingness of existing parties to accommodate 
ethnic minority demands—I employ a somewhat different conceptualization of the 
strength-weakness dimension. Since my concern here is not policy implementation, 
instead of focusing on the capacities of the state to implement policies favorable to an 
ethnic minority group, I consider the capacities of the ethnic minority group to mobilize 
to gain access to the state. Factors such as numerical strength, the salience of the ethnic 
identity, the group’s human and financial resources should all substantially influence an 
ethnic group’s potential for political mobilization, and hence its “strength.” 
 What combination of these categories (open versus closed, strong versus weak) 
will produce sufficient demand for the formation of an EMP? If the attitude of 
mainstream political parties (or at least one mainstream party) is one of accommodation 
to an ethnic minority’s concerns, and this ethnic minority is “weak,” we can expect that it 
is likely not to form a party of its own, as it will feel that its interests are best served by 
working through an established party (or multiple parties). However, if a minority is 
strong, it may still be tempted to form a party of its own, even with an accommodative 
strategy employed by the political mainstream, because it believes it can make its 
presence felt more strongly and accomplish more of its objectives in this way. There is no 
clear theoretical expectation in this scenario. 
What should we expect to observe if mainstream political parties are universally 
hostile or apathetic toward an ethnic minority group’s demands? In cases where the 
minority group is weak, we ought to see some limited demand for an EMP. While 
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members of the minority group may be dissatisfied at their exclusion from the political 
process, it is unclear whether the ambitious project of EMP formation will appear viable 
to them. However, if mainstream parties reject claims made by an ethnic minority group 
but that minority group is strong, we should expect to see substantial demand for an 
ethnic minority party. My theoretical expectations are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: The political opportunity structure and demand for an EMP. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3. International influences 
 In addition to the domestic determinants of ethnic minority party formation, we 
must also examine the influence of international actors in encouraging the establishment 
of such parties. As Tarrow (1994) points out, the presence of influential allies outside of 
the state can alter the state’s political opportunity structure and enable the emergence of a 
particular social movement. The same argument can be extended to apply to political 
parties as well. 
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In what way could international influence encourage or hinder the formation of an 
EMP in a particular state? While a minority group’s historical experiences can shape its 
political consciousness in such a way as to make the formation of an EMP seem 
appropriate and necessary, and the failure of mainstream political parties to incorporate 
minority concerns into their platforms could allow such a party to carve out a niche for 
itself in the state’s political system, there may be other obstacles that prevent the minority 
party from coming to fruition. Entrenched political elites in the state can establish legal 
barriers to entry for parties intended to represent minority groups. Whether or not these 
elites choose to do adopt such prohibitive strategies may in turn be influenced by pressure 
from international actors such as foreign governments and the European Union. 
 An illustrative example of such international influence comes in the case of the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in Bulgaria. In the wake of the “Revival 
Process” undertaken by the Bulgaria’s Communist regime in the 1980s, which involved 
the forceful assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turkish and Muslim citizens, there was substantial 
and near-unanimous worldwide condemnation of the country’s handling of its ethnic 
tensions. As a consequence, during the process of Bulgaria’s democratic transition, the 
international community was hopeful that the newly established Turkish minority party 
would be permitted to contest national elections.11 
That Bulgaria’s political elite was opposed to such a possibility is evident from 
the fact that the country’s democratic constitution, adopted on July 12, 1991, prohibits 
political parties on “ethnic, racial and religious lines” (Article 11.4). Yet when Bulgaria’s 
                                                           
11 This was attested to by several scholars and politicians I interviewed in Bulgaria, and is also evidenced 
by the positive reactions of international institutions such as the Council of Europe to the Bulgarian 
Constitutional Court’s decision in favor of the MRF’s constitutionality. See, for example: Official Report 
of Debates of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Volume I. Strasbourg, 1993 
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Constitutional Court took up the case of the MRF, a Turkish minority party in everything 
but name, it ruled the party to be constitutional. Curiously, when Bulgaria’s Roma 
minority attempted to establish a political party of their own—the Democratic Roma 
Union (DRU)—during the same period, they were denied. The Constitutional Court ruled 
the party to be in violation of Article 11.4, and Bulgaria’s Supreme Court concurred. The 
DRU was banned before it could contest any elections. 
 What accounts for the contrasting fates of the MRF and the DRU? While more 
than one factor was likely at play, most scholars of Bulgarian politics agree that the 
widespread advocacy (in the case of the MRF) and the complete absence thereof (in the 
case of the DRU) of international actors played a major role in shaping the affirmation of 
the constitutionality of the former party, and the preclusion from electoral entry of the 
latter. Appalled by Bulgaria’s treatment of its Turks, the international community 
(including numerous foreign governments, most notably Turkey, and international 
organizations such as the European Communities) pressured the country to permit the 
formation of a party protecting the rights of the Turkish community. No such 
international support was voiced in favor of a Roma EMP. 
 Drawing from the Bulgaria example, we can expect that we are less likely to see 
legal barriers to EMP entry, and more likely to observe unencumbered EMP formation 
whenever there is international support for the formation of such a party for a particular 
minority group in a particular state. It is important to stress that this support must be 
expressed with reference to a particular ethnic group, since a vague and general 
affirmation of the need for political representation of ethnic minorities is less likely to 
have sway over the politics of the state. There has to be concrete pressure to give a 
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particular ethnic group a vehicle for a political voice. 
Which international actors can we expect to be the most relevant in facilitating 
EMP formation? 
Since the region examined in this dissertation is Europe, we should expect the 
European Union (and prior to 1993, the European Communities) to be the most 
influential international actor in promoting minority party formation.12 The influence of 
the EU should be particularly strong in states that are either official candidates for 
membership in the organization or have serious ambitions of one day becoming 
members. Such states face incentives not to obstruct the formation and functioning of 
EMPs in order to demonstrate their commitment to the liberal and tolerant values 
espoused by the EU. 
Existing theoretical and empirical research is divided on the extent to which the 
European Union has influenced politics at the national level. Mair (2000) finds that the 
process of European integration has had little tangible effect in either introducing 
successful new parties or altering the ways existing ones relate to and compete with one 
another. In contrast, Gabel (2000) finds that European integration has introduced a new 
dimension of political competition in the UK and France, and Hix and Goetz (2000) 
suggest a variety of ways in which the EU has altered the strategies of domestic political 
actors. Ladrech (2008) argues that while the EU has exerted little to no influence on the 
party systems of West European states, the organization has “been a significant factor 
shaping the transition to democracy in general, and indirectly the parties themselves, with 
                                                           
12 Of course, we should also not underestimate the substantial influence that the Council of Europe and the 
European Convention on Human Rights have had in establishing minority rights norms on the continent. 
However, as the higher-profile and more lucrative of the two organizations, we can expect that European 
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political conditionality an important factor driving change” (p.149). This lends support to 
the expectation that EU influence ought to be particularly strong in states striving for EU 
membership. 
Additionally, we can expect that advocacy by a nearby kin state will increase the 
likelihood that a particular minority group remains unhindered in establishing a party of 
its own. States may be more likely to allow the formation of an EMP if they are afraid 
that by blocking such an attempt, they would be alienating a geographically proximate 
country. Bulgaria, for instance, may be more willing to allow the establishment of a 
Turkish party; Romania and Slovakia may be more willing to permit the formation of a 
Hungarian party. In contrast, ethnic minorities without a kin state (e.g. the Roma, Kurds) 
should not enjoy any such benefit, and their efforts to organize politically may be 
seriously challenged by the state. 
Of course, it is possible that the proximity of a kin state may backfire by 
engendering suspicion about the loyalties of a nascent ethnic minority party. Such parties 
may be perceived as instruments for the kin state to exert an influence on the politics of 
the host state, and thus may be treated with hostility by that state, or at least by the more 
nationalist parties of the majority ethnicity. However, there are additional ways in which 
kin states can bolster the likelihood for the emergence of an EMP. They can act as 
whistle-blowers to the international community, pointing out excessive barriers to the 
electoral entry of ethnically-based parties that may have otherwise been overlooked. 
Thus, we can expect kin states to exert indirect, as well as direct, pressure on states to 
permit the formation of EMPs. Additionally, kin states can offer assistance to incipient 
ethnic minority parties by providing them with the logistical (and perhaps even financial) 
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resources necessary to establish a political party genuinely capable of competing for 
votes.13 On the balance then, it appears reasonable to expect that the presence of a nearby 
or neighboring kin state should provide a net advantage for the establishment of an EMP. 
V. The Electoral Success of Ethnic Minority Parties 
 Many of the factors invoked in explaining the formation of ethnic minority parties 
ought to also influence the electoral performance of such parties, once they have been 
established. Factors pertaining to a minority group’s historical background, the party 
system of its state, and influences from international actors can have an impact on an 
EMP’s ability to attract and maintain electoral support over time. 
In sections 1 through 3 below, I will briefly describe how variables from these 
three groups can be expected to influence EMP success.  Then, in sections 4 and 5, I will 
introduce two other groups of variables—those pertaining the organizational 
characteristics of the minority party and the state’s political culture—that are necessary in 
supplementing the explanatory framework for EMP success. 
1. Historical factors 
The presence of the three historical factors—historical presence, territorial 
attachment and dominance/autonomy—ought to not only create the impetus for the 
creation of an EMP, but also to provide the conditions necessary for its sustained 
electoral success. An ethnically-based party will be more successful when making 
electoral appeals to a people-group whose psychology has been shaped by historical 
events so as to heighten and politicize the collective (ethnic) identity. Such ethnic 
                                                           
13 For an example of such direct minority support, see: The Orban government and the Hungarian minority 
in Romania, 2011. Hungarian Spectrum. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from: 
http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/the-orban-government-and-the-hungarian-minority-
in-romania/ 
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minorities can more easily be persuaded to consistently back a party grounded in 
ethnic—rather than ideological—distinctions. 
 2. Party system variables 
 It is not clear whether the variables pertaining to the political opportunity 
structure ought to continue to influence the electoral fortunes of EMPs beyond their 
initial emergence. The strategies mainstream political parties adopt with respect to the 
demands of minority groups might influence the propensity of such groups to support 
ethnically-based parties over time. Attempts by one or more political parties in a state to 
make inroads with ethnic minority voters, if successful, would weaken an EMP’s 
monopoly over its target electorate and hurt its electoral prospects. The prospect of 
gaining the backing and protection of a major, influential political party could influence 
minority voters to switch their allegiances, while the opportunity to play an active role 
within the structure of such a party could prove tempting for members of the group who 
have personal political ambitions. 
However, it is not clear how successful such after-the-fact initiatives at making 
inroads with minority voters are likely to be. Indeed, it seems that a mainstream party’s 
ability to credibly present itself as a defender of a minority group’s interests would 
diminish substantially following the formation of an EMP. The establishment of an 
ethnically-based party means that mainstream parties are not merely running as being for 
a people-group; they must also necessarily run against an existing EMP. This puts parties 
in a difficult position where overt criticism of an existing ethnic party could be seen as 
anti-minority rhetoric and actually damage a party’s chances of making inroads into that 
voting bloc. On the other hand, failing to criticize the EMP or the quality and 
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extensiveness of political representation it offers to its group means the party would fail 
to offer any reasons for members of the group to alter their allegiances. Additionally, 
efforts by mainstream parties to appeal to minority voters could themselves be presented 
as a consequence of the EMP’s emergence, and cited as evidence of its effectiveness. 
Thus, it is not clear that the political positions of major, mainstream political parties 
ought to have a significant effect on that party’s ability to achieve electoral success. 
 While the strategies adopted by mainstream political parties are unlikely to affect 
the electoral prospects of EMPs, we must also consider the influence of parties outside of 
the political mainstream. In particular, it seems intuitive that the presence of a strong 
right-wing populist (RWP) party in a state could bolster the vote share for EMPs. Like all 
parties, EMPs should be most successful when, in addition to communicating to voters 
what they are fighting for, they are able to clearly articulate what they are fighting 
against. The parties of the populist right, characterized by their nativist appeals against 
ethno-cultural pluralism, make the perfect foil for ethnic minority parties. The 
provocative pronouncements such parties frequently make with respect to ethnic minority 
groups can be used by EMPs as evidence for the need for a strong counter-mobilization 
of minority voters. Of course, in order for minority parties to utilize the rhetoric of RWP 
parties in mobilizing their own electorate, the latter must have achieved at least some 
level of success and recognition.  We should then expect that the presence of a 
prominent, electorally successful RWP party in a state should strengthen the electoral 
support of ethnic minority parties in that state. Koev (2014) examines the other direction 
of this proposed relationship, finding that ethnic minority parties contribute to the success 
of the populist right; it seems plausible to expect that the reverse effect takes place as 
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well. 
 3. International influences 
 Can we expect the influence of international factors to go beyond facilitating the 
mere entry of an ethnic minority party and impact that party’s likelihood of electoral 
success? It seems that while there are good reasons to believe that support for kin states 
could contribute to bolstering the electoral performance of EMPs, it is unlikely that the 
European Union could offer the same level of assistance. 
There are various ways in which kin states—especially bordering kin states—can 
contribute to the electoral success of an EMP. First, kin state residents sometimes include 
dual nationals who may be eligible to vote in the elections that the minority party is 
contesting. EMPs can gain an advantage by utilizing their connections in kin states to 
mobilize voters outside of the boundaries of their country and work around the logistical 
challenges to those voters being able to cast their vote. This effect can be particularly 
strong when the minority group the party represents has a kin state that shares a border 
with the state where the election takes place. For instance, Bulgaria’s Turkish-minority 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party is well-known for organizing “electoral 
excursions” where Turkish residents with Bulgarian citizenship and transported to 
Bulgaria around election dates.14 The ability to obtain votes from outside the borders of 
the state can be a valuable asset in generating the necessary support to obtain legislative 
representation. 
Second, kin states can provide a valuable informational and strategic advantage to 
EMPs that in turn could bolster these parties’ performance in elections. Ethnic minority 
                                                           
14 Bulgaria Expats in Turkey Mobilized to Back DPS in Elections. 2009. Retrieved on May 9, 2014 from 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/105337/Bulgarian+Expats+in+Turkey+Mobilized+to+Back+DPS+in+Ele
ctions 
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parties often establish connections with successful political parties in the relevant kin 
state, seeking to gain a strategic advantage by learning from these parties. The 
relationship is symbiotic, with the kin state party seeking to obtain visibility and 
influence in the state of the EMP, with a view toward increasing its own voter base by 
recruiting dual-citizenship expatriates. For instance, it is quite common for Russophile 
parties in former Soviet republics to work with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party, and 
EMPs throughout former Yugoslav republics often go as far as to share the name of one 
of the dominant political parties in their ethnic group’s kin state (consider, for instance, 
the Bosnian-minority Party of Democratic Action parties in Serbia and Kosovo, or the 
Serbian Radical Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Third, connections established with co-ethnic business elites in the kin state could 
enable EMP leaders to attract foreign investment in regions where the party and its target 
ethnic group enjoy a significant presence, with the resulting economic gains being used to 
strengthen and expand the party’s control of these localities. Ethnic minority parties can 
tout their track record of attracting investment to present themselves as the champions of 
the people in the region, as well as distribute jobs generated by such investment on a 
clientelistic basis. For instance, Bulgaria’s MRF has been known to attract investment 
from Turkish businesses into parts of the country where Turks constitute a substantial 
share of the population and where the party enjoys control over local government, using 
the resulting economic benefits to strengthen its electoral monopoly. 
It is important to note that none of the avenues for kin state influence described 
above necessarily imply the active involvement of the kin state government; rather, the 
mere existence of a nearby kin state appears in itself to provide EMPs with a host of 
49 
 
 
strategic advantages in successfully contesting elections. The state itself could also 
choose to intervene, of course, and there is evidence that this has happened in some 
cases—most notably in Hungary’s relationship with the Hungarian minority parties in 
Romania and Slovakia.15 But we need not posit that kin state governments pursue an 
active agenda of EMP empowerment in order to suppose that the existence of such states 
aids the electoral performance of minority parties. 
In contrast to the quite plausible relationship between nearby kin states and EMP 
electoral performance, it is not clear that international organizations like the European 
Union ought to play a significant role in enabling such parties to attract support. While 
the EU may use its persuasive power to discourage existing and potential member states 
from banning or encumbering ethnic minority parties, or from otherwise disenfranchising 
ethnic minority voters, the organization has neither the scope nor interest to ensure the 
vitality of such parties. Not only is it hard to believe that the EU is particularly concerned 
with fluctuations in minority party vote share, but any efforts to improve the fortunes of 
such parties could be seen as unwelcome meddling in national politics. 
If the European Union plays any role in bolstering EMP success, it is most likely 
one that is both passive in nature and minimal in its effects. For instance, the 
organization’s framework could provide opportunities for trans-national linkages between 
EMPs across the continent, enabling them to share information and gain new insights. 
However, it is unclear how beneficial such interactions would turn out to be in practice, 
as the recipe for electoral success can vary substantially from state to state and from 
target voting bloc to target voting bloc. Minority parties may also gain some legitimacy at 
                                                           
15 See, for instance: The Orban government and the Hungarian minority in Romania, 2011. Hungarian 
Spectrum. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from: http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/the-orban-
government-and-the-hungarian-minority-in-romania/ 
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home by becoming members of one of the major political groups of the European 
Parliament, but this seems unlikely to result in substantial or lasting electoral gains. In 
fact, Spirova and Stefanova (2012) find that in the Romanian case, the 2007 and 2009 
European Parliament elections contributed to the weakening of the Democratic Union of 
Hungarians in Romania’s monopoly over the ethnic Hungarian vote by encouraging 
intra-ethnic competition on ideological grounds. 
Additionally, EU candidate states may seek to give such ethnic minority parties a 
more prominent role in national politics as a way of demonstrating tolerance and 
liberality. It can be noted, for instance, that EMPs in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia 
were included in coalition governments while their respective states were in the process 
of acceding to the EU. Participation in government may in turn have strengthened the 
ability of these parties to generate electoral support (all three recorded gains in vote share 
in the following election), as it may have allowed them to allocate state resources in a 
strategic and targeted manner. However, such instances of EU influence are relatively 
few in number and duration, and they are predicated on an indirect and inconclusive 
causal mechanism. There are a number of instances where EMPs have been included in 
coalition governments without the dangling carrot of EU membership, and where 
participation in government has not yielded subsequent electoral gains. 
Overall, it seems that there are few avenues through which the European Union 
could directly or indirectly impact the electoral fortunes of ethnic minority parties, even 
though minority rights in themselves are more visibly on the EU agenda. 
4. Political culture variables 
An additional factor we ought to consider in explaining the electoral success of 
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ethnic minority parties is the political culture of the state in which the party competes. In 
particular, I believe that EMPs ought to be most successful when they contest elections in 
states where clientelistic practices are more commonplace. 
Ethnic minority parties are likely to benefit disproportionately from the presence 
and acceptance of clientelism because they are better suited than non-ethnic parties to 
develop a stable, reliable and effective network of patron-client linkages. Establishing 
and maintaining such a network among an ethnic minority population entails fewer costs 
because such groups tend to live in tight-knit, geographically-concentrated (at the 
neighborhood level) communities that are bound together by a common culture and a 
common status in society. The spatial clustering and shared characteristics of minority 
groups ought to make them more amenable to influence by a local patron. Additionally, 
social and religious institutions unique to the group may provide a supply of influential 
community leaders who can be recruited as patrons. 
Once such ethnic patron-client networks are established, they are unlikely to be 
easily challenged by non-ethnic parties. Those local leaders who attempt to defect by 
throwing their support behind a different party can easily be discredited as “traitors” to 
their ethnic group and their local community, while clients who refuse to support the 
party can be easily identified and punished by the withdrawal on the benefits previously 
conferred upon them. The same tight-knit social structures that facilitate the development 
of clientelistic networks also make it more likely that these networks will survive 
challenges from rival parties. 
In contrast, political systems primarily characterized by programmatic—rather 
than clientelistic—competition do not appear to entail a natural advantage for ethnic 
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minority parties. In such systems, political ideology tends to play a more significant role 
in voting choices, and thus non-ethnic, ideologically-based parties ought to stand a better 
chance of attracting support among ethnic minorities. That is not to suggest that minority 
parties could not be successful in making programmatic appeals to their electorate; rather, 
they simply do not seem to enjoy any particular advantage over non-ethnic parties under 
such competition. (In fact, a heavily programmatic focus could prove perilous for 
minority parties as it may exacerbate ideological tensions and divisions within the party, 
leading to the kind of factionalism and splintering that can be deadly for a party with a 
small electorate.) Further, EMP monopolies over the target electorate would be less likely 
to emerge or last, as supporters of the party could be persuaded to change their allegiance 
without the threat of economic loss and social ostracism. 
Thus, I expect that ethnic minority parties will be more successful in states where 
parties tend to compete for votes by clientelistic practices, rather than by making 
programmatic appeals. 
5. Party organization variables 
 In order to paint a complete picture of the determinants of EMP success, we must 
also consider which organizational characteristics contribute to the vitality of such 
parties. Three factors—the professionalization of the party’s central organization, its rules 
for intra-party advancement and its ability to rely on ties to societal groups—ought to be 
particularly important in producing strong electoral results. 
 As discussed earlier in this chapter and suggested by Chandra (2004), 
opportunities for intra-party advancement ought to play a role in ethnic minority party 
success. In order for a party to attract the support of an ethnic group, it must demonstrate 
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that it is capable of continually placing members of that community in positions of power 
and influence. If an EMP has a stagnant, set-in-stone leadership with few opportunities 
for upward mobility for rank-and-file members, aspiring politicians from the target ethnic 
group are more likely to join other parties or form parties of their own. As they do this, 
not only will they draw votes away from the EMP, but also deprive it of their competence 
and innovation. In contrast, ample opportunities for advancement within the party ought 
to produce loyal party members who are committed to working tirelessly for the 
organization, because they know that their turn will come and that their contributions will 
be eventually be rewarded. Thus, we should expect that EMPs with greater opportunities 
for intra-party advancement will be more likely to thrive. 
 Tavits (2012) finds that three variables pertaining to a party’s organizational 
structure play a major role in its ability to consistently attract electoral support—the 
professionalization of the party’s central organization, the extensiveness of its 
organizational structure, and its membership size. With respect to EMPs in particular, it 
seems that the latter two of these factors should not be adequate explanations of electoral 
success. This is because an ethnically-based party has a rigidly defined potential 
electorate, with limited room for expansion through cross-ethnic appeal. Party 
membership has a natural upper bound, and the geographical extensiveness of the 
organizational structure is likewise limited to the localities in which there is a substantial 
population of the target minority group. Variation among ethnic groups on these two 
dimensions would be largely influenced by variation in population size and geographic 
dispersion. In contrast, the professionalization of the party’s central organization could be 
a highly significant influence in EMPs long-term success. Regardless of whether they are 
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ethnic or not, parties with professional, permanent and specialized staff ought to be more 
capable of navigating the challenges of electoral politics, and ought to be better at helping 
their party avoid the missteps that imperil its very existence. 
 In their study of the causes of lasting success in newly formed parties, Bolleyer 
and Bitzek (2013) identify an additional organizational factor that ought to play a role in 
EMP success. The authors find that those parties that can rely on ties to societal groups 
that pre-date the formation of the party are more likely to enjoy success lasting beyond 
the party’s initial parliamentary breakthrough. In contrast, parties formed by individual 
entrepreneurs that cannot rely on such ties are less likely to experience sustained electoral 
success. This factor could very well be influential in EMPs’ electoral success, as those 
parties that have ties to established civil society organizations (for instance, religious 
institutions) ought to have an advantage over those for who no such support structure 
exists, and there is considerable variability on this dimension across different ethnic 
minority groups in Europe. 
 VI. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have drawn insights from history and social psychology to 
develop a unique theory for the emergence and success of ethnic minority parties. I have 
argued that an ethnic minority group’s historical background influences its political 
engagement strategies through sociopsychological processes, proposing that native, 
territorially attached and historically autonomous groups are more likely to form ethnic 
minority parties, and that EMPs formed by such groups are more likely to enjoy electoral 
success. Groups possessing one or more of these characteristics are prone to exhibit the 
traits of positive distinctiveness and shared grievances, contributing to the development 
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of a salient collective political identity. Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as 
native to their state and region, and groups that have enjoyed autonomy are more likely to 
feel entitled to the particular form of representation provided by an ethnic minority party, 
and more likely to generate sufficient electoral support to sustain such a party. 
In addition to developing this original theory, I have synthesized a number of 
existing theoretical approaches to the study of electoral politics, re-formulating them to 
the particular context of this study in order to develop a comprehensive framework 
addressing ethnic minority party entry and success in Europe. I have argued that we are 
more likely to observe EMP entry for sizable minority groups whose concerns are not 
adequately addressed by the major political parties of their state, as well as for groups 
that have valuable international allies in the form of the European Union and/or a 
bordering kin state. With respect to EMP success, I have argued that the presence of a 
prominent right-wing populist party in the political system, the prevalence of clientelistic 
practices in the state, the existence of nearby kin state and the presence of an extensive 
party organizational structure with ample opportunity for intra-party advancement are all 
factors bolstering the electoral performance of ethnic minority parties. 
In the following two chapters, I test my theoretical expectations with a multi-
method approach combining a large-N quantitative analysis and a detailed case study. 
Within the context of my quantitative study in Chapter III, I test all of my predictions 
with the exception of those pertaining to party organization variables. There is simply 
insufficient data to study the impact of these variables in a quantitative, cross-national 
setting. I do, however, examine these theoretical expectations, along with all others 
developed in this chapter, in my case study of Bulgarian ethnic politics in Chapter IV. 
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III. Quantitative analysis 
 I. Introduction 
 In order to test the theoretical expectations developed in the previous chapter, I 
perform a quantitative analysis on a large-N, cross-national dataset of European elections 
in the period 1990-2012. The questions I seek to answer are, first, what factors make 
minority groups more likely to use ethnic minority parties in contesting national 
legislative elections, and second, what factors contribute to the success of such parties 
once they have been formed? 
I find substantial evidence that two of the variables in my Historical-Sociological-
Psychological (HSP) framework—historical presence and dominance/autonomy are 
significant predictors of EMP entry and success. Further, I find some evidence that 
candidacy for EU accession improves the likelihood of minority party entry in the 
candidate state, and that the presence of a strong right-wing populist party increases the 
probability that an EMP will achieve electoral success, although neither of these effects is 
especially strong. In contrast, I find no evidence that the attitudes of the major political 
parties in the state toward ethnic minorities influence those minorities’ decisions of 
whether to form an EMP or not. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II describes my approach in classifying 
minority groups as “ethnic” and parties as “ethnic minority parties.” Section III provides 
a broad overview of the data used in the quantitative analyses in sections IV and V. 
Section IV tackles the question of why some ethnic minority groups contest elections 
with EMPs whereas others do not. Section V examines why some groups are successful 
in obtaining legislative representation through ethnic minority parties, whereas others are 
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not. Finally, I offer my conclusions in Section VI. 
 II. Defining the universe of cases 
 Before exploring the questions of why some minority groups choose to contest 
elections through ethnic minority parties, and why some of these parties fail while others 
succeed, we must first consider how to delimit the universe of cases used in the analysis. 
In order to do this, we must answer two questions. First, how do we define ethnicity and 
what makes a group ethnic in nature? In order to study ethnic minorities’ political 
strategies, we must be able to distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic minority groups.  
Second, how do we classify a political party as an ethnic minority party? We have to be 
able to distinguish between ethnically-based and non-ethnically based parties. These 
questions are addressed in the sections that follow. 
1. What is an ethnic minority group? 
 Social scientists have found ethnicity to be a frustratingly nebulous concept, one 
that does not lend itself to a simple, unambiguous and universally accepted definition. 
Nevertheless, most recent conceptualizations of ethnicity can be traced back to Donald 
Horowitz’s seminal work Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985). Horowitz espoused a broad 
definition of ethnicity, believing ethnicity to encompass identification based on multiple 
characteristics, including skin color, language, and religion. Horowitz advocated that a 
wide variety of groups—from races to tribes, from castes to nationalities—can be 
considered ethnic in nature. 
With such an umbrella definition of ethnicity, perhaps the better question is what 
cannot be considered an ethnic group. For Horowitz, the distinction between ethnic and 
non-ethnic groups lies in the fact that the former are defined by descent-based 
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identification whereas the latter are not. It is important to clarify here that what is 
necessary for the presence of an ethnic identity is the idea of common descent, whether 
or not this idea is grounded in reality. Thus, for Horowitz even imagined or constructed 
identities are ethnic if they appeal to the concept of common descent. 
 I espouse a conception of ethnicity very much in the Horowitz tradition. One 
might object here that adopting such a broad definition of ethnicity poses a challenge—
particularly for performing cross-national research—in that it encourages the researcher 
to compare apples to oranges. While this is a valid concern, one must also consider the 
alternative. I believe that the implementation of the descent criteria does a sufficiently 
good job of distinguishing between ethnic and non-ethnic groups, in that any variation 
that may exist within disparately defined ethnic groups ought to be eclipsed by the more 
substantial differences between ethnic and non-ethnic groups. Further, breaking down 
ethnicity into its various components and studying each separately would seriously 
constrain the number of cases available for analysis, undermining both the empirical 
accuracy and the explanatory power of the resulting findings. 
 A number of scholars have built on the work of Horowitz to derive definitions of 
the term “ethnic group” specific to the context of their research. Among these definitions, 
the one which stands out for both its parsimony and its broad applicability, and the one 
which I shall henceforth adopt, is that developed by Chandra (2006, 2008, 2011). 
Chandra conceptualizes an ethnic group as a subset of the population of a state, 
membership in which is contingent upon the possession of one or more descent-based 
attributes. These attributes include “region, religion, sect, language family, language, 
dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one’s parents or ancestors, or one’s own 
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physical features” (Chandra 2011). Groups defined as ethnic must be sufficiently large 
that not all of their members are personally known or related to each other, excluding 
very small sub-groups such as the family. Further, if membership to an ethnic group can 
be attributed to one sibling, it should be attributed to all siblings; this allows us to exclude 
divisions on minor physical and genetic variations like eye or hair color as traits that 
signify membership to a separate ethnic group. 
I see no need to further narrow down the criteria for what constitutes an ethnic 
group, as some scholars have elected to do. For instance, I do not make any distinction 
between “visible” and “invisible” minorities, as Bird (2005) does. While it is true that 
race-based ethnic differences may be more easily observable than those based on 
language and religion, this does not mean that they are more salient, and many ethnic 
groups whose defining characteristics are “invisible” in a literal sense are quite visible in 
a social sense. 
 With the bases for establishing the ethnic nature of a group in place, it is now time 
to examine which ethnic groups we ought to study. Since the focus of my dissertation is 
on the political mobilization of ethnic minorities, the largest ethnic group in each state 
cannot be considered. Beyond that, however, there is considerable latitude in determining 
the breadth of the sample of ethnic minority groups. Within the literature on ethnic 
minority parties, there is broad range of inclusiveness, from studies that consider only the 
largest ethnic minority group in a state (Kostadinova, 2007) to those that include virtually 
every ethnic minority group, no matter how small as a percentage of the population 
(Bernauer and Bochsler, 2011, Ishiyama, 2009). 
 I feel that the correct specification lies somewhere between these two extremes, 
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though it is difficult to pinpoint a precise threshold for inclusion. Limiting my analysis to 
only the largest ethnic minority group in a state would omit many sizable ethnic groups 
that have potential for political engagement and would severely diminish the size of my 
sample. On the other hand, some ethnic minority groups are so small in membership that 
they have virtually no potential to make an impact on national politics, whichever 
strategy they choose to engage their state’s political system. 
For this reason, I consider only ethnic groups that constitute at least 1% of their 
state’s population. It could be argued that the threshold should be set higher, since 
thresholds of parliamentary representation are often more substantial than 1%. However, 
this ignores the diverse set of electoral laws of European states. Some proportional 
representation (PR) democracies have no electoral threshold, while others have special 
quotas for the parliamentary representation of minorities. Additionally, a small but 
geographically concentrated ethnic minority group could conceivably obtain 
representation under single member district (SMD) and mixed electoral systems. Lastly, 
an ethnic minority group can “punch above its weight” if its voter turnout is higher than 
the national average. For these reasons, I feel that while a 1% threshold is somewhat 
arbitrary, it does a reasonably good job of capturing those ethnic groups which could 
plausibly be capable of effectively engaging the politics of their state. 
2. What is an ethnic minority party? 
Much like defining what an ethnic group is, defining what an ethnic party is can 
be challenging. The two broad approaches taken in the ethnic politics literature are to 
classify parties as ethnic based on either their self-identification or their electoral basis of 
support. 
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One could define a political party as ethnic based on whether or not it has an 
explicit reference to an ethnic group in its name. However, not all parties which have an 
ethnic affiliation in their name are predominantly concerned with ethnic issues, and a 
closer examination of a party’s platform may be necessary to determine its ethnic or non-
ethnic nature. Further, some parties that do not choose to officially label themselves as 
ethnic can be very much focused on defending the interests of a particular ethnic group, 
and can generate the vast majority of their electoral support from that group. Using the 
self-identification criteria alone would exclude parties which are ethnic in nature but 
avoid labeling themselves as such for fear of being antagonized or painted as radical, or 
simply because there are laws prohibiting the formation of ethnicity-based parties, as is 
the case with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria. 
 The electoral support approach to identifying ethnic parties itself has been 
implemented differently by different scholars, with two approaches being most common. 
The first of these asks the question “Does the party in question receive a substantial 
majority of its votes from a specific ethnic group?” The second asks “Does a majority of 
a specific ethnic group vote for the party in question?” The first approach is therefore 
concerned with the extent to which the party’s existence and success hinges on support 
from a specific ethnic group, whereas the second approach is concerned with the extent to 
which members of an ethnic group identify themselves with, and show allegiance to, a 
certain party. 
 I believe that the first approach is more appropriate in gauging whether a party is 
ethnically-based or not. The problem with the second approach is that there are many 
successful parties with non-ethnic political platforms that nonetheless capture the 
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majority vote of several different ethnic groups. Consider, for instance, the Democratic 
Party in the United States—it consistently receives overwhelming support from both 
black and Jewish voters, yet few would consider it to be an ethnic party. Since this 
second approach would tend to categorize merely successful political parties as ethnic 
ones, I prefer not to utilize it. The first approach is more appropriate because it serves as 
an excellent proxy for the extent to which a party represents an ethnic group. If the vast 
majority of a party’s electoral base is concentrated in a single ethnic group, then that 
party must—for motives of pure self-interest—make that group happy in order to ensure 
its own survival. 
 I utilize an approach to classifying ethnic minority parties that combines aspects 
of both the self-identification and electoral support approaches mentioned above. Figure 
3.1 describes the steps I take in determining whether a party is ethnic or not. 
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Figure 3.1: Ethnic/non-ethnic party classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 With these rules as a guide, I identify ethnic minority groups in all democratic1 
                                                           
1 I consider as democratic those states which received a rating of 3 or lower on both the “Political Rights” 
and “Civil Liberties” indices in the 2011 release of Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World.”  
Does the name of the 
party feature the name of 
an ethnic minority group? 
Yes. 
Is representing the interests 
of this ethnic group central 
in the party’s platform? 
No. 
Yes. 
 
No. 
Does the vast majority of the party’s 
electoral support come from a 
specific ethnic minority group? 
Yes. 
Not an ethnic 
minority party. 
No. 
Ethnic minority 
party. 
Ethnic minority 
party. 
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European2 states that meet the size requirement discussed earlier (they comprise at least 
1% of their state’s population), along with any ethnic minority parties they have ever 
formed in order to contest national legislative elections. These ethnic groups and parties 
are presented in Table 3.1 below. Within the population of EMPs presented, I further 
distinguish between successful and unsuccessful parties, with the former being those that 
have consistently obtained legislative representation throughout their existence. (I discuss 
my operationalization of EMP success in greater detail in section V, which examines the 
determinants of such success.) 
  
                                                           
2 I consider as European only those states to the west of the Caucasus, to the north of (or in) the 
Mediterranean Sea and to the east of (or in) the Atlantic Ocean. 
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Table 3.1: Ethnic minority groups and their parties 
STATE ETHNIC GROUP 
(% of population) 
Ethnic minority parties (period contesting elections) Successful? 
Albania 
Greeks (4 %) 
Democratic Union of the Greek Minority (1991) 
yes 
Unity for Human Rights party (1992-present) 
Roma (1.4%) None  
Austria 
Muslims (4.2%) None  
Turks (3.2%) None  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Serbs (31.5%) 
 
Serbian Democratic Party (1990-present) 
yes Serbian Radical Party (1996-2005) 
Serbian Radical Party—VSB (2005) 
Croats (17.3%) 
Croatian Democratic Union (1990-present) 
yes 
New Croatian Initiative (1996-present) 
Croatian Party of Rights (1996, 2005) 
Croats Together (2005) 
Bulgaria 
Turks (8.8%) Movement for Rights and Freedoms (1990-present) yes 
Roma (4.9%) Evroroma (2005) no 
Croatia Serbs (4.5%)  
Serb Democratic Party (1990) yes 
Serb People’s Party (1992) yes 
Serb People’s Party (1995, 2000) no 
Czech 
Republic 
Moravians (4.9%) 
Moravian National Party (1996) no 
Moravian Democratic Party (1998-2002) no 
Moravians (2006-present) no 
Slovaks (1.4%) None  
Denmark 
Muslims (4%) None  
Turks (1%) None  
Estonia 
Russians (25.6%) 
Estonian United People’s Party (1995-2003) yes 
Russian Party in Estonia (1995-1999) no 
Russian Party in Estonia (2003-present) no 
Ukrainians (2.1%) None  
Belarusians (1.1%) None  
Finland Swedes Swedish People’s Party (1906-present) yes 
France 
Muslims (9%) None  
Algerians (3.1%) None  
Moroccans (2 %) None  
Germany 
Muslims (5.4%) None  
Turks (5%) None  
Greece Albanians (4.3%) None  
Hungary 
Roma (5%) 
Gypsy Solidarity Party (1994) no 
Hungarian Gypsies Democratic Party (1998) no 
Hungarian Roma Party (2002) no 
Democratic Roma Party (2002) no 
Party of Roma Solidarity (2006) no 
Germans (2.4%) None  
Italy Muslims (3.9%) None  
Kosovo 
Serbs (7%) 
Independent Liberal Party (2010) yes 
United Serbian List (2010) yes 
Serb Democratic Party (2010) no 
Serb People’s Party (2010) no 
Turks (1%) Turkish Democratic Party (2010) yes 
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
 
 Kosovo Turkish Union (2010) no 
Roma (2.3%) United Roma Party of Kosovo (2010) no 
Bosniaks (2.2%) 
Vakat Coalition (2010) yes 
Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo 
(2010) 
no 
Party of Democratic Action (2010) no 
Latvia 
Russians (26.9%) 
National Harmony Party (1993-1998) yes 
Equal Rights (1993) yes 
Party of Russian Citizens in Latvia (1993-1995) yes 
For Human Rights in United Latvia (2002-2011) yes 
Harmony Centre (2011) yes 
Belarusians (3.3%) None  
Ukrainians (2.2%) None  
Poles (2.2%) None  
Lithuanians (1.2%) None  
Lithuania 
Poles (6.1%) Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (1992-2008) yes 
Russians (4.8%) Union of Russians in Lithuania (1996) yes 
Macedonia 
Albanians (22.7 %) 
Party for Democratic Prosperity (1990-2006) yes 
Democratic Union for Integration (2002-2011)  yes 
Democratic Party of Albanians (2002-2011) yes 
National Democratic Party (2002) yes 
Turks (4.0 %) Democratic Party of Turks (1994) yes 
Serbs (2.1 %) Democratic Party of Serbs (1998) yes 
Roma (2.2 %) 
Union of Roma in Macedonia (2002) no 
United Party of the Roma in Macedonia (2006) no 
Montenegro 
Serbs (28.7 %) 
Serb List (2006-2009) yes 
New Serb Democracy (2009) yes 
Bosniaks/Muslims 
(11.9 %) 
Bosniak Party (2006) yes 
Bosniaks and Muslims Together, As One (2009) yes 
Albanians 
Democratic League in Montenegro (2006) yes 
Democratic Union for Albanians (2006-present) yes 
New Democratic Power – FORCA (2006-present) yes 
Albanian Alternative (2006) no 
Albanian List (2009) no 
Albanian Coalition – Perspective (2009) no 
Netherlands 
Muslims (5.5%) None  
Turks (2.3%) None  
Indonesians (2.3%) None  
Moroccans (2.1%) None  
Surinamese (2.1%) None  
Norway Muslims (2%) None  
Romania 
Hungarians (6.6%) 
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (1990-
2008) 
yes 
Roma (2.5%) Party of the Roma (1990-2008) no 
Serbia 
Hungarians (3.9%) 
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (2000, 2007, 
2012) 
yes 
Hungarian Coalition (2008) yes 
Bosniaks (1.8%) 
Bosniak Democratic Party of Sanjak (2003) no 
List for Sanjak (2007-2008) no 
Party of Democratic Action of Sanjak (2012) no 
Roma (1.4%) 
Roma Union of Serbia (2007) no 
Roma Party (2007-2008) no 
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
Slovakia 
Hungarians (8.5%) 
Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (1990-
1992) 
yes 
Hungarian Civic Party (1992) yes 
Party of the Hungarian Coalition (1994-present) yes 
Most-Hid (2010-present) yes 
Roma (2.0%) Roma Civic Initiative (1994, 2002, 2010) no 
Slovenia 
Serbs (2%) None  
Croats (1.8%) None  
Bosnians (1.3%) None  
Spain 
Catalans (17%) 
Convergence and Union (1979-2011) yes 
Republican Left of Catalonia (2004-2008) yes 
Basques (2%) 
Basque Nationalist Party (1977-2011) yes 
Herri Batasuna (1986-1996) yes 
Basque Solidarity (1989-2004) no 
Amaiur (2011) yes 
Sweden 
Finns (5%) None  
Muslims (5%) None  
Iraqis (1.3%) None  
Switzerland 
Muslims (4.3%) None  
Serbs (2.5%) None  
Portuguese (2.4%) None  
Spanish (1.2%) None  
Turkey 
Kurds (18%) 
People’s Democratic Party (1995-1999) no 
Democratic People’s Party (2002) no 
Democratic Society Party (2007) yes 
Peace and Democracy Party (2011) yes 
Arabs (2.1%) None  
Ukraine Russians (17.2%) 
Party of Regions (1998-present) yes 
Russian Party (2002) no 
Russian Bloc (2002) no 
United 
Kingdom 
Scots (9%) Scottish National Party (1935-present) yes 
Welsh (4.1%) Plaid Cymru (1974-present) yes 
Irish (2.4%) Sinn Fein (1924-present) yes 
Blacks (2.8%) None  
Muslims (2.7%) None  
Indian (1.8%) None  
Pakistani (1.3%) None  
 
 One might object here to the absence of Belgian parties in Table 3.1. However, 
Belgium’s unique ethnic composition and political system preclude comparison to other 
European states on the dimension of minority political participation. Since the two major 
ethnic groups of Belgium are so similar in size, and since each of them constitutes a 
majority of the population in its respective region, it is difficult to conceive of Walloons 
as an ethnic minority group. Further, Belgium’s political system, which contains dual 
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Dutch and French-speaking parties of every major ideological affiliation, is fairly unique 
in Europe. Such parties cannot be conceived of as ethnic minority parties in the sense that 
I am considering here, but rather as conventional ideology-based parties in the proto-
states of Wallonia and Flanders. For these reasons, I feel that it would be difficult to 
incorporate Belgium into a cross-national analysis of European EMPs. 
One of the challenges in identifying European minority ethnic groups is how to 
classify Muslim immigrants in Western European states. Ethnicity can certainly be 
defined by religious affiliation, but only if it is socially and politically salient. A strong 
argument can be made that the religion of Muslim migrants in Western Europe is the 
primary characteristic that sets them apart—socially and politically—from the 
predominantly secular host populations. A number of scholars (see, for example, 
Koopmans, et al. 2005 and Statham, et al. 2005) have argued that Islam’s tendency to 
spill over from the private into the public sphere makes it exceptional among religions in 
Europe, and thus at greater conflict with the West’s secular values. Whether the cause of 
this cultural struggle genuinely lies with the nature of Islam or not, it is undeniable that 
the religious beliefs of Muslims have been publicized and politicized to a greater extent 
than other ethnic traits like language and national origin. 
However, the notion that adherence to Islam is the sole ethnic identity of these 
populations overlooks the fact that Muslim migrants come from a number of different 
states and continents. These differences in national origin, as well as internal sectarian 
divides, make migrant communities in states like the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden 
appear fragmented and may undermine their potential for unified political or social 
action. Sociological scholarship has not thus far provided a clear answer as to whether 
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“Muslim” can be considered a singular and cohesive ethnic group in these (and other) 
states, or whether we should rather think of these migrants as Algerians, Moroccans, 
Indonesians and Turks.  
Since there are valid reasons for adopting either approach to the ethnic group 
classification for Muslim migrants in Western Europe, I employ both of them in my 
analysis. In performing multivariate analysis of ethnic minority party entry in Section IV, 
I test all of my models on two datasets—one that adopts the religion-as-ethnicity 
approach to classification, and one that adopts the national-origin approach. I discover 
that the choice of operationalization does not in any substantial way affect the results. 
 III. The Data 
 In order to test my predictions about the influence of historical and other variables 
on ethnic minority party entry and success, I have assembled a large-N, cross-national 
dataset of all democratic legislative3 elections occurring between 1990 and 2012 in 
European states containing at least one ethnic minority group meeting the minimum size 
requirement. My dataset comes in two versions, with the first one (henceforth referred to 
as Dataset 1) considering Muslims in West European states to constitute a single minority 
group, and the second (henceforth referred to as Dataset 2) dividing them up into separate 
ethnic groups based on national origin. 
I select the starting point of 1990 in part because it coincides with the onset of 
democratic elections in former Communist states in Europe. Examining East and West 
European states over the same time period protects against any temporal effects that 
could skew the results. An additional reason for selecting 1990 as the starting point is that 
it serves as a good approximation for the point in time at which Islam became politically 
                                                           
3 In countries with bicameral legislatures, only lower house election results are included. 
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salient in Western Europe (see Jopke 2009: 108). Since one of the two versions of my 
dataset defines ethnicity in religious terms when it comes to Muslims in Western Europe, 
it is appropriate to exclude time periods during which the religious identity of Muslims 
was not sufficiently prominent in the political sphere.  
 The unit of analysis is minority ethnic groups, with only those groups that 
constituted at least 1% of the population of their state in a particular election year being 
included. The unit of observation is country/ethnic group/election year. There are a total 
of 409 observations in Dataset 1, and 404 in Dataset 2. 
I choose to use the ethnic group, rather than the political party, as my unit of 
analysis because I am ultimately interested in which ethnic groups have managed to 
meaningfully engage their political systems through the vehicle of an EMP. A glance at 
Table 3.1 in Section II reveals that different ethnic groups exhibit vastly different patterns 
of EMP formation, survival and success. In some cases there are multiple successful 
parties representing a single ethnic group competing in the same election; in others 
initially successful parties fade out and are replaced by new ones. In other cases yet there 
is a single party that enjoys consistent support as the only representative of its ethnic 
group over the entire time period examined. While this diversity in patterns of party 
formation and performance is an interesting phenomenon that deserves attention, 
explaining it is neither possible nor necessary within the bounds of this analysis.4 The 
question I seek to answer here is what conditions encourage minority groups to seek and 
obtain political representation through ethnically-based parties. Explaining the various 
forms that this representation can take on are simply outside the scope of what my 
theoretical framework can account for. 
                                                           
4 I do, however, address this question to some extent in my case study in Chapter IV. 
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IV. Analysis #1: Electoral Entry 
The first question I examine is what factors encourage or discourage ethnic 
minority groups from forming a political party to contest national legislative elections. 
The dependent variable is therefore a dichotomous dummy variable coded as “1” when at 
least one EMP representing a given minority group contests a national legislative 
election, and “0” when a minority group has no EMP contesting a particular election. 
 There are three main groups of independent variables whose influence on the 
dependent variable I seek to determine—those which constitute my historical-social-
psychological (HSP) framework (historicity, territorial attachment and 
dominance/autonomy), those that derive from political opportunity structure theory 
(mainstream party response) and those that pertain to international actor influences (kin 
state, EU candidate). Additionally, I include several control variables (ethnic group 
population share, electoral disproportionality). These variables, their operationalization 
and their expected theoretical relationship to the dependent variable are described in 
detail in the sections below. 
 1. HSP variables 
 In Chapter II, I identified three historical variables that I expected would, working 
through social psychological processes, influence an ethnic minority group’s demand for 
forming an EMP.  
 1.1 Historicity 
 The first of these variables is the historicity of an ethnic minority group. The 
expected relationship to the dependent variable is that if a minority group is 
predominantly native (as opposed to migrant) in origin, it will be more likely to attempt 
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to contest elections via an ethnic minority party. 
 In order to operationalize this distinction, I constructed a dichotomous dummy 
variable coded as “1” for native groups, and “0” for non-native groups. I categorized as 
native those minority groups that had an extensive and continuous historical presence on 
the territory of their present state of residence prior to the formation of that state. I 
consider ethnic groups with no such historical background to be non-native. 
 In categorizing ethnic groups according to their historicity, I consulted a variety 
of historical and contemporary sources pertaining to demographics. I focused on sources 
describing the extent of an ethnic group’s presence on the territory of a given state, prior 
to the formation of that state. I then compared the size of this historical presence with the 
share of the population the minority group represented at the point at which it entered the 
dataset. If it appeared sound to assume that, at the time the ethnic group entered the 
dataset, most of its constituent members could have traced their descent to a historically 
native population, the group was considered native. If, on the other hand, it appeared that 
most of the group’s members descended from migrants arriving following the 
establishment of the modern state, the group was considered non-native. 
 For most cases, this categorization was rather straightforward. Groups such as the 
Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, and Catalans and Basques in 
Spain enjoyed an extensive historical presence on the territory of their present countries, 
and have few members who cannot trace their lineage to these historic populations. In 
contrast, other groups, such as Turks in Germany, Muslims in France or the Portuguese in 
Switzerland are almost entirely constituted of migrants or the descendants of migrants. 
 However, some cases are more difficult to code, with the former Soviet Baltic 
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republics being especially challenging. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia each contained a 
small Russian minority at the time of their emergence as independent states in 1918, with 
ethnic Russians constituting 7.8%, 2.5% and 8.2% of the population of each state, 
respectively. However, the occupation and incorporation of the Baltic states into the 
Soviet Union in 1940, and the subsequent widespread post-World War II Russian 
migration into the region dramatically increased the number of Russians in each country. 
At the point in time at which they enter the dataset, Russians constituted 34% of the 
population in Latvia, 30.3% in Estonia and 9.4% in Lithuania, or nearly four times their 
share of the population at the establishment of each respective state. 
Cases like this require a difficult judgment call – does the fact that a number of an 
ethnic group’s members descend from a historically native population mean we ought to 
classify the whole group as “native”? Or should we rather classify it as non-native, given 
the fact that the vast majority of its members are migrants or descend from migrants? I 
choose the latter option and categorize Russians in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as a 
non-native ethnic group. In reality, these groups may be best thought of as hybrid native-
migrant entities, but I find that the introduction of such a category would needlessly 
complicate the analysis and would not necessarily improve operationalization. 
Ultimately, I feel that ethnic groups constituted predominantly by migrants or the 
descendants of migrants are best thought of as non-native; likewise, those constituted 
predominantly by the descendants of native populations should be considered native. 
It bears mentioning, however, that it would be ill-advised to categorize groups as 
native or non-native simply by comparing their share of the population at the two 
measurement points (the establishment of the modern nation state and the point at which 
74 
 
 
they enter the dataset). What makes such an approach problematic is that the population 
growth of a people-group can be as much a function of high birth rates as of widespread 
migration. The case of the Roma in most Central and East European states illustrates this 
point very well. Let us take Hungary, where the Roma share of the population increased 
from 0.5% to 1.4% over the relevant time period. If we were to try to apply the same 
hard-and-fast classification rule to cases like this as well as to cases like the Russians in 
the Baltic states, we would have to conclude that the Hungarian Roma should be coded as 
non-native. Yet an exploration of the history of the minority group reveals this to be 
false; unlike the Baltic Russians, it is higher-than-average birth rates, not migration, that 
best explain the growth of the Roma population. Therefore, in coding this variable I was 
careful to consult not only the relevant demographic statistics but also historical sources 
that pointed to the likely causes for population size fluctuations. 
A more comprehensive case-by-case breakdown of the coding decisions for this 
and other variables, including citations for all relevant sources, is included in Appendix 
A. 
1.2 Territorial Attachment 
The next variable from my HSP framework, territorial attachment, seeks to 
capture the extent to which a minority ethnic group has historically identified with a 
particular region (or regions) within the borders of the state in which it resides. The 
theoretical intuition is that a strong sense of territorial attachment will increase the appeal 
of the EMP model of ethnic minority political representation, and contribute to the 
likelihood of contesting an election through a minority party. 
Whether a minority group is attached to a particular geographic area is first of all 
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contingent on the historicity of that group. I theorize that territorial attachment is 
something that occurs when a people-group was concentrated within a particular region 
(or regions) of its present-day state, prior to the formation of that state. Present-day 
territorial concentration within a certain region does not necessarily imply territorial 
attachment; there must be historical precedent in order for the attachment process to 
develop. Therefore, territorial attachment is best thought of as a subset of historicity; 
while it is possible for a minority group to be native but not territorially attached, it is 
impossible for a non-native group to be territorially attached, even if it is currently 
geographically concentrated within its state. 
In order to classify ethnic groups as territorially attached or not, I first excluded 
all groups that I classified as ‘non-native’. For each remaining group, I examined present-
day and (where available) historical maps demonstrating the population distribution of 
the group within its state, as well as other historical sources that speak to the spatial 
distribution of the group around the time of the formation of the modern state. Where 
present-day population maps revealed a strong geographic concentration I sought to 
identify whether this concentration was long-standing, or whether it had resulted from a 
recent migration pattern. Ultimately, I constructed a dichotomous variable where I coded 
groups that appeared to have been territorially concentrated by the time of the 
establishment of the modern state as “1” and those that were territorially dispersed as “0”. 
The foremost challenge in coding this variable is determining the size of the 
region at which to look for ethnic population clustering. Virtually all ethnic minority 
groups in Europe appear to be clustered if one examines a small-enough area. For 
instance, an analysis at the level of city neighborhoods would reveal a high concentration 
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of Roma in most East European states, or of Muslims in much of Western Europe. 
However, examining geographical concentration on such a small scale does not capture 
the essence of the theorized effect, since it deals with regions that are far too small to be 
politically salient or significant in the consciousness of minority group members. The 
region(s) considered ought to be large enough to encompass a significant portion of the 
minority population in the state and to hold some political significance for that 
population. I therefore examined population distribution patterns at the level of the 
largest administrative regions in the state. 
As with the coding of the historicity variable, and perhaps even more so, 
developing hard-and-fast objective criteria for classifying minority groups as territorially 
attached or not proved exceedingly difficult. Among the largest challenges encountered 
were the variable sizes and numbers of the largest administrative divisions in each state 
(complicating cross-national comparison) and the limited availability of historical 
population data at this level of observation. Therefore, as with historicity, coding 
sometimes required incorporating additional insights drawn from (non-quantitative) 
historical sources. Ultimately, I classified as territorially attached those ethnic minority 
groups that appeared to have enjoyed a significantly higher numerical presence in one or 
a handful of regions than in the rest of the state, around the time that the state was 
established.  
1.3 Dominant/autonomous 
 The final explanatory variable derived from the HSP framework is experience 
with autonomy and self-rule. I expect that those ethnic minority groups which have 
enjoyed some historical experience governing themselves (either as an autonomous or 
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semi-autonomous political entity, or as a dominant ethnic group exercising rule over 
others) on the territory of their present-day state will be more likely to attempt to obtain 
legislative representation by contesting elections with an EMP. 
 Similarly to the previous two historical variables, I operationalize 
dominant/autonomous as a dichotomous variable with a value of “1” for ethnic groups 
that have historical experience with self-rule, and “0” for those without such experience. 
Once again, it is worth stressing that this dominance/autonomy must have been exercised 
within the confines of the borders of the state that the minority currently inhabits. 
Another restriction on what I coded as a genuine experience with autonomy is that it must 
have been sufficiently institutionalized and must have occurred over a non-trivial period 
of time (for instance, a few months of anarchy during a war or in between regime change 
does not count). There is no restriction for when the experience must have occurred other 
than that it took place prior the point at which the ethnic groups enters the dataset. Unlike 
the other two historical variables, dominance/autonomy takes into consideration the 
period after the formation of the modern state, as well as the period prior to that event. 
 The ethnic groups classified as having once been dominant or autonomous are 
quite varied in their historical experience. This category includes both those minority 
groups whose experience with independent self-rule is temporally distant (Basques and 
Catalans in Spain5) and those who have enjoyed such a period very recently (e.g., 
Russians in the Baltic states). It includes those groups that once ruled themselves in 
independent political entities that were later assimilated into larger ones (e.g., Scots and 
                                                           
5 While these groups have enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy since Spain’s democratic transition, 
they still function within a unitary state that is ultimately sovereign. I therefore do not consider Basques 
and Catalans to be currently autonomous in the same way that they were in their respective medieval 
kingdoms. 
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Irish in the U.K.), as well as those that exercised rule over the territory they currently 
reside on as a dominant or co-equal ethnic group within a larger polity (e.g., Turks in 
former Ottoman Empire-ruled states, Serbs in former Yugoslavia, Poles in Lithuania). 
Yet I hold that the common thread among all these cases—the fact that the ethnic group 
in question can recall a period in history in which it governed itself—is more important 
than the specific details of that experience. In other words, I feel that the Swedes in 
Finland and Russians in Estonia are more similar to each other on this dimension, than 
they are to the Roma in Romania, for example. 
 Table 3.2 below provides a complete list of the coding decisions for the HSP 
variables for every ethnic minority group used in the analysis. 
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Table 3.2: Ethnic minority groups and their historical characteristics 
STATE ETHNIC GROUP (% of 
population) 
Native Territorial Dominant/ 
autonomous 
Albania 
Greeks (4 %)    
Roma (1.4%)    
Austria 
Muslims (4.2%)    
Turks (3.2%)    
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Serbs (31.5%)    
Croats (17.3%)    
Bulgaria 
Turks (9.4%)    
Roma (4.9%)    
Croatia Serbs (4.5%)     
Czech 
Republic 
Moravians (4.9%)    
Slovaks (1.4%)    
Denmark 
Muslims (4%)    
Turks (1%)    
Estonia 
Russians (25.6%)    
Ukrainians (2.1%)    
Belarusians (1.1%)    
Finland Swedes    
France 
Muslims (9%)    
Algerians (3.1%)    
Moroccans (2 %)    
Germany 
Muslims (5.4%)    
Turks (5%)    
Greece Albanians (4.3%)    
Hungary 
Roma (5%)    
Germans (2.4%)    
Italy Muslims (3.9%)    
Kosovo 
Serbs (7%)    
Roma (2.3%)    
Bosniaks/Muslims (2.2%)    
Turks (1%)    
Latvia 
Russians (26.9%)    
Belarusians (3.3%)    
Ukrainians (2.2%)    
Poles (2.2%)    
Lithuanians (1.2%)    
Lithuania 
Poles (6.1%)    
Russians (4.8%)    
Belarusians (1.5%)    
Macedonia 
Albanians (22.7 %)    
Turks (4.0 %)    
Serbs (2.1 %)    
Roma (2.2 %)    
Montenegro 
Serbs (28.7 %)    
Bosniaks/Muslims (11.9 %)    
Albanians (4.8%)    
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Table 3.2 (cont.) 
Netherlands 
Muslims (5.5%)    
Turks (2.3%)    
Indonesians (2.3%)    
Moroccans (2.1%)    
Surinamese (2.1%)    
Norway Muslims (2%)    
Romania 
Hungarians (6.6%)    
Roma (2.5%)    
Serbia 
Hungarians (3.9%)    
Bosniaks (1.8%)    
Roma (1.4%)    
Slovakia 
Hungarians (8.5%)    
Roma (2.0%)    
Slovenia 
Serbs (2%)    
Croats (1.8%)    
Bosnians (1.3%)    
Spain 
Catalans (17%)    
Basques (2%)    
Sweden 
Finns (5%)    
Muslims (5%)    
Iraqis (1.3%)    
Switzerland 
Muslims (4.3%)    
Serbs (2.5%)    
Portuguese (2.4%)    
Spaniards (1.2%)    
Turkey 
Kurds (18%)    
Arabs (2.1%)    
Ukraine Russians (17.2%)    
United 
Kingdom 
Scots (9%)    
Welsh (4.1%)    
Irish (2.4%)    
Blacks (2.8%)    
Muslims (2.7%)    
Indian (1.8%)    
Pakistani (1.3%)    
 
 
2. Political opportunity structure  
In addition to the historical variables described above, I seek to test the influence 
of the political opportunity structure on an ethnic minority group’s likelihood to contest 
elections with an EMP. The political opportunity structure entails two variables—the 
response of mainstream political parties to the demands of the ethnic group, and the 
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capacities of that group to accomplish its goals. 
2.1 Mainstream party response 
Building on insights from existing scholarship, I theorized that the response of 
mainstream parties to the demands of a particular ethnic group could either encourage or 
discourage that group from forming a party of its own. I expect that ethnic minority 
groups will be more likely to form EMPs when their concerns are rejected by the political 
establishment, and when major political parties fail to incorporate those concerns into 
their platforms. This effect ought to be particularly strong in cases where the minority 
group possesses the capacities necessary to successfully organize and form an EMP. In 
cases where this capacity is limited, the attitude of mainstream political actors ought to 
play a more limited role, as minority groups may not have a choice but to try to work 
within non-ethnic parties. 
While Bernauer and Bochsler (2011) find this variable to have little influence on 
EMP formation and success, the expectations appear to be theoretically sound, and 
deserves another test in a geographically and temporally expanded context, and with an 
alternative (and I would argue, superior) operationalization. 
 My data for the reaction of mainstream parties is derived from the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset, which contains quantitative content analysis data on 
party programs and manifestos. Using five CMP indicators, I constructed a “favorability 
to ethnic minorities” index, seeking to capture parties’ attempts (or lack thereof) to appeal 
to ethnic minority groups. I first added three of the indicators—support for federalism or 
devolution, support for multiculturalism and negative or critical mentions of the “national 
way of life”—that seemed to suggest a favorable view toward minority groups. Next, 
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from the sum of these three I subtracted two others—opposition to multiculturalism and 
statements promoting a “national way of life”—that imply a more critical attitude toward 
ethnic minorities. The values of the resulting index initially ranged from -25 to 23.9, but I 
transformed the variable by adding 25 to each value in order to create a positive scale that 
more easily lends itself to interpretation. Thus, the transformed variable has values 
between 0 (indicating extreme hostility toward minorities) and 48.9 (indicating a highly 
favorable attitude toward minorities). 
For each election in the dataset, I calculated the favorability toward ethnic 
minorities for the top two vote-getting parties. I then compared the scores of these two 
parties in order to determine which of the two was more supportive (or less hostile) 
toward ethnic minority concerns. I used the more-favorable party’s score as the 
“mainstream party response” value for that particular election. My reasoning here is that 
what is really important is how pro-minority the most pro-minority major party in a state 
is, since that will determine whether an ethnic minority has an opportunity to work and 
accomplish its goals within a major party. The attitude of the less-favorable major party 
does not play a role in this consideration. In this respect, my operationalization is superior 
to that of Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), who consider the response of the party with the 
more “intense” overall reaction, whether this reaction was predominantly positive or 
negative toward ethnic minorities, thus comparing the values for the more pro-minority 
of the two parties for some elections to the values of the more anti-minority party for 
others. 
2.2 Minority group strength 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the effect that mainstream party behavior 
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has on the likelihood of EMP formation is also contingent on the capacity of an ethnic 
group to accomplish its political goals—something that I have crudely termed minority 
group strength. But what goes into determining the value of this variable? 
 First and foremost, a minority group’s numerical size, as a percentage of the 
population, ought to play a major role in setting the limits for its potential political 
influence. Larger groups, by nature of constituting a more sizeable share of voters, have a 
natural advantage in accomplishing their political goals, and thus are more likely to 
attempt to form an EMP in the absence of a mainstream party that caters to their interests. 
In contrast, smaller groups may be reluctant to engage in a party-building project, even in 
the face of antagonism or apathy from major parties, because they are doubtful of such a 
project’s viability. 
 The data for ethnic group population as a percentage of total population come 
from the Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) Project, produced by the 
Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The 
CREG dataset contains annual population share estimates for all ethnic groups in 165 
countries in the post-World War II era. Population data for a particular year is assembled 
by comparing and reconciling multiple sources; statistical techniques are then used to 
estimate population size and share for years for which there is no available data. The 
primary advantage of using the CREG data is that it is able to capture and account for 
gradual shifts in population size that take place between official and authoritative 
measurements (such as national censuses), and thus paint a more accurate picture of an 
ethnic group’s numerical strength in any given year. 
 One problem with using minority population share as a measurement of ethnic 
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group strength is that the numbers used to derive this statistic are based on the number of 
residents belonging to a particular ethnicity within each country; it does not tell us how 
many of these residents are also citizens of that country, and therefore in possession of 
full voting rights. This is relevant to the analysis because one of the central arguments of 
this work is that predominantly native minorities enjoy an advantage over predominantly 
migrant ones, for reasons of historical background and resulting social psychology. Yet 
native minorities also possess an advantage in that they are more likely to be citizens of 
the states in which they reside. For this reason, it seems appropriate to adjust the CREG 
data so as to reflect the number of citizens for each group. 
Unfortunately, accurate statistics regarding citizenship are not available for 
most—let alone all—of the ethnic groups in my dataset. I am therefore forced to 
approximate—based on the limited data that is available—what proportion, on average, 
of a migrant population can be expected to be citizens of the state in which reside. I 
construct three alternative measurements of the population share variable which reduce 
the population of predominantly migrant groups by 25, 33 and 50 percent, respectively, 
while keeping native group population the same. The latter of these reductions seems 
excessive,6 yet I include it to protect against underestimating the effect of migrant-ness 
on citizenship status. I do not argue that any one of these numbers accurately captures 
this effect, but the broad range of alternative operationalizations serves as a sort of 
sensitivity analysis meant to prevent bias in the results for failure to capture the 
citizenship dimension. In fact, when I employ these citizenship-adjusted measurements of 
population share in my analysis later in this chapter, I discover that they very minimally 
                                                           
6 It can be noted, for instance, that even in Latvia, which is known to have one of the most restrictive paths 
to citizenship in Europe, well over half of ethnic Russians are citizens. “Citizenship in Latvia”, Latvian 
Foreign Ministry, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/latvia/integracija/pilsoniba/. 
85 
 
 
alter the results. 
 Another component that might shed light on a minority group’s capacity for 
unified political action is the (political) salience of ethnicity, with the expectation that 
more salient ethnic identities provide a stronger basis of support for such action. The 
problem with a variable like this is that it is very difficult to operationalize. There are no 
precise ways we can gauge how politically salient an ethnic identity is without taking into 
consideration the collective political actions that group engages in. But to do this would 
be to conflate the independent and dependent variables, since ethnic group actions are 
what we are trying to explain. The distinctiveness of an ethnic group is not enough to 
determine salience of ethnicity; the differences between Serbs and Montenegrins or 
Czechs and Moravians appear so miniscule to the outside observer that it seems strange 
to consider them as separate ethnic groups, yet divisions along these lines have resulted 
in the formation of EMPs. When Beranuer and Bochsler (2011) attempt to operationalize 
this variable, they use a rather distant proxy—the salience of nationalism in each 
country—that appears to be measuring something different altogether. 
 Ultimately, I feel that the closest we can get to a measurement of political salience 
is the historically based HSP framework presented in this work. These variables have an 
advantage in that they are specific to each ethnic group, allowing for variation between 
different groups in the same state, and in that they measure something that is temporally 
prior to the observation of the outcome variable, and therefore not affected by it. (In 
contrast, our perceptions of the salience of ethnicity are inevitably influenced by ethnic 
groups’ collective political action.) Therefore, since the political salience of ethnicity is 
largely captured by the three variables in the HSP framework—historicity, territorial 
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attachment and dominance/autonomy—I feel no need to introduce a separate variable that 
tries to capture this effect. 
This leaves ethnic group size as the only variable accounting for a minority 
group’s capacities to accomplish its goals. There are no doubt other factors that play into 
this variable (e.g., educational attainment, socio-economic status), but it is impossible to 
obtain accurate data specific to most of the ethnic groups in this dataset. 
I therefore consider the simultaneous effect that population size and mainstream 
party response have on a group’s propensity to contest elections through an EMP. In my 
models, I do this by introducing an interactive term between population share and most 
favorable party response. 
3. International influences 
There are two international factors that I have suggested may play a role in ethnic 
minority party entry—influence from international organizations (most notably the 
European Union) and influence from kin states. 
3.1 European Union influence 
I theorize that European states may be more likely to provide the institutional 
conditions necessary for minority party emergence if they are actively seeking 
membership in a supranational organization such as the European Union that espouses 
and promotes the values of liberalism and tolerance. States have a variety of strategies at 
their disposal for thwarting or impeding attempts at ethnically-based party formation, 
ranging from setting high electoral thresholds to outright legal bans on ethnic parties (as 
in Bulgaria7 and Turkey8). However, governments should be reluctant to enact or enforce 
                                                           
7 Article 11.4 of the Bulgarian Constitution prohibits parties organized along "ethnic, racial, and religious” 
lines. In practice, this article has been unevenly enforced by the courts. 
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such legal restrictions if they are seeking to attain membership in the European Union, 
for fear of jeopardizing the viability of their applications. It is possible that countries may 
even encourage minority voter participation, in order to demonstrate a commitment to 
multiculturalism and tolerance. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that EU candidacy would favor minority party entry in 
the candidate country. In order to capture this effect, I constructed a dichotomous 
variable with a value of “1” for all elections in states that were candidates for EU 
accession at the time of the election, and “0” for all other elections. Countries were 
considered to be EU accession candidates if the election took place between the date the 
state submitted a formal application for EU membership and the date the state was 
admitted into the European Union. 
3.2 Kin state influence 
Additionally, I hypothesize that ethnic minority groups with a nearby kin state 
will be more likely to contest elections through a minority party, for two reasons. First, 
similar to the reasoning in the previous section, states may be more reluctant to block or 
frustrate minority party formation efforts if they believe they would be alienating other 
countries in the region in doing so. Second, kin states may act as whistleblowers to the 
international community, should such efforts at suppressing ethnic minority political 
participation persist. Finally, kin states themselves may feel the need to support in 
whatever capacity they can the formation of an EMP, either to improve the standing and 
welfare of their co-ethnics living abroad, or in the hopes of gaining leverage on the 
politics of the state in the question and advancing their own interests. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 The Constitutional Court of Turkey has repeatedly banned Kurdish ethnic minority parties on the grounds 
that they promote separatism. See, for example: Arsu, Sebnem. “Turkey Bans Kurdish Party.” The New 
York Times 11 Dec. 2009. 
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In operationalizing this factor, I constructed a dummy variable coded as “1” for 
ethnic minority groups with a kin state within Europe and “0” for groups without such a 
state. I consider a kin state to be any state in which the ethnic group in question 
constitutes a majority of the population. I also include an alternative operationalization of 
this variable that only considers neighboring kin states—those that share a physical 
border with the state in which the minority group resides. I include this operationalization 
in light of the possibility that kin state effects may only be significant if the kin state 
shares a border with the state in question, since neighboring states tend to be much more 
geopolitically and historically intertwined. 
4. Control variables 
In addition to the independent variables described above, I include a number of 
control variables in my analysis of ethnic minority party entry. 
4.1 Population size 
Although the interaction between population size and mainstream party reaction 
was examined as a predictor of EMP entry earlier in this chapter, we must also consider 
the influence that population size as a share of total population ought to exert in its own 
right. It seems intuitive that the larger an ethnic group’s share of the population is, the 
more confident it ought to feel about the viability of an ethnically-based political party, 
and that this factor ought to play a significant role in what strategy the group pursues in 
seeking to obtain political representation and influence. Therefore, I also include 
population share on its own as a predictor of electoral entry in all my multivariate 
models. 
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4.2 Electoral disproportionality 
While most European states employ pure proportional representation (PR) 
electoral systems, not all do. Even within PR systems, there can be considerable variation 
in proportionality due to additional electoral rules such as minimum thresholds for 
parliamentary representation. Since proportional systems tend to favor the representation 
of minority groups, one would expect that greater disproportionality would impede the 
entry of EMPs. However, it is well established that parties with a strong territorial 
concentration of support can actually thrive in disproportional electoral systems. Since 
many ethnic minorities are territorially concentrated, it is important to take this fact into 
account. While it is ultimately not intuitively clear whether disproportionality ought to 
favor or hurt minority party entry taken as a whole, it is worth to include it as a control 
variable since it will most likely exert some influence. 
In order to capture electoral disproportionality, I use the Gallagher Index, which 
takes the square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference between percent of 
vote and percent of seats for each of the parties in a particular election. The resulting 
number is an index with values ranging from 0 to 100, where higher numbers indicate 
elections with more disproportional outcomes.9 
4.3 Federalism/devolution 
In light of the findings of Bolleyer and Bitzek (2013), I include a measurement of 
federalism/devolution for every election in the dataset. The theoretical intuition is that 
federal or devolved systems provide greater opportunities for parties to develop at a 
regional level before contesting national elections. Such experiences can be stepping 
                                                           
9 Where available, the values used were taken from Michael Gallagher’s online ‘Election Indices’ database 
(http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf). In 
elections for which the values were not available, I calculated them myself. 
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stones for incipient ethnic minority parties looking to eventually enter national elections, 
and success at a regional level in a system where regional governments are empowered 
could provide a party with the resources and visibility needed to go on to contest state-
wide elections. In contrast, a party operating in a unitary system may not receive the 
same level of opportunity for gradual growth and development, and therefore never 
muster up the confidence to contest a national election. 
In order to capture this factor, I constructed a dichotomous variable with values of 
“1” for elections taking place in states that are either federal or significantly devolved, 
and “0” for elections in unitary states. 
5. Analysis 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics for continuous variables in the dataset. 
Table 3.4 presents frequencies and percentages for dichotomous variables. 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Variable Minimum 1st 
Quartile 
Median Mean 3rd 
Quartile 
Maximum 
Population share 1 1.8 2.7 6.1 5.9 34.3 
Most favorable 
party score 
0 25.8 27.3 27.7 29.6 48.9 
Electoral 
disproportionality 
0.7 3.6 5.7 7.7 9.7 34.5 
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Table 3.4: Frequencies and percentages for dichotomous variables 
Variable Value Frequency Percent 
Electoral entry 0 222 55 
1 181 45 
Native 0 166 41 
1 237 59 
Territorial 0 241 59 
1 162 40 
Dominant/autonomous 0 260 65 
1 143 35 
Kin state 0 140 35 
1 263 65 
Bordering kin state 0 234 58 
1 169 42 
Federal/devolved 0 292 72 
1 111 28 
EU candidate 0 290 72 
1 113 28 
 
 
 5.2 Bivariate correlations 
 Table 3.5 presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between each of the 
independent and control variables in the analysis and the dependent variable. In order to 
assess statistical significance, P-values derived from a Wald’s Two Sample t-test are also 
reported. 
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Table 3.5: Bivariate correlations with electoral entry 
Variable Correlation Coefficient 
Native 0.68 
Territorial 0.65 
Dominant/autonomous 0.72 
Most favorable party score 0.08 
Population share 0.51 
EU accession 0.11 
Kin state 0.07 
Bordering kin state 0.41 
Electoral disproportionality 0.09 
Federal/devolved 0.11 
 
 Several things jump out from examining Table 3.5. First, the historical variables 
(native, territorially concentrated and dominant/autonomous) appear to be the most 
strongly correlated with electoral entry. Second, most favorable party score is the only 
variable in the analysis that does not exhibit the expected relationship, suggesting instead 
that the more favorable parties are toward an ethnic minority group, the more likely that 
group is to contest an election with an EMP. Third, of the two variables seeking to 
capture kin state influences, only bordering kin state appears to be highly correlated with 
the dependent variable. Therefore, in the subsequent multivariate analysis, I elect to use 
the former variable to the exclusion of the latter. 
 5.3 Cross-tabulation 
 In order to examine the effect of the three historical variables working in 
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conjunction with each other, I next consider the incidence of electoral entry for each of 
the six possible combinations of the presence and absence of these characteristics. Table 
3.6 reports the proportion of electoral contestations for groups possessing each of these 
combinations of historical traits. 
 
Table 3.6: Proportions of electoral entry for combinations of the three HSP variables 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The first thing that jumps out in this table is the complete absence of ethnic 
minority party attempts for groups that do not possess at least one of the three variables in 
the HSP framework—out of 208 such observations, no electoral entry attempt has been 
made. On the other hand, possessing even one of the dominance/autonomy and historicity 
traits substantially increases the likelihood of EMP entry. For instance, having experience 
with autonomy raises electoral entry from 0 to 56% for non-native groups, and more than 
doubles it for native groups. Similarly, a native background raises the incidence of EMP 
 Native 
NO                                  YES 
D
o
m
in
a
n
t/
a
u
to
n
o
m
o
u
s 
Y
E
S
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 N
O
 
 
 
0% (0 of 208) 
                           Territorial 
 
Non-           46% (12 of 26)  
Territorial              
 
33.7% (23 of 61) 
 
 
 
56% (14 of 25) 
                           Territorial 
 
Non-         92.3% (133 of 
Territorial      143) 
 
N/A 
94 
 
 
entry from 0 to 40% for non-autonomous groups, and from 56 to 92.3% for groups with a 
history of dominance/autonomy. The influence of territorial attachment is somewhat 
more difficult to discern. In cases where experience with autonomy is lacking, 
territoriality only increases the incidence of electoral entry from 33.7% to 46%, a change 
that does not appear substantial and that a chi-square test reveals to be statistically 
insignificant (p=0.52). In cases where dominance/autonomy is present, there is simply no 
basis for assessing the influence of the territorial attachment variable, because there are 
no cases for which this trait is absent. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether territorial 
attachment in and of itself has any significant effect on party entry. What is clear 
however, is that for minority groups that are both native and have experience with self-
rule, we observe a remarkably high (92.3%) incidence of electoral entry. 
 5.4 Multivariate models 
 I next proceed to model electoral entry using several generalized linear mixed 
effects models. I choose generalized linear mixed effects due to the dichotomous 
dependent variable (electoral entry) and the multilevel nature of the data. Some variables 
in the data (e.g., most favorable party response, EU candidate, disproportionality) are 
specific to the country in which the election takes place whereas others are specific to the 
ethnic group (e.g., the historical variables, bordering kin state, population size). Further, 
many of the variables measured at either level (e.g., EU candidate, disproportionality, 
population size) are time-variant.  Since we cannot assume that multiple measurements 
from the same country, country-ethnic group or year are independent of one another, it is 
necessary to control for country, country-ethnic group and time. In order to do this, I use 
a generalized linear mixed effects model that incorporates both fixed effects (the 
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predictor variables) and random intercepts for each country and each country-ethnic 
group.10 
 In order to test the various proposed explanatory paradigms for EMP entry, I 
begin by creating three models corresponding to the three groups of independent 
variables described in the previous section—historical, political opportunity structure and 
international. Model 1 thus contains the variables native, territorial attachment and 
dominant/autonomous. Model 2 incorporates an interactive term between most favorable 
party score and population share. Model 3 consists of the variables bordering kin state 
and EU accession. In addition, each of the three models contains the three control 
variables—population share, electoral disproportionality and federalism. The results 
from these three models are presented in Table 3.7. 
  
                                                           
10 An alternative logistic regression model with fixed effects for country, county-ethnic group and year did 
not produce substantially different results. 
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Table 3.7: Generalized linear mixed model analysis of EMP entry 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Native 11.73 ** 
(3.65) 
  9.62 *** 
(2.74) 
territorial attachment -2.43 
(1.05) 
   
dominant/autonomous 7.66 *** 
(2.32) 
  6.09 ** 
(2.02) 
MFP score x 
population share 
 0.001 
(0.01) 
  
MFP score  
 
0.01 
(0.15) 
  
population share 0.31 * 
(0.12) 
0.62 
(0.40) 
0.56 ** 
(0.21) 
0.27 * 
(0.12) 
bordering kin state   7.12 ** 
(2.71) 
0.81 
(2.02) 
EU candidate   1.75 * 
(0.82) 
1.45 . 
(0.76) 
electoral 
disproportionality 
-0.13 * 
(0.06) 
-0.09 . 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.11 . 
(0.06) 
federal/devolved 3.13 
(6.19) 
-2.59 
(2.81) 
- 2.39 
(5.23) 
2.94  
(5.29) 
N 402 390 402 402 
 
 Model 1 reveals that both historical presence and a history of 
dominance/autonomy are highly statistically significant predictors of ethnic minority 
party entry. Curiously, however, territorial attachment does not appear to be an influential 
factor; its coefficient even exhibits the opposite sign of the one predicted. This is most 
likely due to the fact that the variables native and territorial attachment are highly 
correlated, as the latter is a specific case of the former. Removing native from this model 
actually yields a statistically significant (at p<0.05) coefficient for territorial attachment, 
with the expected sign. However, the results of Model 1 seem to suggest that any 
predictive utility territorial attachment appears to have is primarily a function of the fact 
that all territorially attached minority groups also happen to be native to their states of 
residence; it is not clear that there is anything unique and particular to territorial 
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attachment that aids EMP entry. 
 Model 2 reveals that the interaction between mainstream party reaction and 
minority group strength is not a highly influential predictor of minority party entry. 
Indeed, while the other models attest to the statistical significance of population share as 
a variable in its own right, it appears to bear little influence on EMP entry when 
interacted with most favorable party score. Further, the latter of the two variables is not 
shown to be a statistically significant predictor of minority party entry, even though it 
does exhibit the expected negative relationship, in contrast to the results in the bivariate 
analysis. Overall, there appears to be little evidence for the hypothesis that the attitudes of 
major parties in a state toward an ethnic minority influence that minority’s likelihood of 
contesting elections through an ethnically-based party. 
 Model 3 appears to contain evidence for both of the proposed international 
influences on EMP entry. EU candidate is statistically significant at p<0.05, indicating 
that we are more likely to observe EMPs in states that are somewhere along the 
application process for membership in the European Union. Bordering kin state is even 
more influential (statistically significant at the p<0.01 level), suggesting that the presence 
of an adjacent kin state encourages the relevant minority group to adopt the minority 
party approach. 
 As a final step in this analysis, I combine several components of models 1 through 
3 in order to present a more comprehensive examination of the determinants of EMP 
entry in Model 4. In this final model, I combine the historical variables (with the 
exception of territorial attachment, which appeared to have limited utility in Model 1), 
the two international variables and the three controls. I omit the interactive term between 
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most favorable party score and population share, since the previous models revealed that 
only population size in its own right seems to influence the likelihood of minority party 
entry. 
 The results confirm the impression that two of the three historical variables—
historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are the strongest predictors of EMP entry. 
Additionally, EU candidacy remains a significant predictor, as it was in Model 3, albeit 
only at the p<0.1 level. In contrast, the presence of a bordering kin state loses the 
statistical significance it possessed in Model 3.  One possible explanation for why this 
occurs is that similarly to territorial attachment, bordering kin state is highly correlated 
to historical presence. Minority groups that tend to have adjacent kin states are almost 
always ones that are native to their state, and groups that do not have an adjacent kin state 
are often of a predominantly migrant character. A similar relationship can be observed 
with the other historical variable, dominant/autonomous. Thus, the results of Model 4 
suggest that the predictive influence that bordering kin state appeared to possess in 
Model 3 is a product of the variable’s relation to historical factors, rather than being due 
to some unique and intrinsic feature. 
 An examination of the control variables in the four models paints a fairly 
consistent picture. Electoral disproportionality has a modest effect in discouraging EMP 
entry. The larger an ethnic group’s share of the population, the more likely that group is 
to contest elections with an ethnically-based party. Finally, a federal or devolved 
government system does not appear to substantially increase the likelihood of EMP entry. 
 The above analysis was performed using the version of the dataset that 
operationalizes the ethnicity of Muslims in Western Europe according to national origin. 
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What happens if we define ethnicity according to religious adherence instead? Table 3.8 
shows the results of the four multivariate models tested on a dataset using this alternative 
operationalization. 
 
Table 3.8: Multivariate analysis on alternative (religion-as-ethnicity) dataset 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Native 11.88 ** 
(3.68) 
  9.7 *** 
(2.75) 
territorial attachment -2.49 
(2.34) 
   
dominant/autonomous 7.77 *** 
(2.32) 
  6.16 ** 
(2.03) 
MFP score x 
population share 
 0.0004 
(0.01) 
  
MFP score  
 
0.02 
(0.15) 
  
population share 0.31 * 
(0.12) 
0.56 
(0.39) 
0.50 * 
(0.22) 
0.27 * 
(0.12) 
bordering kin state   8.85 ** 
(3.14) 
0.81 
(2.04) 
EU candidate   1.82 * 
(0.84) 
1.46 . 
(0.76) 
electoral 
disproportionality 
-0.13 * 
(0.06) 
-0.1 . 
(0.06) 
-0.08  
(0.07) 
-0.11 
(0.06) 
federal/devolved 2.99 
(5.96) 
-3.01 
(2.63) 
- 2.45 
(5.66) 
2.81 
(5.12) 
N 407 395 407 407 
 
 A comparison of tables 3.7 and 3.8 reveals that the results of the two models are 
virtually identical. The only difference of note is that the control variable electoral 
disproportionality loses its statistical significance in Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.8. 
However, we observe no discrepancy between the results derived from the two datasets 
when it comes to the independent variables belonging to the three groups—historical, 
political opportunity structure and international—that this analysis is primarily concerned 
with examining. 
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 I performed one additional sensitivity test by employing the three alternative 
measurements of ethnic group size described earlier in this chapter, reducing the size (as 
a percentage of total population) of predominantly migrant ethnic groups by 25%, 33% 
and 50%, respectively. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether 
variation in citizenship rates between migrant and native groups could account for the 
positive effect of historicity on ethnic minority party entry. If that were the case, then the 
advantage enjoyed by native groups may have nothing to do with their historical 
background, but be simply a product of their legal status and voting eligibility. However, 
in testing each of the models described above, I discovered that the alternate 
specifications for the population share variable do not affect the results in any substantial 
way. Even when reducing migrant groups’ population share by 50%, the statistical 
significance level for native remained constant across both Model 1 and Model 4. Nor 
were there any substantial effects on the coefficients or statistical significance exhibited 
by other variables (including population share itself). It seems, thus, that we cannot 
explain away the link between historicity and EMP entry as a mere product of citizenship 
status. 
 V. Analysis #2: Electoral success 
 Operationalizing electoral success is not as straightforward as operationalizing 
electoral entry. What does it mean for an ethnic minority party to be successful? 
 One way to approach this question is to look at the share of the vote the party 
receives in a particular legislative election, and to view parties that get a greater share of 
the vote as more successful. While this may be an appropriate way to measure success for 
ideologically-based parties, it has a serious drawback when used for EMPs. Unlike non-
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ethnic parties, EMPs tend to have a built-in ceiling to how many votes they can attract. It 
is true that ethnic parties in Europe have occasionally attracted a modest number of votes 
from voters who are not members of the ethnic group in question, but for the most part 
electoral support for EMPs has been limited by the size of the group the party seeks to 
represent. Therefore, measuring success based on vote share would not do justice to 
smaller minority groups. 
 A better way to define success is to ask whether an ethnic group was able to 
obtain legislative representation by contesting a particular election with an EMP. The 
primary purpose of a minority party is to give its ethnic group a voice in the country’s 
law-making body. For this reason, it seems that asking whether the party obtained 
legislative representation is the best way to determine whether the minority party project 
can be considered a success. Therefore, I consider as “successful” those ethnic minority 
groups that were able to win at least one seat in the national legislative body as a 
consequence of the electoral performance of one or more EMPs representing that group. 
Some might object here that this operationalization does not avoid the problem 
raised earlier, since parties representing larger groups are more likely to obtain the votes 
necessary to pass electoral thresholds of representation. However, this part of the analysis 
only considers minority groups that have formed parties. The entry of an EMP suggests 
that it is at least plausible that the party could have obtained electoral representation, 
since the desire to win seats in the national legislature is the primary reason parties 
contest elections. If the odds were completely stacked against a minority group, it is hard 
to understand why it would pursue the minority party strategy in the first place. 
Therefore, setting “legislative representation” as the requirement for success does not set 
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the bar too high. Nor does it reward EMPs representing larger ethnic groups that win 
many seats due to their numerical strength. 
 It is important to add that legislative representation must have been obtained 
without the help of special quotas reserved for ethnic minority representation. That is, if 
quotas for ethnic group representation do exist within a country, a minority party can be 
considered successful only if it obtained a sufficient number of votes so that it would 
have been able to win at least one seat even in the absence of preferential rules. If this is 
not the case, the wisest course of action is to remove the case from the analysis, since we 
cannot be certain how the party would have fared had there been no quota in place. We 
cannot consider such cases to be “failures” since the party may have obtained a greater 
share of the vote if it had not been assured of representation through the quota system. 
 In the sections below, I discuss the independent variables theorized to be 
predictors of ethnic minority party success in this analysis. 
1. HSP variables 
While I theorize that the three historical-social-psychological variables developed 
in Chapter II account primarily for an ethnic group’s decision to form and contest 
elections through a party of its own, the influence of these factors would seem to spill 
over into the area of electoral performance as well. After all, it is possible that some 
ethnic minority parties are formed as a consequence of the personal ambition of one or 
more political entrepreneurs, even if the social and political consciousness of the group it 
seeks to represent does not lend itself to the EMP model of representation. A casual 
examination of the cases in the dataset reveals that minority parties are sometimes 
attempted by groups that lack one or more of the historical factors theorized to aid 
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electoral entry. I expect that those parties that do not possess as many of the desirable 
historical characteristics will have a more difficult time generating sufficient electoral 
support among their target group in order to obtain legislative representation. 
2. Party system variables 
 In Chapter II, I proposed that the presence of a strong right-wing populist (RWP) 
party in the state ought to improve an ethnic minority party’s likelihood of attaining 
success. The reasoning behind this is that EMPs and RWP parties tend to be polar 
opposites on issues that central to both parties, and that the latter group of parties often 
seek to capitalize on anti-minority and anti-pluralist sentiment in their country. Thus, the 
heated rhetoric right-wing populist parties advance in order to mobilize nationalist and 
anti-minority support also aids ethnic minority parties by creating a sense of political 
threat among minority voters. Minority group members are more likely to respond to 
EMP campaign efforts if they view such efforts as counter-mobilization against the far 
right. 
 For this reason, I include a variable in my analysis that corresponds to the share of 
the vote received by all right-wing populist parties in a particular election. I further 
include a lagged version of this variable in order to allow for the possibility of a delayed 
effect where RWP party performance in one election could influence minority party 
performance in the following election. My expectation is that the greater the share of 
electoral support for populist right parties, the more likely we are to observe a successful 
EMP. 
 I classify as “right-wing populist” those parties that exhibit all three of the 
characteristics that Mudde (2007) identifies as being foundational for the populist right in 
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Europe—nativism (the claim to representing the interests of the majority ethnic group of 
the state), populism (opposition to the political establishment on the grounds that if favors 
“other people” rather than “the people”) and authoritarianism (promoting a strictly 
ordered society where disobedience of authority is punished severely). In order to 
determine whether a party contains these features, I consulted party manifestos and, 
where manifestos were not available, press releases and academic and popular 
publications, to determine whether a certain party exhibited RWP traits. Although I 
favored primary sources (party manifestos and press releases) where they were available 
either in English or in languages I am proficient in reading (Bulgarian, Macedonian and 
Serbian-Bosnian-Croatian), I often had to rely on secondary but nonetheless trustworthy 
sources, authored by academic and non-academic experts on the politics of the relevant 
state.  
Table 3.9 below presents all of the parties I classified as right-wing populist. 
(Note that this list is limited to countries where an EMP entered at least one election.) 
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Table 3.9: Right-wing populist parties 
STATE Right-wing populist parties (period contesting elections) 
Albania National Front (1991-present) 
Bulgaria Ataka (2005-present) 
Croatia Croatian Party of Rights (1992-present) 
Croatian Party of Rights - dr. Ante Starčević (2011-present) 
Czech 
Republic 
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (1992-1998) 
Republicans of Miroslav Sladek (2002-present) 
Estonia Estonian Future Party (1995) 
Estonian Independence Party (1999-present) 
Finland True Finns (1999-present) 
Hungary Hungarian Justice and Life Party (1994-present) 
Jobbik (2006-present) 
Latvia For Fatherland and Freedom (1993-1995) 
 Latvian Independence Movement (1993-1995) 
 For Fatherland and Freedom/LNKK (1998-present) 
Lithuania Order and Justice (2004-present) 
Lithuanian Nationalists Union (1992-present) 
Young Lithuania (2012-present) 
Macedonia Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic 
Party for Macedonian National Unity (1990-present) 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – People's 
Party (2006-present) 
Romania Greater Romania Party (1992-present) 
Serbia Serbian Radical Party (2000-present) 
Slovakia Slovak National Party (1990-present) 
 True Slovak National Party (2002) 
Turkey Nationalist Movement Party (1999) 
Ukraine Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (1994-present) 
Ukrainian National Assembly (1994-present) 
All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’ (1994-present) 
UK British National Party (1992-present) 
 
 3. Political culture variables 
Another variable I theorize influences EMP success is a political culture of 
clientelism. In Chapter II, I argued that in states where clientelistic practices are a 
substantial source of electoral support, parties organized along ethnic lines have an 
advantage. This advantage is due to the fact that a common ethnic identification creates 
natural built-in networks for both the acquisition of votes and the allocation of rewards 
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for votes received. I therefore expect that EMPs will tend to be more successful in states 
where clientelism is more commonplace. 
 Clientelism and patronage are notoriously difficult phenomena to measure, as the 
practices and exchanges involved do not usually happen out in the open. For this reason, 
quantitative studies have tended to utilize proxies. I follow Manow (2002) in using 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as a proxy for 
clientelism. While it is certainly not an ideal way to measure clientelsim, the CPI is one 
of the best proxies for two primary reasons. First, much of the data contained in the 
sources used to calculate the CPI has to do directly with clientelistic practices, since it 
touches on issues like the misuse of public power for private benefit. Second, even the 
indicators comprising the index that do not directly deal with clientelism or patronage can 
be expected to be nonetheless highly correlated with the presence of such practices. The 
values of the CPI range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating lower perceptions of 
corruption. (In order to avoid confusion, I label the variable as “absence of corruption” in 
the following analysis). 
 4. International variables 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that a nearby kin state can help a minority party 
maximize its electoral support. The existence of such a state can offer EMPs improved 
access to citizens living abroad, give them an opportunity to form strategic partnerships 
with established parties in the kin state and enable them to attract strategically targeted 
foreign investment. Thus, we can expect the presence of a kin state to maximize an ethnic 
minority party’s voteshare and therefore increase the likelihood of that party obtaining 
legislative representation. 
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As in the previous analysis, I consider two alternative operationalizations of this 
variable—a broader one including all European kin states, and a narrower one limited to 
bordering kin states. 
 5. Party organization variables 
 Chapter II discussed three factors pertaining to party organization that can be 
expected to contribute to EMP success. However, testing these variables in the present 
quantitative analysis is unfeasible, for two primary reasons. First, obtaining accurate data 
for these variables, especially for a large dataset like this, would be extremely 
challenging and time-consuming. Second, incorporating such variables would necessitate 
examining the data at an ethnic party level of measurement, rather than an ethnic group 
level of measurement. Doing this would significantly complicate the analysis, since 
multiple parties from the same ethnic group competing over the same time period would 
be included. This would frustrate interpretation of the influence of ethnic group-level and 
country-level variables, since minority groups that produce successful ethnic parties are 
also likely to produce unsuccessful challengers to those parties. For these reasons, I elect 
not to examine party organization variables as part of this analysis. However, I do explore 
these variables in the case study in Chapter IV. 
 6. Control variables 
 
 The same control variables employed in the previous analysis—population, 
electoral disproportionality and federalism/autonomy—are utilized here. It seems 
straightforward that more numerous ethnic groups are more likely to produce an EMP 
capable of winning seats in the country’s legislature. Likewise, a federal or devolved 
state could enable EMPs to use regional politics as a laboratory in which to develop their 
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capacities before entering national contests, making it more likely that when they do so, 
they will achieve success. Finally, as with electoral entry, it is not clear what effect we 
should expect electoral disproportionality to have on electoral success, since it is possible 
that geographically-concentrated groups could actually benefit from a disproportional 
distribution of seats to votes. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to include disproportionality 
as a control variable to account for variation among states.   
 7. Descriptive statistics 
 
 The dataset used in this analysis a subset of the one used in the previous analysis, 
comprised only of cases where an ethnic minority group contested an election with an 
EMP. The total number of observations therefore falls to 180. 
 Table 3.10 presents some descriptive statistics for all continuous variables 
contained in this narrower dataset, while Table 3.11 presents frequencies and percentages 
for the dichotomous variables used in the analysis. 
 
Table 3.10: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Variable Minimum 1st 
Quartile 
Median Mean 3rd 
Quartile 
Maximum 
Population share 1.1 3.4 6.5 10.4 16.3 34.3 
Electoral 
disproportionality 
0.7 3.6 5.7 7.7 9.7 34.5 
Right-wing 
populist vote 
0 0 3.2 8.7 12.4 48.8 
Lagged right-
wing populist 
vote 
0 0 1.0 7.3 9.1 48.8 
 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
1.3 3.0 3.8 4.3 4.7 9.8 
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Table 3.11: Frequencies and percentages for dichotomous variables 
Variable Value Frequency Percent 
Electoral success 0 36 19 
1 145 80 
Native 0 7 4 
1 174 96 
Territorial 0 44 24 
1 137 76 
Dominant/autonomous 0 47 26 
1 134 74 
Kin state 0 56 31 
1 125 69 
Bordering kin state 0 65 36 
1 116 64 
Federal/devolved 0 142 78 
1 39 22 
 
 
 One thing to note here are the relatively few cases of minority groups that do not 
possess the three favorable historical characteristics, and this is particularly true for 
historical presence. This is due to the fact so few minority groups that do not possess 
these characteristics even attempt to contest elections with an ethnically-based party. 
Also of interest is the significant overlap between kin state and bordering kin state. Of 
the 125 cases where a kin state was present, 116 were cases where that state shared a 
border with the country where the election took place. This suggests that in this version 
of the dataset, the two variables are nearly identical.  
 8. Bivariate correlations 
 Table 3.12 presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between each of the 
independent and control variables in the analysis and the dependent variable. In order to 
assess statistical significance, P-values derived from a Wald’s Two Sample t-test are also 
reported. 
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Table 3.12: Bivariate correlations with electoral success 
Variable Correlation Coefficient 
Native 0.26 
Territorial 0.46 
Dominant/autonomous 0.53 
RWP vote 0.03 
Lagged RWP vote 0.04 
(Absence of) corruption 0.02 
Population share 0.21 
Kin state 0.42 
Bordering kin state 0.43 
Electoral disproportionality -0.08 
Federal/devolved 0.23 
 
 
 The bivariate correlations between the three historical variables and the dependent 
variable are not as strong as they were in the previous analysis, owing to the fact that the 
cases contained in this narrower dataset are already heavily selected for the presence of 
these factors. Nonetheless, these characteristics do still appear to be correlated with 
minority party success. Both operationalizations of kin state effect also exhibit a 
substantial correlation with EMP success, with their coefficients being almost identical. 
As in the first part of the analysis, I elect to use bordering kin state in the multivariate 
analysis going forward. I found that substituting the broader operationalization does not 
alter the results, as suggested by the considerable overlap between the two variables 
highlighted in the previous section. While right-wing populist party vote does not exhibit 
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a strong correlation with the dependent variable in either its lagged or non-lagged forms, 
I am still interested in examining its influence in the multivariate analysis going forward. 
In the following section, I do this with the lagged version of the variable, since it appears 
to be slightly more influential. 
 9. Cross-tabulation 
In order to examine the effect of the three historical variables working in 
conjunction with each other, I next consider the incidence of electoral entry for each of 
the six possible combinations of the presence and absence of these characteristics. Table 
3.13 reports the proportion of electoral contestation for groups possessing each of these 
combinations of historical traits. 
  
Table 3.13: Historical variable pairs and proportions of successful electoral entry 
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 Because none of the cases where all the three HSP variables are absent produced 
EMP entry, there is also no EMP success to speak of. Once again, we observe that 
possessing even one of the three characteristics raises the incidence of electoral success 
dramatically. For instance, simply possessing the dominant/autonomous trait produces a 
78.6% success rate, increasing to 89.4% in conjunction with the native trait. Similarly, 
native minorities that are not dominant/autonomous have successful EMPs in 34.2% of 
elections, growing to 89.4% for autonomous groups. However, in contrast with the 
equivalent analysis preformed with respect to EMP entry, it appears that the 
dominance/autonomy variable has a substantially larger influence than the historicity 
variable when it comes to EMP success. Being native only increases the likelihood of 
success from 78.6% to 89.4% for formerly autonomous minorities, a change that is not 
statistically significant according to a chi-squared test (p=0.62). On the other hand, being 
dominant/autonomous raises the likelihood of success for native groups from 34.2 to 
89.4%, which a chi-squared test reveals to be a statistically significant difference 
(p=0.003). Another difference is that territorial attachment seems to play more of a role in 
EMP success than it does in EMP entry. In cases where dominance/autonomy is absent 
but historicity is present, territoriality accounts for an increase from 21.7 to 58.3% in the 
incidence of electoral success, which appears at first glance to be a substantial difference. 
However, the number of observations here is very small and a chi-squared test suggests 
the difference is not quite statistically significant (p=0.08), so it seems uncertain whether 
territorial attachment really is highly influential. What is clear is that historicity and 
dominance/autonomy seem to contribute to minority party success when working in 
conjunction, and that the latter of these variables seems to be rather powerful even on its 
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own. 
 10. Multivariate models 
 
 I proceed to test the proposed predictors of ethnic minority party success using the 
same method (generalized linear mixed effects models) utilized in Analysis 1, again due 
to the dichotomous dependent variable and the multilevel structure of the data.  
 The first model I test includes the three historical variables, as well as the three 
control variables. The second model contains the factors pertaining to the party system 
and political culture of the state—right wing populist party strength (measured by lagged 
RWP voteshare) and pervasiveness of clientelism (proxied by the Corruption Perceptions 
Index). Model 3 contains the lone international influence variable in this analysis 
(bordering kin state), plus controls. The results from these three models are presented in 
Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.14: Multivariate analysis of electoral success 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Native 13.39 * 
(6.52) 
  10.58 ** 
(3.79) 
territorial attachment -1.22 
(2.48) 
   
dominant/autonomous 7.59 ** 
(2.36) 
  6.08 ** 
(1.98) 
RWP vote (lagged)  0.1 . 
(0.06) 
 0.09 . 
(0.05) 
Absence of corruption  
 
-0.38 
(0.62) 
  
population share 0.39 * 
(0.18) 
0.33 . 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.15) 
0.34 * 
(0.13) 
bordering kin state   6.15 ** 
(2.31) 
0.78 
(1.84) 
electoral 
disproportionality 
-0.16 * 
(0.07) 
-0.13  
(0.09) 
-0.15 . 
(0.09) 
-0.14 * 
(0.07) 
federal/devolved 0.77 
(2.18) 
7.2 
(5.82) 
6.98 . 
(3.79) 
1.81 
(2.05) 
N 180 180 180 407 
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 The results of Model 1 mimic those of the equivalent model in Analysis 1, in that 
they reveal that of the three historical factors, only historical presence and 
dominance/autonomy are statistically significant predictors of electoral success. A 
group’s territorial attachment does not appear to highly influence its ability to field a 
successful EMP. Once again, territorial attachment’s association with the dependent 
variable seems to be more a consequence of it being a subset of the historical presence 
variable. The same model with the latter variable omitted yielded a statistically 
significant coefficient for territorial attachment. However, the model presented here 
seems to suggest that historical presence is a better predictor of EMP success than the 
more narrow territorial attachment variable. 
 Model 2 reveals that the electoral strength of right-wing populist parties accounts 
for a modest improvement in a minority party’s likelihood of obtaining legislative 
representation. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant at the p<0.1 level. 
In contrast, the presence of a clientelistic political culture (proxied by corruption) does 
not appear to have any effect on the dependent variable. However, given the limitations 
of using an imperfect proxy variable to capture clientelism, we should not be too hasty in 
dismissing this theorized relationship. I revisit the question of whether clientelism aids 
minority parties in the next chapter.  
 The results of Model 3 reveal that a bordering kin state is highly correlated with a 
minority group’s ability to field a party that obtains legislative representation, with the 
coefficient being significant at p<.01. We should be cautious however, since a similar 
effect was present in the analysis of electoral entry, only to disappear when the historical 
variables were taken into account. 
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 Model 4 (also presented in Table 3.14) combines the three approaches to 
explaining minority party success represented in models 1 through 3. All independent 
variables save for territorial attachment and absence of corruption are included. Three of 
the explanatory variables that appeared to be significant predictors of minority party 
success in the first three models—historical presence, dominance/autonomy and RWP 
vote—retain their statistical significance; the fourth—bordering kin state—does not. 
Similarly to the analysis of minority party entry, apparent influences exerted by the 
proximity of a kin state disappear when a minority group’s historical characteristics are 
taken into account. 
 VI. Conclusion 
 The results of the analyses performed in this chapter reveal that two of the three 
historical variables proposed in my theoretical framework—historicity and 
dominance/autonomy—are the strongest determinants of ethnic minority party entry and 
success. Having an historical presence on the territory of the state prior to the formation 
of that state, and possessing experience with self-rule significantly contributes to an 
ethnic group’s ability to establish a successful ethnic minority party. The influence of 
these two variables exceeds that of any other tested in this analysis, including the size of 
the ethnic group as a percentage of total population. 
 In contrast, the influence of the remaining historical variable—territorial 
attachment, capturing a group’s historical identification with a particular region(s) in its 
state—varies relative to the mode of analysis. While there is a strong bivariate association 
between territorial attachment and EMP entry and success, this association greatly 
diminishes once it is examined in conjunction with the effect of other variables (though 
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slightly less so in the case of EMP success). On the balance, it seems that the influence 
territoriality appears to exert on its own is a largely a product of that variable’s high 
correlation with historicity (the former being ostensibly a subset of the latter). We should 
keep in mind however, that there are relatively few cases of historical ethnic groups that 
lack territorial attachment, particularly in the analysis on minority party success. Thus, it 
may be hasty to draw conclusions about the role of this variable based on the results 
presented here. 
 I find little evidence to support the idea that the political opportunity structure 
influences an ethnic group’s decision of whether to contest elections with an EMP or not. 
None of the analyses performed indicated that the attitudes of mainstream political parties 
toward ethnic minorities, either on their own or interacted with the ethnic group’s size, 
influence the likelihood of ethnic minority party entry, confirming the null finding of 
Bernauer and Bochsler (2011). It appears that the political decisions minority groups 
make have more to do with the intrinsic character of those groups than with a reaction to 
the prevailing attitudes and strategies of major political parties. However, we should not 
be too quick to dismiss the influence of the political opportunity structure, as these null 
findings may be at least partly the result of the methodological challenges faced in 
accurately measuring party attitudes toward ethnic minorities, and especially attitudes 
toward specific minority groups. 
In examining the influence of international actors, two main findings emerge. 
First, candidacy for European Union accession seems to slightly increase the likelihood 
of observing electoral entry for an ethnic minority party within the candidate state. 
Second, and somewhat surprisingly, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the 
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presence of a bordering kin state aids in either EMP entry or success. In both cases, the 
variable appears to exert a strong influence when examining bivariate associations and 
multivariate models that do not include historical variables. However, once historicity 
and territorial attachment are taken into account, the influence of a bordering kin state 
vanishes. It appears that similarly to the territorial attachment variable, the perceived 
impact of a neighboring kin state has more to do with its association with other strong 
predictors of EMP entry and success (historicity and territorial attachment) than with any 
intrinsic quality. On the balance then, it seems that international-actor explanations of 
minority party entry and success are not as successful as those based on the historical 
characteristics of ethnic groups. 
 Lastly we come to the political culture and political system variables proposed to 
influence minority party success. I find no evidence in any of the analyses performed that 
a clientelistic political culture contributes to EMP success. However, we should keep in 
mind that the operationalization of the variable utilized (based on perceptions of 
corruption, rather than clientelism) is less-than-ideal, so it would be hasty to draw 
conclusions based on the null finding. (In Chapter IV, I discuss how the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms party in Bulgaria has excelled at utilizing clientelistic practices to 
bolster its standing.) With respect to the political system of the state, I find that we are 
more likely to observe successful EMPs in elections that are also contested by a 
successful right-wing populist (RWP) party. Although the influence of such parties on 
minority party success is modest, it does suggest that the sense of threat instilled by the 
radical right does play some role in mobilizing support for EMPs. 
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IV. Ethnic Minority Politics in Bulgaria 
I. Introduction 
The cross-national, quantitative study of ethnic minority party emergence and 
success entails some inherent limitations. As with all large-N analyses, depth must be 
sacrificed in order for complex, multi-faceted processes and influences to be quantified, 
or reduced into neatly conceived categorical variables. In particular, historical-social-
psychological factors, which are a central focus in this work, can be so unique and ethnic 
group-specific that it is impossible to do them full justice by employing such an 
approach. While my analysis in the previous chapter captures the primary determinants of 
EMP emergence and success, much remains to be said about how these relevant factors 
manifest themselves in the political participation strategies of particular minority groups.  
In order to complement the quantitative findings of Chapter III, this chapter 
presents a detailed, qualitative case study of the factors contributing to EMP 
establishment and success in Bulgaria. Focusing on a single country allows me to dig 
deeper into the relationships between independent and dependent variables, and to 
examine the specific causal mechanisms through which the former influence the latter. It 
further enables me to closely examine the influence of variables—such as major party 
reaction to minority demands, or the presence of clientelism—whose operationalization 
in the previous chapter was less-than-ideal due to data limitations. Lastly, this study 
enables me to test some of the theoretical expectations—namely those pertaining to party 
organization characteristics—developed in Chapter II that I was unable to incorporate 
into my quantitative analysis. 
Bulgaria is an excellent subject for a case study on the determinants of the 
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political strategies of ethnic minority groups, as well as the outcomes of those strategies. 
It contains two sizable minority groups—the Turks and Roma—whose efforts in the area 
of collective political action have taken different paths and resulted in widely diverging 
outcomes. 
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a party representing Bulgaria’s ethnic 
Turks and Muslims, is one of the most successful and influential EMPs in Europe. Since 
the demise of Communism, the MRF has enjoyed a strong and growing electoral support 
(winning as much as 14.5% of the vote in the 2009 parliamentary election) and has 
consistently obtained parliamentary representation. It has successfully fended off 
challenges from both rival Turkish parties and mainstream, non-ethnic parties that have 
sought to make inroads into its electorate. The success of the party has allowed it to exert 
a tremendous amount of influence on Bulgarian politics. Prior to 2009, virtually no 
Bulgarian government existed without formal or informal MRF support. Bulgarian 
center-right and center-left governments of the 1990’s depended on the backing of the 
MRF in parliamentary votes of confidence. Between 2001 and 2009, the party was part of 
the governing coalition and controlled numerous portfolios, and it recently returned to 
power following the 2013 parliamentary elections. 
In contrast, while there has been no shortage of attempts to form a Roma party, 
such efforts have generally failed or enjoyed only modest and fleeting success, with the 
group’s political participation remaining deeply fragmented and disorganized. Initial 
efforts to establish a Roma party in aftermath of Communist collapse failed, as the 
Democratic Roma Union (DRU) was banned on grounds of violating Bulgaria’s 
constitutional ban on ethnic parties. While later attempts at Roma party formation were 
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permitted by the Bulgarian courts, most of the parties established remained political 
minnows, content with contesting local elections and lacking the ambition or capacity to 
enter nationwide contests. Bulgaria’s most successful Roma party to date, Euroroma, won 
1.3% of the vote in the 2005 parliamentary elections—enough to secure government 
funding but far short of the 4% electoral threshold for legislative representation. Another 
party, Civil Union “Roma”, has been part of the Bulgarian Socialist Party-led center-left 
electoral coalitions in every national legislative election since 2001, but none of its 
members have ever been elected to the parliament or appointed to posts of national 
influence. No Roma party has contested national legislative elections on its own since 
2005. 
Although the Turks and Roma have experienced vastly different levels of success 
in their efforts to obtain legislative representation through ethnic minority parties, the two 
groups share much in common. Both are of similar numerical size—the Roma constitute 
around 5% and the Turks around 8% of the country’s population1—and both are large 
enough that parties representing them could plausibly pass Bulgaria’s 4% electoral 
threshold. Turks and Roma alike are characterized by low educational attainment and a 
low socio-economic status when compared to ethnic Bulgarians. While this is truer for 
the Roma than the Turks, the difference between the two groups is smaller than the 
difference between Turks and Bulgarians on these dimensions.2 Both groups tend to live 
in smaller cities and rural areas, and are less likely to be found in large cities. Although 
                                                           
1 Numbers based on Bulgaria’s 2011 census. Unofficial estimates suggest a more substantial Roma 
population. Official census data across Europe is generally considered to underestimate the size of Roma 
populations, in no small measure because some Roma refrain from self-identifying because of fear of 
discrimination. 
2 Minkov (2011: 359) examines 2001 Bulgarian Census data, showing that ethnic Turks are statistically 
closer to the Roma on measures of educational attainment (based on possession of secondary and post-
secondary degrees) than they are to ethnic Bulgarians. 
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Christianity has made considerable headway into Roma communities in recent decades, 
Islam is still the predominant faith in the community (as it is, of course, for Turks). 
Members of both communities tend to speak a primary language other than Bulgarian. 
Lastly, both the Turks and the Roma experienced tremendous levels of repression, 
harassment and forced assimilation under Bulgaria’s Communist regime. While I do not 
claim that these similarities are sufficient to consider this a Most Similar Systems Design, 
they nevertheless ought to alleviate some concern about omitted variable bias, and allow 
a reasonably rigorous test of the explanatory framework proposed in this dissertation. 
In order to determine whether the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II 
can account for the different levels of success enjoyed by Turkish and Roma efforts at 
political engagement, I performed extensive field research over the course of a month in 
Sofia, Bulgaria. I conducted twelve detailed interviews with former members of 
parliament, members, leaders and founders of various ethnic minority parities 
representing the Turkish and Roma communities, leading scholars of Bulgarian politics 
and members and leaders of non-governmental organizations concerned with promoting 
ethnic interests.3 The interviews had an average duration of about one hour, with subjects 
typically providing responses to between ten and twelve questions. The interviews were 
semi-structured, meaning that I sometimes deviated from my prepared list of questions in 
order to pursue ideas introduced by the person interviewed. In order to protect the 
reputations of all interview subjects and to elicit their honest and forthright responses, I 
guaranteed the subjects’ anonymity. In addition to conducting these interviews, I 
accessed valuable historical and sociological resources at institutions such as Sofia 
                                                           
3 The precise breakdown of the respondents’ occupations is as follows: six politicians, three scholars and 
three NGO representatives. 
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University and the American Research Center in Sofia. Both prior to and following my 
stay in Bulgaria, I consulted a host of both academic and non-academic sources in order 
to obtain a comprehensive picture of the country’s ethnic politics. 
As in my quantitative analysis, my primary concern in this study was exploring 
the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter II—namely those pertaining to the 
Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) framework, the country’s party system and 
political culture, the influence of international actors and features of party organization. 
However, the interviews I conducted were sufficiently open-ended so as to explore the 
role of variables outside of this theoretical framework, and I was careful not to 
intentionally steer the interview subjects toward confirming my predictions. As a 
consequence, while most of my theoretical expectations were confirmed, some were not, 
and several factors unique to Bulgarian ethnic politics emerged as important in explaining 
the success of the MRF, and the lack thereof of Roma parties (as well as rival Turkish 
EMPs). 
Ultimately, I found that that a number of historical factors have contributed to the 
political strategies employed by the Roma and Turkish communities and their respective 
levels of success. Both groups share an extensive historical presence on territories 
currently part of the Bulgarian state, making the idea of an ethnic minority party plausible 
and appealing for both. However, the greater historical capital possessed by the Turkish 
community as a product of its territorial concentration and former dominant status has 
helped generate mass-level support for a Turkish minority party far surpassing similar 
sentiment in favor of a Roma party. I further find that in addition to the three variables of 
the HSP framework, the repressive policies of forced assimilation carried out by 
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Bulgaria’s Communist government toward its ethnic minorities played a substantial role 
in galvanizing widespread support for a Turkish party, but not for a Roma party. I 
attribute this latter finding at least partly to the fact that the Roma community did not 
possess the vast historical capital of Bulgaria’s Turks. 
I further find that a host of non-historical variables help explain the fates of these 
two minority groups in the political arena. I discover that Bulgaria’s major political 
parties initially made only feeble and misguided attempts at attracting the Turkish and 
Roma vote, allowing for the MRF to solidify its support among the former demographic, 
while the more systematic recent efforts to appeal to Turks are unlikely to break the MRF 
monopoly, since this monopoly was solidified and entrenched in the early 1990’s. I 
further find that the emergence of the nationalist party Ataka has improved the MRF’s 
electoral fortunes by helping the party mobilize its base. The Movement has also greatly 
benefitted from its ability to utilize clientelistic networks, exploiting such networks to a 
greater extent than the country’s major non-ethnic parties.  
With respect to international influences, I determine that support from both 
Turkey and the European Union played a role in the emergence of the MRF in the early 
1990s, and that the lack of such international support enabled the Bulgarian state to snuff 
out efforts at Roma party formation in the same period. However, I find no evidence that 
the EU contributed to the party’s strong electoral performance beyond this foundational 
period, and while the existence of a neighboring kin state has helped in this respect, this 
is due to reasons other than direct and intentional intervention by the Turkish state. 
Lastly, I find that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been aided in its 
electoral success by its extensive and rigidly hierarchical organization structure that 
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nevertheless offers opportunities for intra-party advancement, as well as by the quality of 
its leaders. In contrast, parties of the Roma have suffered the consequences of a weak 
organizational structure, paired with serious deficits in the educational attainment and 
political acumen of their leaders. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. In section II, I examine the historical 
background of Bulgaria’s two largest ethnic minority groups—the Turks and the Roma—
and trace how the two groups’ experiences have impacted their social and political 
consciousness and shaped their strategies for engaging in the political process. In section 
III, I consider the influence of party system variables—namely the attitudes and strategies 
of mainstream political parties, as well as the rise of the nationalist party Ataka—on the 
emergence and success of EMPs in Bulgaria. In section IV, I examine the role Bulgarian 
political culture—and more specifically the proliferation of clientelistic practices—plays 
in the success of the MRF. In section V, I consider the party organizational features of the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms, as compared to other ethnic and non-ethnic parties, 
and how it has allowed the party to flourish in Bulgarian politics. Lastly, I conclude in 
Section VI. 
II. Historical variables 
What role did the historical experiences of Bulgaria’s Turks and Roma have in 
shaping the two groups’ strategies for political engagement in the country’s post-
Communist electoral landscape? Further, do these respective historical backgrounds help 
to explain why the Turks managed to establish a highly successful party and the Roma 
did not? 
To answer these questions, I first offer a broad overview of the history of 
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Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities and the development and politicization of the Turkish and 
Roma ethnic identities in section 1. Then, in section 2, I assess the applicability of the 
HSP framework in the Bulgarian case, and consider the influence of a historical factor 
outside of that framework—past repression and forced assimilation. 
1. Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities: a historical overview 
1.1 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1878-1913 
 In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin established the Principality of Bulgaria as a 
constitutional monarchy, and Eastern Rumelia as an autonomous Ottoman province. 
These two entities would go on to become unified in 1885 and would eventually declare 
independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908, forming the modern Bulgarian state. 
 The creation of this new state led to an inversion of the hierarchical relations 
between the ethnic groups residing within it. Muslims, who had formerly enjoyed a 
privileged majority status within the Ottoman Empire, now found themselves as a 
sizeable minority group, accounting for almost a quarter of the population of the 
Principality of Bulgaria in the late 19th century.4 This group was comprised 
predominantly of ethnic Turks but also of Pomaks (Slavic Muslims) and Gypsies. In the 
following decades, Bulgaria’s Muslims would decline as a percentage of the population 
due to migration to the Ottoman Empire (and later Turkey), yet Turks and Roma remain 
Bulgaria’s two largest ethnic minority groups today. 
 The protection of Bulgaria’s Muslim minority was firmly enshrined in the 1879 
Turnovo Constitution, one of the most liberal constitutions in the world at its time of 
adoption. Yet the policies of the Bulgarian state towards the Muslim minority from 1879 
                                                           
4 Koksal, Yonca. “Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1940.” 
Nationalities Papers 38.2 (2010): 191-211. 
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to 1913 were unstable and did not work toward any long-term vision or goal, but rather 
served as temporary solutions to the various problems that arose during this period.5 
There was a general apathy on the part of Bulgarian political elites toward the plight of 
the Muslim population, resulting in policies driven by short-sighted utilitarianism. 
 The political participation of Bulgarian Muslims in this period is difficult to 
evaluate. On the one hand, election results indicate that the Muslim community obtained 
considerable legislative representation. For instance, in 1882 ethnic Turks comprised 13 
of the 56 deputies in the Third National Assembly6. Yet there is no evidence that political 
elites—regardless of their ethnicity—took to heart the concerns of ordinary Turkish 
Muslims. Rather, the dominant political parties in the state relied on clientelistic policies 
to win the support of the Muslim community. Party bosses purchased the allegiance of 
local Muslim leaders by offering certain rewards in exchange, and the Muslim 
community proceeded to vote uniformly for the party endorsed by the leader. Thus, no 
stable patterns of voting and political participation emerged during this period.7 There 
was no sense of a coherent Muslim political agenda, and there were few efforts to 
organize politically in the hope of exerting an influence on government. 
 Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities took some time to transition out of the confessional 
Ottoman millet system, with no strong sense of ethnic identity emerging over this period 
for either Turks, Pomaks or the Roma. Instead, we observe the significant (though slowly 
waning) relevance of religious affiliation as an identity marker. The public’s overreliance 
on religious leaders and other Muslim elites for guidance on political decisions 
                                                           
5 Koksal, Yonca. “Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1940.” 
Nationalities Papers 38.2 (2010): 191-211. 
6 Manolova, Maria. Parlamentarismut v Bulgaria: 1879-1894. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata akademiya 
na naukite, 1989. 
7 Koksal, Yonca. “Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1940.” 
Nationalities Papers 38.2 (2010): 191-211. 
127 
 
 
discouraged independent thinking and political participation at the mass level. The 
traditionalism of these Muslim communities further restrained the educational 
advancement and ideological development necessary for effective political participation. 
 Thus, it would be naïve to expect to observe ethnically-based political formations 
during this period. Not only was Bulgaria far too young a democracy for the politics of 
ideas to prevail over the politics of established hierarchical power relations, but there was 
no coherent ethnic minority identity to rally around—a “Muslim” identity was too broad, 
while Turkish and Roma identities were still in embryonic form. 
 1.2 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1914-1944 
 The first evidence of coordinated political action on the part of Bulgaria’s 
Muslims dates back to 1914. In the parliamentary elections held in February of that year, 
a vast majority of Muslim voters backed the Liberal Coalition, which won a plurality of 
the popular vote. It was a principled vote due to the liberals’ support for Muslim rights 
and their opposition to the Christianization of the Pomak population in Bulgaria’s newly 
acquired territories in the aftermath of the two Balkan Wars.8 Muslim representatives in 
the Bulgarian parliament proposed numerous legislative measures to improve the welfare 
of the Muslim minority, but these demands ultimately fell on deaf ears due to the 
government’s disinterest and preoccupation with wartime concerns.9  Thus, while Muslim 
Bulgarians made strides in their ability to engage the political system in an organized 
manner, this improved participation did not necessarily result in more favorable 
government policies. 
                                                           
8 Kostadinova, Tatiana. Bulgaria, 1879-1946: The Challenge of Choice. Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1995. 
9 Koksal, Yonca. “Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1940.” 
Nationalities Papers 38.2 (2010): 191-211. 
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 The development of mechanisms for managing the affairs of Bulgarian Muslims 
was greatly influenced by the signing of two major international treaties. First, in the 
aftermath of the Second Balkan War, the Treaty of Istanbul (1913) established the office 
of the Grand Mufti (the leading religious official in the state) as central to the affairs of 
the Muslim community. The treaty also weakened the relation between the Grand Mufti 
and the Ottoman government and increased his subordination to the Bulgarian state, 
paving the way for the state to exercise a tighter control over Muslim community life. 
 Next, following its defeat in the World War I, Bulgaria signed the Treaty of 
Neuilly (1919), which imposed the League of Nations’ requirements regarding the 
protection of minority rights. Later in 1919, the Bulgarian government endorsed a Statute 
for the Religious Organization and Rule of Muslims in the Bulgarian Kingdom. The 
statute presented a detailed plan for how the group would govern itself democratically as 
a minority. It organized Bulgaria’s Muslim community into separate Muslim 
Confessional Municipalities (MCM’s) run by democratically elected Muslim 
municipality boards, which managed the municipality’s property and nominated local 
muftis.10 The Grand Mufti remained on top of the Muslim community hierarchy, serving 
an important role as an intermediary between the community and Bulgarian state 
institutions. 
 Although this institutional structure presented an opportunity for Bulgaria’s 
Muslim community to exercise some degree of self-rule, the internal dynamics of the 
community had by that point become increasingly complex. At the inception of the 
modern Bulgarian state, there was little sense of Turkish nationalism among Muslims. 
                                                           
10 Ibid. 
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Turkish nationalism was predominantly exported to Bulgaria from Istanbul,11 and the rise 
of Kemalist ideology greatly accelerated this process. Initially, Bulgaria and the Ottoman 
Empire collaborated to prevent the spread of Turkish nationalism in Bulgaria. Yet 
following the Young Turks’ takeover of the Ottoman Empire in 1908, Turkish 
nationalism began to make serious inroads in Bulgaria. 
 While most Bulgarian statesmen were comfortable with a non-Christian 
confessional minority which nonetheless pledged allegiance to the Bulgarian state, the 
presence of a national minority with a bordering kin state was troubling. The period from 
1919 to the end of World War II saw efforts on the part of the Bulgarian government to 
prevent the Muslim community from becoming a Turkish one. As a consequence, the 
government went to great lengths to prop up and perpetuate the religion-based MCM 
structure, even as it came under attack from Turkish nationalists in Bulgaria. Turkish-
speaking Kemalists in Bulgaria detested the MCM structure and the authority of the 
Grand Mufti, seeing them as backward and elite-favoring vestiges of the Ottoman system, 
and as obstacles to the improvement of the welfare of the Bulgarian Turks. The Bulgarian 
government saw Kemalists as dangerous and disloyal, and consequently threw its support 
behind conservative Muslim religious elites and institutions. 
 The rise of the Turkish national identity served to accentuate the already present 
ethnic divisions within Bulgaria’s Muslims. Distinctions between ethnic Turks, Pomaks 
and the Roma became more pronounced. In particular, negative attitudes toward the 
Roma on the part of both ethnic Turks and Bulgarians strengthened over the course of the 
20th century. During the Ottoman Empire’s five-century reign, authorities were largely 
                                                           
11 Koksal, Yonca. “Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1940.” 
Nationalities Papers 38.2 (2010): 191-211. 
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successful in sedenterizing the Roma, and the vast majority of the gypsies had adopted 
Islam as a means of improving their status in society (though they remained second-class 
citizens to other Muslims). However, as Bulgaria underwent a process of modernization 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Roma became increasingly distinctive from 
other ethnic groups. As demand for the goods and services they had traditionally 
provided declined, the Roma were increasingly viewed as a people useless to society, 
unable to cope with modern realities and parasitizing on the charity of the state and its 
citizens (Tomova 1996: 17-19). Meanwhile, the Pomaks found themselves in an ethnic 
no-man’s land, torn between their racial and linguistic similarity to ethnic Bulgarians and 
their common religion with ethnic Turks. 
 Despite these divisions, most Bulgarian Muslims backed Aleksandar 
Stamboliyski’s Agrarian Union in the early 1920’s, and Stamboliyski himself as Prime 
Minister was favorable toward Kemalism and the rights of Turks as a national minority. 
However, Stamboliyski’s reign proved short-lived, and subsequent governments became 
increasingly assimilationist and hostile toward the Muslim minority. This trend was 
exacerbated during Bulgaria’s far-right flirtations in the mid-to-late 1930’s and early 
1940’s. The activities of many Turkish political, social and education organizations were 
initially limited, and eventually banned outright by the Bulgarian government.12 
Bulgarian Turks’ opportunities for political participation became more limited than they 
had been at any point of the Bulgarian state’s existence. 
 To summarize, Bulgarian inter-ethnic relations in this period were greatly 
influenced by the transition of the Bulgarian Muslim community from a traditionalist 
                                                           
12 Koksal, Yonca. “Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1940.” 
Nationalities Papers 38.2 (2010): 191-211. 
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group with a predominantly religious consciousness to a modernizing group with a 
secular, national consciousness. These developments led to increased participation by 
Turks into the affairs of the Bulgarian state, as well as to lively and spirited political 
discussions within the Muslim community itself. This evolution of the Muslim minority, 
coupled with the newly created institutional structure for managing its affairs, appeared 
to set the Turkish minority on a path toward effective political participation. This period 
saw the emergence of the first exclusively Turkish political organizations, which if left 
unhindered might have blossomed into successful ethnic minority parties. However, 
increasing suspicion and hostility towards Turkish nationalism on the part of the 
Bulgarian governing elites in the 1930’s and 1940’s halted and reversed the progress 
made in Turkish political representation.  
 1.3 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1945-1989 
 Following the conclusion of World War II, most Muslims supported the 
Communist Party and the Fatherland Front of which it was a member, with the hope that 
it would offer an expansion of minority rights and freedoms.13  The Dimitrov 
Constitution, adopted in 1947, acknowledged the existence of national minorities and 
stated that such groups are “entitled to be taught in their mother tongue and develop their 
national culture.” The period between 1947 and 1958 saw a dramatic increase in the 
number of Turkish schools and Turkish-language periodicals and newspapers, as well as 
the emergence of local Turkish literature.14 A number of Communist leaders praised the 
development of Turkish literature and Turkish culture, and promised to support its future 
                                                           
13 Koksal, Yonca. “Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1940.” 
Nationalities Papers 38.2 (2010): 191-211. 
14 Karpat, Kemal H. “The Turks of Bulgaria: The Struggle for National-Religious Survival of a Muslim 
Minority.” Nationalities Papers 23.4 (1995): 725-49. 
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expansion.15 
 While the Communist government’s social and cultural policies were initially 
favorable to the Turkish, Pomak and Roma minorities, this began to change in 1958, 
when a special plenum of the Politbureau set the precedent for the slow erosion of 
minority cultural rights in the years to come. The initial change in policies affected only 
the Roma, prohibiting the publishing of the community’s newspapers in a language other 
than Bulgarian and forcing its Muslim members to change their names to Bulgarian 
ones16. Such assimilationist policies would later be extended to other members of the 
Muslim community, including Turks. Starting in the 1960’s, the Bulgarian government 
gradually began to close down Turkish primary and secondary schools. It proceeded to 
close Turkish theaters and required that all newspapers be printed in Bulgarian.17 The 
Zhivkov Constitution, adopted in 1971, eliminated all references to minorities. In the 
early 1970’s, the government launched a campaign to change the Turkish/Arabic names 
of the Pomaks to their Bulgarian equivalents.18 
 The political participation of Bulgarian Muslims during Communism occurred in 
the same and only way it could occur for any Bulgarian citizen—entirely within the 
confines of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The party initially actively recruited 
members of the Muslim community, and in the 1950’s a significant number of Turks and 
Pomaks joined its ranks, including tens of thousands who held public office and top 
managerial positions.19 Yet at the same time, few Turks were elected to influential organs 
                                                           
15 Ibid. 
16 Petkova, Lilia. “The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian-Turkish 
Relations, 1947-2000.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1.4 (2002): 42-59. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Petkova, Lilia. “The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian-Turkish 
Relations, 1947-2000.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1.4 (2002): 42-59. 
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of the party like the Central Committee and the parliament, and none ever became part of 
the Politbureau or held ministerial posts.20 The lack of influence exerted by Muslim 
members on the policies of the Communist party is evident in the increasingly hostile 
policies adopted by the party toward ethnic minorities over time. 
 The Communist government’s extreme assimilationist policies with respect to the 
Turkish minority culminated in the so-called “Revival Process,” a 1984-85 campaign to 
change the names of the Bulgarian Turks. The “incentives” the state offered for the 
name-change ranged from economic sanctions to overt violence. The thousands of Turks 
who refused to change their names were sent to prison or labor camps. Additionally, the 
government banned expressions of Turkish and Muslim culture, such as the wearing of 
traditional dress, performing traditional rituals and playing Turkish folk music.21 To 
justify this campaign, the Bulgarian government sought to portray Turkey as a threat to 
the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state, and the Turkish minority as “terrorists” and 
“separatists.” Actually, Turkish terrorist attacks were very rare prior to the Revival 
Process, but increased dramatically during and after it—there were over twenty acts of 
terrorism between 1984 and 1987 (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008: 138). 
 In addition to stimulating terrorist activity, the Revival Process spawned a number 
of secret Turkish organizations dedicated to fighting for the group’s rights through 
nonviolent means. Among these was the Turkish National Liberation Movement in 
Bulgaria (TNLMB), founded and headed by Ahmed Dogan in 1985. At the time, Dogan 
was a fellow at the Institute of Philosophy at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; he had 
                                                           
20 Pundeff, Marin. “Bulgaria” in Joseph Held, ed. The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth 
Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
21 Petkova, Lilia. “The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian-Turkish 
Relations, 1947-2000.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1.4 (2002): 42-59. 
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also been working as an agent for the Committee for State Security (Darzhavna 
Sigurnost), the repressive apparatus of Bulgaria’s Communist party, since 1974. The 
TNLMB’s leading slogan was “War Without Arms,” and the organization focused on 
undermining the Revival Process through nonviolent means, including general strikes and 
the boycotting of elections. The authorities cracked down on the organization’s activity in 
the summer of 1986, throwing Dogan in prison. 
 Unlike the previous campaigns targeting the Roma and Pomaks, the campaign 
against the Turkish minority attracted a great deal of criticism from both the Turkish 
government and the international press. The policies of the Communist Party drove over 
300,000 Bulgarian Turks to emigrate to Turkey when they were allowed to do so in 1989. 
When Petar Mladenov succeeded Todor Zhivkov in 1989 to become Bulgaria’s last 
Communist leader, he renounced Zhivkov’s policies toward the Turkish minority, and 
approximately half of the émigré Turks returned to Bulgaria. 
 To summarize, the initial stages of Communist rule saw improvements in the 
social and cultural life of Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks (and to a lesser extent the Roma). 
The Dimitrov Constituion for the first time recognized national minorities, and the Turks 
were allowed and encouraged to educate themselves and to develop and express their 
own culture. Thus, the transformation from a traditionalist Muslim to a secular Turkish 
community initiated earlier in the century was more or less completed. Although the 
Bulgarian state lacked genuine democratic institutions, a significant number of Turks 
participated politically by becoming members of the Communist Party. 
 Once again, however, the honeymoon between the political establishment and 
ethnic minorities did not last long, as the communist government engaged in the most 
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extreme assimilationist policies in the history of the Bulgarian state. The most vulnerable 
of the minority groups, the Roma, was first to suffer from these policies. Next were the 
Pomaks, who similarly to the Roma did not have the benefit of neighboring state like 
Turkey interceding on their behalf. Finally, the Communist Party, which had contributed 
to the last stage of the development of a Turkish identity in Bulgaria, now sought to erase 
it in the blink of an eye. Instead, the Party’s actions served primarily to energize and 
revitalize Turkish nationalism in both its violent and non-violent forms. 
 1.4 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1990-present 
 The collapse of Bulgaria’s Communist regime paved the way for the formation of 
the Movement for the Rights and Freedoms of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria, a self-
identified liberal party protecting the interests of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. The 
party was founded in January 4th of 1990 by a group of Turkish dissidents who had 
opposed the Revival Process and headed by the recently released from prison Ahmed 
Dogan. Dogan emerged as the leader of the party due to his superior education and 
intellect; few of the other founding members appear to have been aware of his past work 
for State Security at this point. Dropping “Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria” from its name, 
the party contested the October 1990 elections for Constitutional Assembly, despite the 
fact that a law active at the time prohibited parties organized along ethnic or religious 
lines. The party was able to win 23 seats and thus became a participant in the crafting of 
Bulgaria’s new constitution. 
 Despite the MRF’s vociferous objections, the Constitution adopted on July 12th, 
1991 contained language banning ethnically-based parties, with Article 11.4 reading 
“there shall be no political parties based on ethnic, racial or religious lines.” The fate of 
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the MRF, along with that of ethnic minority parties representing the Roma (Democratic 
Roma Union) and Macedonians (United Macedonian Organization-Illinden) was now in 
limbo. After a protracted legal battle regarding the MRF’s eligibility to participate in the 
October 1991 parliamentary elections, Bulgaria’s newly established Constitutional Court 
ruled in April of 1992 that the MRF is not in violation of Article 11.4 since the party does 
not prohibit membership based on ethnicity. In contrast, parties like the Democratic 
Roma Union and UMO-Illinden were banned, despite having charters nearly identical to 
that of the MRF. The leaders of the latter party subsequently applied to the European 
Court of Human Rights, which ruled in their favor, citing a violation of Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.22 
 Following the monumental decision of the Constitutional Court, the MRF was 
able to establish itself as one of the most successful parties in Bulgarian politics. To date, 
the party has never failed to obtain legislative representation and has been portfolio-
holding coalition partner in three different governments. Despite the many revelations 
that have emerged regarding widespread corruption in the party and many of its leading 
members’ past work for State Security, the MRF has actually enjoyed rising popularity, 
having achieved its three strongest electoral performances in the last three parliamentary 
elections—2005, 2009 and 2013. 
 In contrast, Roma political parties have failed to make a dent in national politics. 
While a host of Roma parties have been formed, most remain marginal actors that only 
contest elections at the local level. To date, the most successful Roma party nationally 
has been Euroroma, which was able to win 1.3% of the vote in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections—the only legislative elections the party ever contested. No other party 
                                                           
22 United Macedonian Organization Ilinden-Pirin and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, ECHR 2005  
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representing an ethnic minority group—including various Turkish parties rivaling the 
MRF—has ever come close to reaching the 1% threshold necessary to obtain government 
funding, to say nothing of the 4% threshold needed for legislative representation. 
 2. The Historical-Social-Psychological framework and the Bulgarian case 
The preceding section examined the evolution of ethnic minority identities in 
Bulgaria, as well as developments in their politicization and political expression, 
revealing in the process the complexity of the historical processes that led to the present-
day ethnic political landscape. I now move on to examine the role of historical factors in 
the present-day fortunes of Turkish and Roma ethnic minority parties in a more 
systematic manner. I first consider the role of the three factors in my Historical-Social-
Psychological framework—historical presence, territorial attachment and 
dominance/autonomy. I then turn my sights to a historical factor outside of that 
theoretical framework that proved to be highly influential in the Bulgarian case—the 
experience of repression and forced assimilation. 
 2.1 Historical presence 
 Most of the Turks living in Bulgaria today are the descendants of settlers who 
came to the region following the Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria’s Second Kingdom at the 
end of the 14th century, although there is some evidence that there were even earlier 
waves of settlement. In any case, historical censuses suggest that Muslim settlers of 
various Turkic tribes constituted nearly 20% of the population of the Balkans as early as 
the year 1530 (Lapidus 2002: 252), with the lands of the modern Bulgarian state 
experiencing some of the highest concentrations of such settlers. Thus, groups that are 
today considered to be ethnically Turkish have enjoyed a significant historical presence 
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in the region for nearly 500 years. 
 Of course, for most of the length of this period, most Turks did not conceive of 
themselves as such, but rather assumed a Muslim identity under the Ottoman Empire’s 
confessional millet system. Other collective identities were likely to be based on tribal or 
clan allegiance, as opposed to a pan-Turkic ethnic identification. Turkish nationalism 
emerged only in the mid-19th century with the founding of the Turanian Society, and did 
not completely displace religiously-based identities until the first half of 20th century. 
Nevertheless, the modern Turkish ethnic identity is viewed—both by those who hold to it 
and those who do not—as a continuation of the Muslim identity that predominated 
among the various Turkic peoples in the region since the 16th century. While not every 
Muslim in the region exhibited the linguistic and racial characteristics today attributed to 
the Turkish ethnicity, a significant majority did, and despite the confessional nature of the 
millet system, both legal and social distinctions often existed between Turkic Muslims 
and those who were of a Slavic or (especially) Roma ethnicity. 
 The settlement of the Roma on the lands currently constituting the Bulgarian state 
possibly predates even that of the Turks, with first mass migration wave believed to have 
taken place between the 13th and 14th centuries (Marushiakova 2001: 19). A subsequent 
influx of Muslim Roma transpired over the course of the 14th and 15th centuries, 
following the Ottoman conquest of Bulgarian lands (Marushiakova 2001: 26). While 
there were smaller subsequent migration waves of Romani people, we can confidently 
state that they, like the Turks, had established a significant presence in the region by the 
mid-15th century. Although they were initially characterized by nomadism (as, indeed, 
were some of the Turkic settlers), most of the Roma were sedenterized prior to the 
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establishment of the modern Bulgarian state. 
 While they were technically part of the Muslim community under the millet 
system, the Roma took on a decidedly second-class status within it, enjoying few 
advantages over the Empire’s Christian subjects. Thus, although it appears that they 
sought to integrate into Muslim society as a means of improving their social standing, the 
Roma were never embraced by their Turkic and Slavic co-religionists. As the previous 
section discussed, the distinctiveness of the Roma ethnicity became even more 
accentuated with the transition to modernity and the rise of Turkish nationalism. Thus, 
while it may have taken a number of centuries for a “Roma” ethnic identity to fully 
emerge, holders of this identity have a rich history as a distinct people-group in the region 
upon which they can draw. 
 2.2 Territorial attachment 
 Although Turkish settlement following the Ottoman conquest affected virtually 
all regions of modern-day Bulgaria to some extent, the most numerous such settlements 
occurred in the southern Thracian valley and in what is today the northeastern portion of 
the country. These settlement patterns proved durable over the centuries, and on the eve 
of Bulgarian liberation from Ottoman rule in the 1870’s, it was these same regions that 
contained the highest concentration of Turks and Muslims. Subsequent to the 
establishment of the modern Bulgaria state, several migration waves took place as Turks 
moved to territories controlled by the Ottoman Empire (and later Turkey). However, 
northeastern Bulgaria and the southernmost portion of Bulgarian Thrace retained a 
substantial Turkish population. Many towns in these regions had been populated almost 
exclusively by Turks until Bulgarian refugees from other portions of the Ottoman Empire 
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settled in them to produce the current ethnically-mixed population (the surrounding 
villages, on the other hand, tended to retain their ethnic homogeneity). Thus, it is actually 
often the ethnic Bulgarians in these regions that are the late-comers. 
Figure 4.1 presents a map of the share of the population represented by ethnic 
Turks in Bulgaria’s 28 provinces. As we can observe, the historical settlement patterns 
have resulted in a present-day concentration of Turks in the provinces of Kardzhali in the 
south and in Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen and Silistra in the northeast. Not surprisingly, 
these provinces are also the major strongholds of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, with the party holding a near-monopoly of the vote in many of their villages, 
towns and municipalities. 
 
Figure 4.1: Ethnic Turks as a percentage of total population 
 
 
Source: 2011 Bulgarian National Census 
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In contrast to the Turks, the Roma did not settle in any geographically 
concentrated pattern. This was initially because they tended not to settle at all, as they 
were predominantly nomadic. However, over the centuries many Roma did take up 
permanent dwellings, either voluntarily or under compulsion by the governing 
authorities. Thus, by the end of the 19th century most Roma tribes were sedentary. 
However, even then the Roma remained spread across the country, with no significant 
number of them having settled in a particular region (or regions). This is reflected in this 
group’s present-day geographical dispersion, shown in Figure 4.2. As can be observed, 
the Roma do not constitute more than 15 percent of the population in any of Bulgaria’s 
provinces. Contrast this with the Turks, who comprise over 25 percent of the population 
in five provinces, and over 50 percent in two. 
As a consequence both of the group’s nomadic heritage and its failure to 
concentrate its numbers into particular geographic areas, no Bulgarian regions are today 
identified with the Roma or are viewed as being centers of Roma history or culture. 
Instead, the Roma can be found in most villages, towns and cities in Bulgaria, but never 
in great numbers. While they do tend to be isolated into separate neighborhoods within 
the cities they inhabit, these neighborhoods lack the political or historical significance to 
build political appeals around.
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Figure 4.2: Roma as a percentage of total population 
 
Source: 2011 Bulgarian National Census. 
 
 
 2.3 Dominance/autonomy 
 Bulgaria’s Turks (and to a somewhat lesser extent, its Slavic Muslims) enjoyed a 
dominant status within the Ottoman Empire during its five century-rule over the territory 
of modern Bulgaria that not only afforded them cultural and political autonomy, but also 
numerous privileges over other confessional communities. This is of course due to the 
fact that the Ottoman Empire was itself established and ruled by Muslim Turks. It is true 
that under the millet system, the empire’s primary religious communities—Muslims, 
Christians and Jews—were to some extent allowed to govern their own affairs. However, 
the millet leaders themselves were subservient to the sultan and were required to 
demonstrate absolute loyalty to the empire.  Additionally, there were significant taxes 
imposed on non-Muslim subjects that Muslims did not have to pay, and legal disputes 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim were always judged under Islamic sharia law. Thus, 
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the Turks enjoyed a privileged status that not only enabled them to exercise self-rule, but 
to also rule over others in the region. 
 Although a vast majority of the Roma living in Ottoman Bulgaria were Muslim, 
they were not afforded the same privileged status as other (Turkic or Slavic) Muslims. 
Indeed, in their treatment of the Roma, the Ottomans in many ways broke with the millet 
system, governing the group not based on its religion but its ethnicity (Celik 2004: 5)  
While the Roma did enjoy some of the tax relief associated with the adherence to Islam, 
they were asked to pay significantly more than their Slavic and Turkic co-religionists. 
Additionally, there is evidence that the Roma were marginalized and antagonized by the 
Ottoman authorities throughout their reign in the region. For instance, some 16th-century 
registers of the Ottoman imperial assembly reference the Roma as “people of malice” and 
accuse them of perpetrating various crimes (Celik 2004: 20). And, perhaps needless to 
say, the Roma did not have any representation in the imperial court itself. 
Overall, the status of the Roma prior to the establishment of the modern Bulgarian 
state appears to have differed dramatically from that of Turks. Whereas the latter enjoyed 
a status of autonomy and dominance afforded to conquerors, the former were largely 
subjugated and treated as second-class citizens. 
 2.4 Assessing the relevance of the HSP variables 
 We thus observe a commonality between Bulgaria’s Turkish and Roma ethnic 
groups in terms of their extensive historical presence on the territories of the modern 
nation-state, but also substantial differences in the areas of territorial attachment and 
dominance/autonomy. Does the similarity on the former dimension help to explain why 
there have been attempts at the ethnic minority party form of political representation for 
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both groups, and do the differences in the latter two dimension account for the disparity 
in the success enjoyed by parties representing the two groups?  
 Answering these questions is complicated by the fact that, due to the 
constitutional ban of ethnically-based parties in Bulgaria, parties representing minority 
groups are very reluctant to admit association with a particular ethnicity. Thus, the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ charter does not so much as contain the words 
“Turk” or “Muslim,” let alone state that the party stands for these groups’ rights. Instead, 
the MRF presents itself as a liberal party committed to protecting the rights of all 
Bulgarians, regardless of ethnic identity. Similarly, a high-ranking member of the 
Euroroma party I spoke with was adamant from the outset that his is not a Roma party, 
despite the fact that the word “Roma” constitutes exactly 50% of the party’s name. 
Indeed, members of both the MRF and Euroroma that I interviewed were highly sensitive 
to any questions that even indirectly implied that the respective parties served as 
representatives of their ethnic groups. This (somewhat understandable) reluctance to 
identify with specific minority groups makes it difficult to assess the role of historical 
experience in these parties’ success, since the parties themselves do not officially base 
their appeals on such factors. 
 Nevertheless, it was evident from the interviews I conducted in Bulgaria, as well 
from various other sources I consulted, that both Turkish and Roma parties draw heavily 
on the historical and cultural heritage of their respective groups in order to generate 
electoral support. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been highly influential in 
the establishment and funding of Muslim religious and Turkish cultural institutions in 
Bulgaria since 1990, in turn using these institutions to raise its profile among its target 
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electorate. The party works very closely with the Muslim religious leadership in order to 
secure the support of the country’s Turks and Pomaks, and has funded the education of 
many promising young students at Turkish universities. Similarly, despite its claims to 
the contrary, Euroroma appears to be a party grounded in the culture and historical 
experiences of the Roma, as a simple examination of the party’s website reveals. For 
instance, the only video advertisement contained on the website is a music video where 
the party’s leader, Tzvetelin Kanchev, dressed in traditional Roma attire, sings a Romani 
folk song, accompanied by a similarly clad female performer (recording artist Sofi 
Marinova).23 
 Bulgaria’s Turkish minority group exhibits all three of the favorable 
characteristics in the HSP framework, and has therefore not surprisingly produced one of 
the most successful ethnic minority parties in Europe. The combination of the group’s 
historical presence and its territorial concentration has provided a significant basis for 
demanding representation under the ethnic minority party model. It was evident from my 
conversations with scholars and various political actors that the Turks possess a strong 
and historically-grounded ethnic identity. Bulgarian Turks by and large do not shy away 
from their Ottoman heritage, but celebrate it in their cultural and religious activities, as is 
reflected by a number of books and other materials published by Turkish cultural 
organizations and NGOs.24 
 This pride in the group’s heritage enables the formation of positive distinctiveness 
necessary for strong ethnic identities. Bulgarian Turks appear to have as much to be 
                                                           
23 “За Нас.” Политическо Движение Евророма. Политическо Движение Евророма. Web. 10 Oct. 
2013. 
24 See, for example: Georgieff, Anthony and Dimana Trankova, eds. The Turks of Bulgaria: History, 
Traditions, Culture. Sofia, Bulgaria: Vagabond Media, 2012. 
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proud of as ethnic Bulgarians. Not only have they inhabited areas of the country for over 
five centuries, but in many regions they constituted nearly all of the population prior to 
Bulgarian independence. In such regions, it was often the Bulgarians who were the late-
comers, and this provided a basis for Turks to feel entitled to exercise self-rule within 
them. As one former MP pointed out, while the MRF behaves cautiously in Sofia, it is 
bullish and aggressive in areas of significant Turkish heritage. Lastly, the heritage of 
descent from the ruling ethnic group in one of the largest empires the world has ever 
known undoubtedly aids self-esteem and positive distinctiveness. 
 These three historical characteristics have further influenced the politicization of 
the Turkish ethnic identity. Much of the emergence and initial success of the MRF can be 
attributed to its ability to give a political voice to the grievances shared by the Turkish 
community, especially in the aftermath of the assimilationist policies of Communist 
Bulgaria. But in order for common grievances to emerge, there has to be an appropriate 
reference point, so that that the status quo can be contrasted with a more favorable past. 
Assimilationist policies—even aggressive ones—may be viewed as a tolerable evil by a 
group lacking the appropriate reference point, but this was not the case for the Turks. For 
them, the reference point was (at the very minimum) equality with ethnic Bulgarians, 
since the state belonged just as much to them as it did to the Bulgarians, and the “normal” 
state of affairs entailed the ability of the group to govern its own affairs and maintain a 
unique ethno-religious identity. Thus, the excesses of the so-called Revival Process 
resulted not in servility and submission, but in the proliferation of both violent and non-
violent political opposition, which was promptly channeled into political action with the 
transition to democracy. 
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 Although the Roma possess sufficient historical capital in order to make the idea 
of an ethnic minority party plausible and attractive to at least some of the group’s 
members, this capital has proved insufficient to generate the widespread support 
necessary for such a party to obtain legislative representation. This is due both to the fact 
that the Roma ethnic identity does not appear to be as strong and cohesive as the Turkish 
one, and that it has not become equally politicized. 
 Like the Turks, the Roma lived on Bulgarian lands hundreds of years prior to the 
establishment of the modern state. They played a unique role in the Ottoman world and 
were actually valued for many of the services and goods they provided, often making a 
living as craftsmen and musicians, until modernity began to make their goods and 
services increasingly obsolete. The Roma were not only party of the Ottoman-era social 
fabric, but they also enjoyed some minor privileges due to their overwhelming adherence 
to Islam in the form of reduced taxes. Thus, despite their present-day position at the 
bottom of the social ladder, the Roma have a history and culture that they can look back 
on and drive some positive distinctiveness from, contributing to the emergence of 
something like a coherent and salient ethnic identity. 
 However, the consensus among the subjects I interviewed was that the Roma 
identity is not nearly as strong or cohesive as the Turkish one.25 This can be explained in 
part by the historical contrasts between the two groups. Although the Roma did enjoy 
some minor privileges during Ottoman rule due to their faith, their position in society was 
a far cry from that of Turkic Muslims, who were the group of the ruling elite.  
Additionally, the Roma never formed a significant percentage of the population in any 
                                                           
25 Sociological studies corroborate this perception. For instance, Ladanyi and Szeleznyi (2001) find that 
only two-thirds of Bulgarian subjects interviewed in their study who were perceived to be Romani by the 
interviewers actually self-identified as such.  
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region they settled, precluding the development of major centers of Romani culture that 
could have engendered a stronger ethnic identity. Of course, we should not underestimate 
the challenges that linguistic and religious heterogeneity within the Roma community 
poses for the emergence of a prominent and unified ethnic identity.26 Yet this enduring 
heterogeneity itself is partly a product of a past less hospitable to the myth-making 
essential to the construction of a strong collective identity. 
 Another contrast between the Turks and the Roma can be observed in the 
politicization of their respective identities. As in most European countries where they are 
found, Bulgaria’s Roma have been perpetual victims of social exclusion and government 
repression. According to one Roma political leader I interviewed, the fate of the Roma 
under Communist-era forced assimilation policies was often far worse than that of the 
Turks or Pomaks; the historical record seems to support that assertion. Thus, if any group 
has a legitimate basis for shared grievances, it is the Roma. Yet the treatment of the 
Roma did not result in anything close to the level of politicization exhibited by the 
Turkish ethnic identity. This is largely due to the fact that the Roma did not have the 
same reference point as the Turks. For them, equal treatment had never been the norm: 
they had never been rulers, but always subjects; they had never had a territory to consider 
their own, but rather had the consciousness of visitors and outsiders. One might argue 
that repression was what they had come to expect, and thus the abhorrent policies of the 
Communist government did not prompt a sufficient mass-level demand for an ethnic 
minority party the way it had for the Turkish community. 
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2.5 Government repression and forced assimilation 
 As indicated in the previous section, on overview of the historical determinants of 
ethnic minority party emergence and success in Bulgaria would not be complete without 
accounting for one key historical factor outside of the HSP framework—the experience 
of having suffered forced assimilation at the hands of the state. 
 There was a near-unanimous agreement among the subjects I interviewed that the 
Communist-led Revival Process played a major role in both the emergence and success 
of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The Revival Process greatly heightened the 
sense of threat and maltreatment for Bulgaria’s Turks and thus enabled them to rally 
behind a political party like the MRF. One former MP remarked that even to this day, 
“the memory of the Revival Process is alive” in the Turkish community, and a valuable 
asset in helping the MRF generate support around election time. A political scientist I 
interviewed argued that the assimilationist policies of the Communist government in the 
1980s contributed to the emergence of an ethno-religious cleavage in Bulgaria’s post-
Communist electoral landscape, and the leader of a Turkish ethnic minority party echoed 
these comments. 
 However, we should be careful not to overstate the effect of these policies on 
ethnic minority party formation in the Bulgarian case. As the previous section mentioned, 
the evils the Roma community suffered under Communist rule at least matched, and 
probably exceeded those suffered by the Turkish community. Yet this treatment did not 
produce the same willingness and ability to rally behind a single political party as it did 
for the Turks. To explain this discrepancy, we must consider the experiences of 
government repression in the context of the factors from the HSP framework. We must 
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also consider the influence of various non-historical variables that will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
 III. Party System Influences 
 1. The political opportunity structure 
 1.1 Mainstream political parties and the Turkish minority 
 The attitude of mainstream political actors toward the Turkish and Roma 
minorities and their parties has evolved significantly since the introduction of democracy 
in Bulgaria. The one constant, however, is that until 2009, no Bulgarian political party 
made a concerted and systematic effort to attract either the Turkish or Roma vote. 
 1.1.1 Bulgaria’s first party system, 1990-2001 
 In the early years of Bulgarian democracy, Turkish voters appeared to be a natural 
electorate for the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The UDF was a reform-oriented 
coalition of ideologically diverse political organizations (encompassing conservative, 
Christian democratic, social democratic, liberal, environmentalist, centrists and agrarian 
ideologies) that emerged as the only serious challenger to the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP) in the post-Communist electoral landscape. Since no people-group had suffered 
greater injustice in the final years of Bulgaria’s Communist rule than the Turks, and since 
the BSP was the successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party, it seemed natural for the 
Turkish electorate to back the UDF. Indeed, one MRF member remarked that the UDF 
came out “in strong support of ethnic minority groups” during this period and that the 
Turks “greatly sympathized with the UDF.” 
 While the UDF did enjoy some modest success in attracting certain types of 
Turkish voters in the 1990s, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish electorate was 
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quickly attracted by Ahmed Dogan’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The UDF did 
enjoy some electoral support from urban and integrated Turks, particularly ones living in 
Bulgaria’s largest cities. In fact, a number of Turks with political ambition, including the 
future leader of the MRF, Lyutvi Mestan, joined the coalition’s ranks and even contested 
legislative elections as UDF-backed candidates in the early 1990s.27 However, the vast 
majority of Turkish political leaders and voters were consolidated under the MRF in 
advance of Bulgaria’s first democratic elections in 1990, where the party captured an 
impressive 8% of the vote. Many Turkish politicians such as Mestan were successfully 
recruited into the ranks of the party by the mid-nineties.28 
 The Union of Democratic Forces initially treated the MRF with cautious 
optimism, viewing it as a valuable potential ally. Indeed, all interviewed subjects agreed 
that the MRF gravitated toward the UDF between 1990 and 1993. In this period, the UDF 
appeared content with ceding most of the Turkish electorate to the MRF, since it believed 
it could count on the party’s support against the common enemy of the anti-reform BSP. 
Consequently, the UDF did not appear to have a concrete strategy at expanding its base 
of support beyond a handful of well-educated, big-city Turks (a small minority of 
Bulgaria’s Turkish population). 
 However, the era of warm feelings between the two parties would not last long. In 
1993, the UDF government headed by prime minister Filip Dimitrov unexpectedly lost a 
confidence vote thanks to the loss of MRF support. The UDF, which was itself 
undergoing a process of transition from a catch-all reform-oriented party to a standard 
European Christian Democratic party, felt betrayed and began to view the MRF with 
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28 Ibid.  
152 
 
 
increasing apprehension and suspicion. For the remainder of its prominence in Bulgarian 
politics, it made no substantial efforts to expand its appeal to the Turkish population 
outside the country’s major cities. According to one MRF member, the party even began 
to intentionally exclude Turks from its electoral lists and leadership positions. 
 While it may seem on the surface that the BSP and the MRF made strange 
bedfellows in the aftermath of the Revival Process, a closer examination of their 
respective electorates reveals striking similarities. Both parties derive a disproportionate 
share of their support from older, less-educated, poorer and rural citizens. The only 
difference between their electorates is that the BSP is backed by ethnic Bulgarians 
whereas the MRF enjoys the support of ethnic Turks. In Bulgaria’s emerging urban vs. 
rural political cleavage (which can also be thought of as an “economic winners of market 
reforms vs. economic losers of market reforms” cleavage), both parties occupy the 
“rural” side, advocating for greater government spending in less-developed parts of the 
country.29 
 Due to these substantial similarities in both platform and electoral base, the BSP 
has been reluctant to encroach on MRF territory. Much like the UDF in the early 1990s, it 
has seen no need to try to make inroads into the electorate of a party whose support and 
cooperation it has come to count on. The combination of BSP accommodation and UDF 
neglect meant that the MRF’s near-monopoly over the Turkish electorate remained 
unchallenged throughout the 1990’s. 
 1.1.2. Bulgaria’s second party system (2001-2009) 
 The emergence of the National Movement for Simeon II (later National 
                                                           
29 Lyubenov, Milen. “Българската партийна система: групиране и структуриране на партийните 
предпочитания 1990-2009.” Sofia, Bulgaria: University Press “St. Kliment Ohridski”, 2011. 
153 
 
 
Movement for Stability and Progress, or NMSP) and its tremendous showing in the 2001 
parliamentary election signaled a transition to a new party system in Bulgaria. The first 
system, lasting between 1990 and 2001 was characterized by highly-polarized two-party 
competition primarily over market reforms, with a balancing third party (the MRF). By 
2001, the question of market reforms had been more or less resolved. This enabled the 
emergence of a less-polarized, multi-party political system lasting between 2001 and 
2009, characterized by cooperation among the three largest parties in this period—the 
NMSP, the BSP and the MRF.30 During this period, the MRF enjoyed its strongest spell 
of influence in Bulgarian politics and further consolidated its support among ethnic 
Turks. 
 The NMSP was established shortly prior to the 2001 parliamentary election as a 
vehicle for Bulgaria’s deposed king Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (Simeon II), who would 
go on to serve as the country’s prime minister between 2001 and 2005. Under Simeon’s 
guidance, the NMSP adopted a liberal and centrist ideology placing high value on inter-
ethnic tolerance. These ideological leanings made partnering with the MRF an attractive 
proposition,31 and indeed the two parties would go on to rule jointly between 2001 and 
2005, and as part of a three-party coalition with the Socialists between 2005 and 2009.32 
 An interview with a prominent member of the NMSP revealed that Bulgaria’s 
Turks held the former king in high esteem and greatly respected him for his liberal and 
tolerant positions. They marveled, for instance, at the fact that one of his grandchildren 
bears the name “Hassan.”  But this sympathy toward Simeon on the part of the Turkish 
                                                           
30 Lyubenov, Milen. “Българската партийна система: групиране и структуриране на партийните 
предпочитания 1990-2009.” Sofia, Bulgaria: University Press “St. Kliment Ohridski”, 2011. 
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transnational alliance of Europe’s liberal political parties and one of the largest parliamentary groups in the 
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minority did not translate into any electoral gains for his party. Nor is it apparent that the 
NMSP had any clear strategy for attracting the Turkish vote, beyond simply advocating 
ethnic tolerance. Like the BSP and UDF before it, the party was reluctant to step on the 
territory of what it perceived as a valuable and like-minded political ally. 
 1.1.3 Bulgaria’s third (?) party system (2009-present) 
 The first party to make a serious effort to challenge the MRF monopoly over the 
Turkish vote was Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (known in Bulgaria 
under the acronym GERB, which translates as “coat of arms”). Although GERB 
contested the 2009 parliamentary elections “declaring itself against the MRF, riding the 
wave of nationalism,” in the words of one interviewee, the party did more than simply 
antagonize the MRF for the benefit of attracting ethnic Bulgarian voters. It actually 
fielded candidates in MRF-controlled constituencies and sought to introduce some 
measure of political pluralism in parts of the country where the Turkish party had 
previously been the only game in town.33 Following its victory in the 2009 parliamentary 
elections, the party even appointed Bulgaria’s first non-MRF Turkish minister when it 
made renowned sculptor (and outspoken MRF critic) Vezhdi Rashidov Minister of 
Culture.34 
 While GERB’s strategy yielded some modest results, the MRF was largely able to 
maintain control over its electoral strongholds while making significant gains elsewhere. 
On the one hand, GERB was able to win a handful of seats in the MRF-dominated 
provinces of Kardzhali and Razgrad. On the other hand, it is unclear what role ethnically 
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Turkish voters played in these electoral victories, and Rashidov is the only ethnic Turk 
who is currently in the party’s parliamentary delegation. Ultimately, the 2009 election 
saw the Movement for Rights and Freedoms enjoy its highest vote share of any 
legislative election so far. 
 1.1.4 Conclusions regarding mainstream parties and the Turkish minority 
 The conclusion that emerges from the preceding discussion is that overall, efforts 
by mainstream parties to attract the Turkish minority vote have been feeble and 
unsuccessful. There are several reasons for this. 
 First, the parties that were historically in the best position to attract the MRF’s 
electorate were also the most reluctant to attempt to do so. The UDF (in the early 90s), 
the BSP and the NMSP each had an opportunity to build bridges to Bulgaria’s Turks at 
specific periods of the country’s history, but they elected not to do so. This was most 
likely because the certain costs of alienating a key political ally in the MRF outweighed 
any potential benefits in improved electoral performance among the Turkish electorate. 
 Second, where attempts to attract the ethnic Turkish vote have been made, they 
have been poorly thought out, unsystematic and short-sighted. As one prominent scholar 
of Bulgarian politics remarked, the country’s major parties “do not have a strategy toward 
their own electorate, let alone the Turkish electorate.” According to her, Bulgarian parties 
have shown themselves to be remarkably myopic, more concerned with extracting 
resources from the state while they remain in power than with developing and 
implementing long-term strategies to preserve their electoral viability. The failure of 
major parties to make inroads with Turkish voters is symptomatic of this general absence 
of strategic thinking. 
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One prominent political scientist suggested that a key reason attempts to attract 
Turkish voters have failed in the long term is that they are based on power politics rather 
than idea politics. Instead of making ideological appeals to the voters, major parties 
concern themselves with getting influential Turkish businessmen who have somehow 
become alienated from the MRF to switch their political allegiance so that they can 
deliver a certain amount of votes. Related to this, the same scholar pointed out the role 
that parties like UDF and GERB seem to have played in the emergence of the People’s 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms and People’s Party “Freedom and Dignity,” two 
right-of-center splinter parties established by former MRF members. Such unsystematic, 
ad-hoc, divide-and-conquer strategies have yielded very limited results in the short term, 
and virtually no results in the long-term. 
A theme that emerged over and over again in my interviews with various scholars 
and political actors was that even in situations where mainstream parties sought to attract 
Turkish voters though ideological appeals, they made a crucial error in failing to 
nominate Turkish candidates in electable positions. Instead, they tended to include Turks 
and other minority candidates in positions on the party list that have little or no chance of 
winning a seat in parliament. Even rarer is the inclusion of minority candidates in 
leadership positions in major parties. One interviewee attributed this trend to prevailing 
ethnic stereotypes and a fear of alienating ethnic Bulgarians. Whether or not that is the 
case, actions speak louder the words, and mainstream parties’ reluctance to embrace 
Turkish candidates while seeking Turkish votes has severely limited their credibility with 
the ethnic group. 
Ultimately, however, what the Bulgarian case reveals is that it is exceedingly 
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difficult for non-ethnic parties to make inroads into the electorate of a firmly established 
and successful ethnic minority party. As this analysis has revealed, an established ethnic 
minority party can be a crucial coalition partner that no one may wish to offend by 
encroaching on its territory. Additionally, as numerous interviewees pointed out, it is far 
too easy for the MRF to portray itself as the only legitimate defender of Bulgaria’s Turks, 
and to paint every Turk who defects to a different party as a traitor.  Multiple scholars 
and political actors agreed that even if a party was to employ the “right” strategy in 
pursuing the Turkish vote, it would take a very long time—perhaps even a generational 
shift—for it to accomplish this goal. Therefore, we should not expect that a sudden shift 
toward policies accommodating an ethnic minority group will instantaneously boost a 
party’s performance with that electorate. 
These findings seem to support the argument I made in Chapter II that if we 
expect the attitude of mainstream political parties to matter at all, we should expect it to 
matter prior to the establishment of an ethnic minority party. Once such a party becomes 
entrenched in its country’s political system, there is little that other political parties can 
do to sway its electorate. It is possible that a major, ideologically-based party can step in 
to meet the demand for ethnic minority representation and prevent the formation of an 
EMP. In Bulgaria, this did not happen, in part due to the fact that the only “mainstream” 
formation to back ethnic minority rights—the UDF—was just as new and inexperienced 
as the MRF, and its electoral prospects appeared almost as uncertain as those of the 
Turkish party. Once an EMP like the MRF is able to demonstrate political competence 
and electoral viability, it gains substantial credibility and makes it exceedingly difficult 
for other parties to undercut its support among the target ethnic group. 
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1.2 Major political parties and the Roma minority 
Much of what can be said of major Bulgarian parties’ attitudes and strategies 
toward the country’s Turks can also be said of its attitudes and strategies toward the 
Roma. The only difference appears to be one of magnitude—Roma voters are treated 
with even greater neglect, their votes are obtained through even baser and more corrupt 
means, and their leaders are completely excluded from electable positions on major party 
lists. 
The only consistent strategy (if it can be called a strategy) of Bulgaria’s major 
political parties in seeking to obtain Roma support is vote-buying. Whereas parties have 
attempted to attract the Turkish votes by penetrating clientelistic networks in the Turkish 
community, their strategy with the Roma is primarily to offer direct payments to 
individuals in exchange for their votes. This is usually accomplished through an 
intermediary—a neighborhood leader—who agrees to deliver a certain amount of votes 
for a certain price per vote, plus a fee for his services.35 The Roma’s weak political 
attachment, paired with their low socioeconomic status makes them highly susceptible to 
tactics such as this. A study conducted by the National Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion in 2009 revealed that 40% of the country’s Roma were willing to sell their vote, 
compared to only 12% of the general population.36  According to one former MP I 
interviewed, the Roma have even been known to vote for Bulgaria’s nationalist party 
Ataka given the right financial incentives. If this claim is true, it would not be surprising, 
given the success investigative reporters have had in purchasing votes in Roma 
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neighborhoods for a completely fictional party with an unknown platform.37 
If Bulgarian parties are reluctant to include Turks in high-ranking positions, the 
inclusion of Roma in such positions is anathema. I interviewed a young Roma political 
activist who is currently the only representative of the Roma community who is part of 
the leadership of a Bulgarian political party that competes in national elections. (His party 
received less than 1 percent of the votes in the 2013 legislative elections.) He revealed 
that there is a tremendous stigma associated with including ethnic minorities (especially 
the Roma) in prominent positions. He attributes this to the prevalence of ethnic 
stereotypes and fear that giving a more visible role to the Roma would alienate voters 
holding to such stereotypes. Indeed, it is exceedingly rare to find Romani candidates in 
electable positions on major party lists in legislative elections, let alone in major party 
leadership.38 
Just as Bulgaria’s major parties sometimes support splintering within the MRF in 
the hopes that an electorally viable and ideologically like-minded Turkish party would 
emerge, these parties have at times sought to raise up Roma EMPs in the hopes of 
controlling them and using them for their own benefit. One example of this is Civil Union 
“Roma”, the Bulgarian Socialist Party’s perennial electoral coalition partner as part of the 
center-left Coalition for Bulgaria. This small party has never contested national elections 
independently, and it is unclear how many votes it delivers for the Socialist-led coalition; 
what is known, however, is that none of its members have ever been elected to the 
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parliament.39 Another example of this phenomenon is Euroroma, Bulgaria’s most 
successful Roma EMP to date. Although it is not formally associated with any other 
political forces, Euroroma is widely believed to be a client of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party. One Roma interviewee recalled an incident where the party’s leader planned to 
contest elections in a particular locality that also happened to be a BSP stronghold, but 
then quickly and mysteriously changed his intentions to do so. The picture that emerged 
of Euroroma from multiple interviews is that of a party that is largely subservient to the 
Socialists, who use it to undercut the support of other parties in areas where the BSP is 
weak and preclude it from contesting elections where the BSP is strong. 
To summarize, there appears to have been no significant effort by any major 
Bulgarian political party to attract Roma voters through the inclusion of Roma candidates 
for office or a commitment to addressing issues affecting the Roma community. Parties 
have been reluctant to be associated with the ethnic group in any way, and have instead 
opted to act surreptitiously, purchasing votes on an ad-hoc basis and using the group’s 
various ethnic minority parties strategically to gain an electoral advantage. 
In response to this neglect by mainstream parties, Roma communities have 
formed a number of EMPs, although most of these have never advanced beyond the local 
and regional levels of political competition.40 In this we see confirmation of theoretical 
expectation that when ethnic minority concerns fall on deaf ears among a country’s 
political establishment, EMPs are more likely to emerge. However, the various 
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limitations on the Roma’s capacities to accomplish their political goals have rendered 
these EMPs either impotent (at least at the national level) or subservient to stronger 
political parties, which simultaneously enable their continued existence and limit their 
opportunities for growth. 
 2. The Role of Ataka 
 What influence has the presence of a right-wing populist and nationalist party like 
Ataka had on the Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ electoral fortunes? For many 
years, the MRF enjoyed steady and substantial electoral support in the absence of any 
notable party occupying the far right of Bulgaria’s political space. But it is undeniable 
that the party has enjoyed its strongest electoral performances during the period in which 
nationalist and anti-minority sentiment was successfully mobilized and brought to the 
forefront of Bulgaria’s political discourse by Ataka. 
 Established in 2004, Ataka was the brainchild of journalist and TV host Volen 
Siderov. Prior to forming the party, Siderov had demonstrated himself to be quite the 
political opportunist. In the early 90s, he was a member of the Union of Democratic 
Forces and editor of the party’s official newspaper, Demokratziya.41 According to one 
politician I interviewed, Siderov also wanted very badly to join Simeon II’s NMSP party 
in the early 2000’s,42 but was rejected by the former king. Ataka grew out of Siderov’s 
popular nationalistic TV program of the same name, and enjoyed a meteoric rise to 
prominence in the mid-2000’s, fueled by a party platform stoking anti-minority and anti-
European Union attitudes.43 The party enjoyed sustained success for the first ten years of 
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it existence, consistently obtaining between 7 and 10 percent of the vote in national 
legislative elections, and as high as 12 percent in European Parliament elections. Only 
recently has Ataka’s popularity begun to erode, with the party winning less than 3% of 
the vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. 
 A number of subjects I interviewed, scholars and political figures alike, pointed to 
the interplay between Ataka and the MRF as a key factor in the favorable electoral 
outcomes achieved by both parties over the past ten years. They suggested that Siderov 
and Dogan play off of one another, intentionally making controversial statements in the 
hope of provoking an equally controversial response from the other side which they can 
then use to mobilize their electoral bases. In the words of one former MP, “Ataka and 
Bulgarian nationalism is the best fuel for the MRF machine.” The anti-Turk rhetoric of 
Siderov and other members of his party are seen as creating fear in the Turkish 
community and encouraging unity and support for the party perceived as the defender of 
the community’s interests. Although the Turkish community is aware that Bulgaria is 
now an EU member and that most ethnic Bulgarians have a positive attitude toward 
Turks, the visceral response to Siderov’s heated rhetoric, paired with the still-fresh 
memory of the Revival Process, can overpower reason and encourage conformity to the 
MRF, despite the party’s numerous and well-catalogued shortcomings. 
 What evidence is there that Ataka has aided the Movement for the Rights and 
Freedoms’ electoral fortunes? Table 4.1 provides the results of the MRF in parliamentary 
elections prior to and after Ataka’s arrival on the Bulgarian political scene. The first thing 
evident from examining the table is that the MRF has enjoyed by far its strongest 
performances in the three elections which Ataka has also contested (2005, 2009 and 
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2013). It is worth noting that 2005 also saw the strongest performance by far for a Roma 
party, as Euroroma captured 1.3% of the vote. Admittedly, other factors contributed to 
the MRF’s outstanding results in 2005 and 2009. In the following section, I argue that 
much of these gains can be attributed to the party’s participation in coalition government 
and its improved ability to fund and expand its clientelistic networks. Additionally, 
changes to electoral law in 1998 (Özgür-Baklacioglu 2006: 327) and the expansion of 
polling places in Turkey throughout the 2000’s44 have made it easier for Bulgarian Turks 
living abroad to cast their vote. Yet it does not seem presumptuous to suggest that the 
emergence and prominence of Ataka also played a role in these improved electoral 
fortunes. Even in the 2013 election, when the MRF could not count on the benefits of 
being in office, the party enjoyed a voteshare nearly four points higher than what it had 
usually received prior to Ataka.
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Table 4.1: MRF vote share, before and after Ataka 
Election Year MRF vote 
share, as % of 
total 
Ataka vote 
share, as % of 
total 
1990 6  
1991 7.6 
1994 5.4 
1997 7.6 
2001 7.5 
2005 12.8 9 
2009 14.0 9.4 
2013 11.3 7.3 
 
 IV. The role of clientelism 
 Do clientelistic practices play a significant role in deciding Bulgarian electoral 
outcomes, and does the Movement for Rights and Freedoms disproportionately benefit 
from such practices? One of the consensuses the emerged during my fieldwork was the 
weakness of “idea politics” and the predominance of “power politics” in Bulgaria. 
Virtually all Bulgarian parties engage in some sort of clientelism and vote-buying, 
although different parties do this to a different extent and with different levels of success. 
The MRF in particular has proven to be remarkably adept at utilizing patron-client 
linkages to obtain votes, bolstered in its ability to do so by its unique character as a 
Turkish minority party. 
 Although the subjects I interviewed exhibited some latitude in their opinion of the 
quality of Bulgarian democracy, most agreed that patron-client relationships are a 
significant source of votes for some parties. While the politics of values and ideas are not 
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powerless in Bulgaria, they are often eclipsed by voters’ purely economic short-term 
considerations. It is typical for Bulgarian parties to elicit the support of local businessmen 
(legitimate or illegitimate) and other notable residents, counting on these community 
leaders to deliver votes for the party among their employees and dependents. These 
patrons in turn receive protection and support from the party to ensure that business runs 
smoothly and that their local influence does not diminish. 
 To understand why the MRF would be better adapted to execute such clientelistic 
politics, we must first examine the party’s target electorate. Ethnic Turks are significantly 
more likely than the average Bulgarian citizen to live in a small town or village, to have 
low educational attainment and to be in a low-income household. The education data is 
particularly striking: according to Bulgaria’s 2001 census, only 2.7% of Turks had 
completed a college degree, compared to 23.5% of ethnic Bulgarians. The census further 
showed that only a quarter of Bulgaria’s Turks had graduated from high school, 
compared to over three fourths of ethnic Bulgarians.45 (Comparable data breakdowns are 
not yet available for the 2011 census.) Less-educated and less-skilled workers are an 
easier target for clientelism due to their low earnings and their dependence on local 
patrons for employment. Further, they are less likely to exhibit post-materialist values 
that would lead them to vote based on personal moral convictions rather than economic 
considerations.46 
 Of course, Turks are not the only people in Bulgaria who are predominantly rural, 
uneducated and poor; there are plenty of ethnic Bulgarians who fit that description as 
well. Is there something unique about the Turkish minority group that makes it more 
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susceptible to clientelistic practices? A few of the scholars and politicians I interviewed 
pointed out the ethnic group’s deference to authority as something that sets it apart from 
ethnic Bulgarians. Turks simply tend to respect and obey authority figures of various 
stripes in their community. Although Bulgaria’s Turks may not be well-educated as a 
whole, they do have a small, well-educated elite (Dogan, for instance, holds a Ph.D.) that 
they greatly admire and look up to. In addition, Turks are more likely than Bulgarians to 
view religious leaders as authoritative figures, and they tend to be influenced by their 
local mufti (Islamic community leaders). In general, any Turk who excels in some 
sphere—whether learning (both secular and religious) or entrepreneurship—is held in 
very high esteem and treated with much deference by the community. When such figures 
speak, community members tend to listen and obey. 
 Capitalizing on these natural predispositions in their electorate, the MRF has 
established a formidable network of client-patron linkages that it has used to great effect 
in mobilizing voters.47 The Turkish leader of an ethnic minority NGO I interviewed 
contended that the party ostensibly has “33 feudal lords in 33 municipalities” with a 
predominantly Turkish population. A current MRF member who served as MP from the 
party for over two decades conceded that MRF rule in majority-Turkish cities like 
Kardzhali amounts to “a dictatorship” where dissent and independent thinking tend to 
carry dire consequences. The leader of a rival Turkish EMP and a former high-ranking 
MRF member, described at length the difficulty his party is encountering in attempting to 
run on ideas, rather than power in Turkish communities. He testifies to countless 
individuals who intended to run against the MRF in regions dominated by the party in the 
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2013 legislative elections, but who withdrew their candidacy following threats over the 
loss of their or their relatives’ jobs. With the party’s near monopoly over employment—
whether in the public or private sectors—in certain localities, the only people who can 
afford to oppose the MRF are those who are independently wealthy (which is, needless to 
say, a tiny fraction of the Turkish community). Thus, it is not surprising that the 
Democratic Linkages and Accountability Project dataset, based on expert surveys in 80 
electoral democracies, reveals the Movement for Rights and Freedoms to be not only the 
most clientelistic party in Bulgaria, but also one of the most clientelistic parties in all of 
the countries studied. This is remarkable given the fact that the dataset includes a host of 
countries in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, regions far more closely 
associated with the presence of patronage and clientelism.48 
 What evidence is there that clientelism has played a major role in MRF success? 
One way to evaluate this claim is to compare the electoral performance of the party in 
elections in which it was in office versus its performance in elections where it was out-of-
power. A party that derives much of its support through the distribution of material goods 
ought to be most successful in elections in which it enjoys control over the greatest 
amount of resources. Since Bulgaria is a unitary state where most resources are 
distributed by the national government, we should expect that participation in 
government at the national level would boost the MRF’s vote share. 
 Table 4.2 reports the average change in vote share for Bulgarian parties for 
elections in which they were part of the incumbent government. The numbers presented 
are calculated by subtracting the party’s vote share prior to its spell in government (ruling 
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either by itself or in coalition with other parties) from its share of the vote in the election 
at the end of its spell in government. The net effect is totaled for each party and then 
divided by the total number of spells in government that the party has enjoyed. 
Table 4.2: Average change in voteshare following a spell in government 
 MRF GERB BSP NMSP UDF 
Average 
change in 
voteshare 
+6.5% -9.2% -16.3% -39.3% -22.2% 
 
 The difference between the MRF and the other parties is striking. While the MRF 
appears to have benefitted from being in office, other parties seem to have suffered 
substantially. Of course, much of this latter effect can be explained by the fact that parties 
are more likely to become part of government when they have enjoyed an unusually 
strong electoral result; therefore, we ought to expect a certain regression to the mean in 
the subsequent election. 
But while this may help to explain the surprisingly negative effect of incumbency 
for most Bulgarian parties, it makes the MRF’s ability to buck this trend even more 
remarkable. During the party’s two terms in government between 2001 and 2009, the 
MRF nearly doubled its electoral support. As pointed out in the previous section, one 
likely contributing factor to this improvement is the emergence of the nationalist party 
Ataka during this period. However, this factor cannot in itself account for such a dramatic 
change. Nor is there any evidence that the MRF and its platform have enjoyed increasing 
appeal among non-Turkish citizens; if anything, it can be argued that animosity toward 
the party among ethnic Bulgarians reached all-time highs during this period. As one 
prominent political scientist I interviewed suggested, the best explanation for this 
phenomenon is that the MRF’s position in power and its control over the distribution of 
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government largesse enabled it to attract a greater number of patrons—including some 
ethnically Bulgarian ones—who were in turn able to deliver votes for the party, even 
outside of its traditionally strongest constituencies. As could be expected, in the 2013 
elections, where the party had been out of office for almost four years, it lost nearly a 
fifth of its previous vote share. 
 V. International Factors 
 1. Kin state effects 
 What role has Turkey played in the success of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms in Bulgarian politics? Does the presence of a neighboring kin state afford 
unique advantages for an ethnic minority party, as I theorized in Chapter II, or might the 
connection between kin state presence and EMP success be spurious and driven by other 
factors, as the analysis in Chapter III seemed to suggest? In Bulgaria’s popular political 
discourse, Turkey is often accused of meddling in Bulgarian politics and propping up the 
MRF, but how much evidence is there to support this? 
 There was considerable disagreement regarding Turkey’s desire to intervene in 
Bulgarian politics among the experts I interviewed. Many argued that Turkey has no 
sinister and grandiose ambitions of propping up the MRF and using it as its agent. One 
former (non-MRF) MP claimed that “Turkey is arguably Bulgaria’s best neighbor at the 
moment, because it does not have any irredentist claims toward Bulgaria; nor does 
Bulgaria have any toward Turkey.” He went on to dismiss claims that Turkey has any 
conspiratorial designs on infiltrating Bulgarian politics. This sentiment was confirmed by 
one of the founding members and longest-serving MPs of the MRF who, despite his 
willingness to level criticisms at the party in other areas, did not believe that Turkey was 
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seeking to use the MRF for its own interests. 
 Other interview subjects could not dismiss the idea that Turkey was actively 
seeking to influence Bulgarian politics through the MRF. One scholar argued that “since 
the mid-1980’s, [Bulgaria] has been pressured by very aggressive nationalist politics on 
Turkey’s part.” Another opined that “there is unquestionably a nationalist current in 
Turkey that dreams of restoring its old imperial influence,” later qualifying this statement 
by explaining that the goal is probably economic influence, not territorial gain. One 
political scientist I interviewed was hesitant to “wander into conspiracy theory territory” 
but nevertheless admitted that the “the Turkish state—like any other state—has an 
interest in its ethnic minorities [abroad] to be used as a bridge, as an opportunity for 
influence.” Given the Turkish state’s increasingly neo-Ottomanist foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era (Murinson 2006), it does not seem far-fetched that such an influence 
has been sought, although this would not necessarily take place through the vehicle of the 
MRF. 
 While there was disagreement regarding whether Turkey has sought to support 
the MRF and use it for its own purposes, there was more agreement about whether such 
strategies—if they were even attempted—have been successful. Even the scholars who 
maintained that Turkey has sought to influence Bulgarian politics through the MRF were 
skeptical about whether it has actually been able to do so. One subject claimed that 
Turkey has never had any influence over the MRF, not because it has not attempted to do 
so, but because “[Bulgarian] Turks have not wanted to become dependent [on Turkey].” 
Another political scientist suggested that “there has always been a certain tension” 
between Ahmed Dogan and Turkish governments, either due to their awareness of 
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Dogan’s past in Bulgaria’s secret service, or due to his unwillingness to look like 
Turkey’s puppet. This tension became apparent in the 2013 elections, where the Turkish 
government backed the People’s Party “Freedom and Dignity” (PPFD), a rival Turkish 
minority party. 
 If the presence of a neighboring kin state has benefitted the MRF’s fortunes, this 
is mostly due to the large number of Turks with Bulgarian citizenship currently living in 
Turkey. There are around 500,000 Bulgarian citizens who currently reside in Turkey, a 
majority of whom are of Turkish ethnicity. The party campaigns for the votes of such 
individuals, and that it organizes “electoral excursions” where Turks with Bulgarian 
citizenship are transported across the border during elections in order to cast their vote.49 
These excursions have become highly controversial in the popular-level political 
discourse in Bulgaria, although they are perfectly legal. There is no evidence that Turkey 
is playing an active role in encouraging this practice. Indeed, the 2013 parliamentary 
elections demonstrated just how little influence the Turkish state exerts in Bulgarian 
politics. Despite opposition from the Turkish government, the MRF was able to obtain 
11.3% of the vote, whereas the Turkey-backed PPFD failed to even reach the 1% 
threshold that entitles parties to government funding. 
 In Chapter II, I offered two additional explanations for how kin states may benefit 
EMPs. First, minority parties can attract foreign investment through their connections in 
the kin state and allocate it strategically to improve their electoral standing. Second, 
EMPs can form mutually beneficial partnerships with parties in the kin state. There was a 
general agreement among the interview subjects that the MRF has sought and been able 
                                                           
49 Bulgaria Expats in Turkey Mobilized to Back DPS in Elections. 2009. Retrieved on May 9, 2014 from 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/105337/Bulgarian+Expats+in+Turkey+Mobilized+to+Back+DPS+in+Ele
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to secure Turkish investment in towns where Turks make up a large portion of the 
population. The leader of a rival EMP lamented that such investments tend to be small 
and not transformative, sufficient to keep the residents loyal to and dependent on the 
party, but not large enough to help them rise above subsistence level. Thus, it seems that 
the Movement has benefitted from this strategy, although the magnitude of the effect is 
hard to quantify. On the other hand, I found no evidence for any strategic partnerships 
between the MRF and parties in Turkey. 
 To summarize, while the presence of Turkey as a neighboring kin state has played 
a modest role in the MRF’s success, this is mostly the consequence of geographic, rather 
the geo-political, factors. The fact that the two states share a border and that a substantial 
number of Bulgarian Turks live relatively close to this border has undoubtedly helped the 
MRF boost its vote tally, although it does not appear that this has been a decisive factor 
in electoral outcomes. Additionally, there is no evidence that the Turkey has encouraged 
this practice or has actively aided the party in any other way. 
 2. European Union effects 
 Have international influences, and more specifically the European Union, aided 
the emergence and success of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms? Is a lack of 
international support for a Roma party to blame for the disparity between the track record 
of Roma and Turkish parties in Bulgaria? In Chapter II, I proposed that influences from 
international organizations can enable the emergence—or, more accurately, prevent the 
suppression—of incipient EMPs. In contrast, I was not convinced that the EU or other 
international organizations would be able to influence electoral results once such a party 
had been established. Does the Bulgarian case support these predictions? 
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Following the forcible assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turkish and Muslim citizens as 
part of the “Revival” Process, there was substantial worldwide condemnation of the 
country’s handling of its ethnic tensions. The international community feared a potential 
outbreak of ethnic violence in a post-Communist Bulgaria and the implications that this 
would have for stability in the region. (The events transpiring in former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s demonstrated that such fears were not unfounded.) Many of subjects I interviewed 
asserted that, as a consequence of such fears, during the process of Bulgaria’s democratic 
transition there was international support for the formation of a party representing the 
interests and defending the rights of Bulgaria’s Turkish minority. But while international 
support for Turkish minority rights in this period is evident from the historical record,50 I 
found scant evidence for the backing of a Turkish party. When pressed for specifics, 
some experts interviewed related anecdotes regarding foreign heads of state calling 
Bulgarian government officials to advocate for the MRF; such claims, while plausible, 
are difficult to confirm. I was not able to find records of any official pronouncements by 
international organizations or foreign governments regarding this issue. 
Whatever the international attitudes may have been at the time, it is clear that 
Bulgaria’s political elite was opposed to the ethnic minority party concept. In April of 
1990, the last Communist parliament passed a law that banned parties formed along 
ethnic lines (Ganev 2004: 70). In July of the following year, the democratically elected 
Constitutional Assembly crafted and adopted a new democratic constitution that 
prohibited political parties on “ethnic, racial and religious lines” (Article 11.4). 
Despite the 1990 law and the 1991 constitutional prohibition, a number of 
                                                           
50 See, for example: Resolution 917 on the situation of the ethnic and Muslim minority in Bulgaria, 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1989. 
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ethnically-based political organizations were formed in the early years of Bulgarian 
democracy. Among them were parties representing Turks and Pomaks (the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria), the Roma (Democratic Roma 
Union) and Macedonians (United Macedonian Organization “Illinden”). In its effort to 
participate in Bulgaria’s first post-Communist democratic elections in June of 1990 for 
the Constitutional Assembly, Ahmed Dogan’s party dropped the “Turks and Muslims in 
Bulgaria” from its name, and was permitted by the electoral commission to register and 
win twelve seats. The other parties in the Assembly—particularly the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party—were not pleased by this development, and during the heated and protracted 
deliberations regarding Article 11.4 of the constitution, the Socialists were adamant that 
the MRF was precisely the kind of party that ought to have been banned under the 1990 
law prohibiting ethnic parties (Ganev 2004: 71). Ultimately, 100 Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF) representatives joined the BSP in adopting the Article 11.4 language in the 
form in which it exists to this day. 
Following the adoption of the new Bulgarian constitution in 1991, the fates of the 
various incipient ethnic parties diverged dramatically. Both the Democratic Roma Union 
(DRU) and United Macedonian Organization “Illinden” (UMO-Illinden) were not 
allowed to register as political parties, being found to be in violation of Article 11.4, with 
the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court confirming these decisions. Neither party 
was ever allowed to contest elections. The MRF also initially appeared to be heading for 
the same fate, after a Sofia city court declined to register the party for the October 1991 
elections, a decision later affirmed by the Supreme Court. Then the Central Electoral 
Commission intervened, granting the MRF the opportunity to contest the elections, with 
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this decision in turn being approved by the Supreme Court (Asenov 1996). Immediately 
following the election, 93 newly elected representatives—predominantly BSP 
members—asked the Constitutional Court to review the case. In April of the following 
year, after several months of deliberations, the court affirmed in a highly contentious split 
decision the constitutionality of the MRF. (Six of the twelve justices actually ruled 
against the party, but a qualified majority of seven was necessary for it to be declared 
unconstitutional.)  
 What accounts for the contrasting fates of the MRF on the one hand, and the 
UMO-Illinden and DRU parties on the other? There was a consensus among the experts I 
interviewed that these cases were fairly similar from a judicial standpoint, with one 
subject remarking that the disparate decisions of the various courts were “as much 
political as they were juridical.” Another subject attested that “the statutes of [the MRF 
and the DRU] were virtually identical.” While more than one factor was likely at play for 
the discrepancy of outcomes, international advocacy (in the case of the MRF) and the 
absence thereof (in the cases of the DRU and UMO-Illinden) may have played a role. 
This was certainly the thesis supported by most of the politicians and scholars I 
interviewed. They painted a picture of an international community which, appalled by 
Bulgaria’s treatment of its Turkish citizens under the Revival Process, and concerned 
about the geopolitical consequences of an MRF ban, pleaded with the country to permit 
the formation of a party protecting the rights of the Turkish community. As one scholar I 
interviewed attested, “Europe followed [Bulgarian politics] very closely” in the early 
1990’s, and “sought to ensure stability and the absence of internal conflicts.” With these 
priorities in mind, there was “serious outside pressure” to affirm the MRF’s 
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constitutionality. Once again, however, it must be said that evidence for such pressure is 
largely anecdotal; although international organizations and foreign governments praised 
the Constitutional Court’s decision and cited it as evidence of the progress of Bulgarian 
liberal democracy,51 it is hard to judge what role they played in the decision’s crafting. 
Ganev (2004: 87) describes the notion that the court’s decision was driven by the 
anticipated Western response as “shallow and simplistic,” and views it as evidence of a 
pro-Western and anti-Balkan bias. 
Yet the curious discrepancy in the treatment of the various ethnic minority 
political formations remains. While the case of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
received attention in the West, the cases of the DRU and UMO-Illinden did not even 
register as a blip on the international radar. The ethnic groups these parties claimed to 
represent were simply not as visible as the Turkish minority in that period, because they 
were—inaccurately—not perceived to have suffered during the Revival Process, nor were 
they viewed as potential sources of conflict. In fact, as a young Roma activist and 
member of the People’s Party “Freedom and Dignity” (PPFD) stressed in his interview, 
the Roma did suffer at least as much—and arguably even more—than the Turks during 
the Revival Process. After all, 90% of all Roma at the time were Muslim, and they were 
often treated with even greater contempt and even less dignity than Bulgarian or Turkish 
Muslims. Yet the international community, largely unaware of this fact, did not consider 
ensuring political representation for Bulgaria’s Roma to be a priority. 
In the opinion of the same PPFD member, the asymmetry in international 
responses in the early 1990’s made all the difference in the world, setting Turkish and 
                                                           
51 See, for example: Official Report of Debates of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
Volume I. Strasbourg, 1993. 
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Roma attempts at EMP representation on radically different courses. While other Roma 
parties were ultimately permitted later in the 1990’s, “you have to strike while the iron is 
hot… unfortunately, the iron was hot between ’89 and ’91.” According to this political 
activist, there was substantial demand for a Roma party during this formative period of 
Bulgarian politics, and a unified Roma EMP with lasting electoral success may have 
emerged had it been allowed to contest elections. Not only that, but Roma political input 
and influence in this period may have paved the way for the improved condition of the 
ethnic group, which in turn would have empowered it politically. 
While international influences may have played some role in the diverging fates 
of Turkish and Roma political representation in Bulgaria, there is no evidence that such 
factors have played any direct role in bolstering the MRF’s subsequent electoral 
performance. Among the experts I interviewed, none believed that the European Union or 
other international organizations aided the MRF politically. As one scholar pointed out, 
European interest in Bulgarian politics waned substantially after the early 90s, when it 
appeared that both democracy and ethnic peace in Bulgaria had been consolidated. Of 
course, Bulgaria did come under greater scrutiny when it became a candidate for EU 
membership. One could hypothesize that the decision of the NMSP to include the MRF 
as a coalition partner was in part driven by the desire to please the EU, and that this 
participation in government in turn improved the MRF’s electoral performance. 
However, there were plenty of other considerations that played into that decision, and it is 
not clear that the MRF’s inclusion is something that Europe particularly wanted to see or 
expected. 
Ultimately, the consensus among the experts interviewed appeared to be that 
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while international influences played a role in rescuing the MRF from an early demise in 
the early 1990s, there is no reason to believe that such influences continued to play a 
major role in its success later on. 
 VI. Party organization factors 
 1. Quality of leadership 
 One of the most commonly cited factors in the popular political discourse 
regarding the success of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is the quality of the 
party’s leadership, and particularly its enigmatic and controversial leader for over two 
decades, Ahmed Dogan. While we ought to be cautious about giving individuals too 
much credit for the success of the parties they lead (such explanations often prove to be 
overly simplistic), it is undeniable that Dogan has proven himself to be a very capable 
politician who has steered his party through numerous challenges and obstacles to 
establish it as one of major players in Bulgarian politics. It is equally evident that the 
absence of such quality leadership has contributed to the fickle efforts of the Roma 
community to create a strong EMP. 
 Virtually all of the experts I interviewed, including those who held an 
overwhelmingly negative view of the MRF and its influence in Bulgarian politics, agreed 
that the party is led by exceptionally capable and intelligent people. One former MP 
representing the NMSP, the MRF’s coalition partner between 2001 and 2009 described 
the latter party’s parliamentary delegation as “quality MPs” and “a very dependable 
coalition partner, as long as they get what they want.” He credits the party with its ability 
to craft an impressive, well-educated “managerial elite” over the years. These sentiments 
were echoed by one scholar, who also added that the party’s members are “clever 
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politicians, with a much stronger political sense” than their Bulgarian counterparts. 
 Ahmed Dogan, the party’s emblematic founder and leader between 1990 and 
2013, has an impressive educational background. In addition to obtaining his Ph.D. in 
philosophy, he graduated from Academy of Social Sciences and Public Administration 
(the premier academy for crafting future statesmen during the Communist era) and was a 
fellow at the Bulgarian Academy of Science.52 Along with his formal education, he 
undoubtedly received extensive training from the Committee for State Security, the 
Bulgarian Communist regime’s repressive apparatus, which he joined as an agent in 
1974.53 It was largely due to his impressive resume that he emerged as the leader of a 
young MRF party in 1990. (His extensive work for State Security had not yet become 
public knowledge at the time.) 
 Whatever their opinions of his morals and ethics, the subjects interviewed painted 
Dogan as an intelligent party leader with a keen political sense and a remarkable (for a 
Bulgarian politician) foresight and ability to plan for the future. This latter quality—the 
willingness to forego immediate rewards in favor of building for lasting success—is what 
separates Dogan and the MRF from ethnically Bulgarian parties and politicians, 
according to one scholar I interviewed. Another scholar echoed these comments, arguing 
that the MRF was wise early in its existence to appear modest in its demands, showing no 
ambition to govern, yet gradually crafting out a role for itself as an influential balancing 
party in Bulgarian politics. Dogan was also smart to invest in the gradual development 
and expansion of the party’s regional structures, a strategy crucial to long-term electoral 
                                                           
52 “Who is Who: Assaulted Bulgarian Ethnic Turkish Leader Ahmed Dogan.” Novinite.com. 19 Jan 2013. 
Web. 1 Jul 2014. < 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/147005/Who+Is+Who%3A+Assaulted+Bulgarian+Ethnic+Turkish+Lead
er+Ahmed+Dogan>. 
53 Buruma, Jan. “Bulgaria to Finally Open Secret Files.” Balkanalysis.com. 15 May 2007. Web. 1 Jul 2014. 
< http://www.balkanalysis.com/bulgaria/2007/05/15/bulgaria-to-finally-open-secret-files/>. 
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success that few Bulgarian parties have followed, as well as in the education of many 
young ethnic Turks who would go on to serve as valuable and loyal cadres of the party. 
“The only thing Dogan ever failed to predict,” remarked one political scientist, “was the 
[faux assassination attempt] against him” in 2013. 
 The difference between the quality of leadership enjoyed by the MRF and that 
enjoyed by even the most successful of Roma ethnic parties is striking. To date, the two 
most successful parties of the Roma in Bulgarian politics have been Euroroma and Free 
Bulgaria. The former party is led by Tzvetelin Kanchev, who holds a bachelor’s degree in 
international economic relations from the University of National and World Economy in 
Sofia—certainly nothing to sneeze at, but also no match for Dogan’s impressive pedigree. 
Kanchev’s only political experience prior to founding Euroroma was his participation in 
Bulgaria’s 38th national assembly, where he served as an MP for the marginal and short-
lived Bulgarian Business Blok party. Kanchev failed to serve out his term, however, as he 
was arrested on assault and kidnapping charges, later convicted and sentenced to 6 years 
in prison.54 The Free Bulgaria party leader, Kiril Rashkov, is better known by the 
nickname “Tsar Kiro,” stemming from his self-proclaimed kingship over Bulgaria’s 
Roma. Rashkov received no higher education, and his profession can charitably be 
described as “businessman” or “entrepreneur,” though his and his employees’ prolific 
arrest and conviction records55 have led some in the media56 and politics57 to refer to him 
                                                           
54 Kanchev was later pardoned after serving only several months in prison. 
55 See, for example: “Notorious Bulgarian Roma Clan Boss to be Released From Jail.” Novinite.com. 18 
Oct. 2013. Web. 30 Jun. 2014; “Notorious Bulgarian Roma Boss, Wife, Indicted for Large-Scale Tax 
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as an organized crime leader. 
 Clearly, there are many factors accounting for the divergent fates of the MRF and 
parties like Euroroma and Free Bulgaria, but the stark difference in the quality of 
leadership cannot be discounted as one of them. On the one hand, we have a gifted 
political elite trained at the nation’s highest institutions and possessing invaluable 
connections; on the other, we have a pair of leaders who have spent more time in prison 
than in college. And lest we assume that a successful Roma EMP is such a challenging 
proposition that no excellence in leadership could bring it about, we should bear in mind 
the Euroroma was able to attract 1.3% of the vote in the 2005 parliamentary election 
under the leadership of the fresh-out-of-prison Kanchev, passing the 1% barrier for 
receiving public funding. What might the party have achieved had it been helmed by 
someone of Dogan’s background and quality? 
 2. Extensiveness of party organization 
 As discussed in Chapter II, the extensiveness and professionalization of party 
organization has recently been demonstrated to be an important predictor for the success 
of newly established parties. Does the same hold true for ethnic minority parties, 
particularly those in Bulgaria? 
 Several of the subjects I interviewed addressed organizational structure (or the 
lack thereof) of Bulgarian parties in general as a key weakness. The leader of one ethnic 
minority NGO I interviewed revealed that he often receives calls from political parties 
seeking to use the NGO’s local structures for campaigning prior to elections, since the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
57 “Controversial Bulgarian Opposition Leader: Top Cop Protects Roma Mafia Boss.” Novinite.com. 5 Oct. 
2011. Web. 6 Jul 2014. 
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parties themselves have not invested sufficiently in developing a local presence. More 
than one scholar commented that due to their short time horizons, Bulgarian parties rarely 
take the time to develop a serious local presence throughout the country, instead counting 
on a wave of popular sentiment to sweep them into power.58 
 The MRF departs from this standard model in a radical way. The party has 
invested in an extensive network of local structures that have enabled it to receive 
consistent electoral support. The leader of the PPFD, the MRF’s rival for the Turkish and 
Muslim vote, conceded that the latter party possesses “very well-developed party 
structures” in areas of the country where Turks hold a substantial share of the population. 
A former (non-MRF) MP remarked that the party’s MP’s “regularly visit their electoral 
districts and try to be of use to their districts.” Existing religious structures are also 
incorporated by the party in order to encourage voters to support the MRF, with the local 
mufti often being among the party’s strongest propagandists.59 
 One of the most remarkable aspects of the MRF’s organizational reach is its 
presence in the youth community. The party has invested significantly in the education of 
promising young Turkish students, providing numerous scholarships and other forms of 
financial support. As a consequence, the party has created a young Turkish elite that not 
only feels loyal and indebted to the MRF, but also possesses skills and abilities that the 
party can utilize to its advantage. With over 20,000 members, the MRF’s youth 
organization claims to be the largest youth party organization in Europe, and possibly the 
second largest in the world. This is an astounding accomplishment for an ethnic minority 
                                                           
58 On the other hand, it is worth noting that Spirova (2005) finds that, on average, Bulgarian parties exhibit 
stronger organization than those in other East-Central European countries. 
59 One regional mufti was actually convicted of vote-buying for the MRF in the 2009 parliamentary and 
European elections. “Bulgarian Mufti Found Guilty of Vote-Buying.” Novinite.com. 18 Oct 2010. Web. 2 
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party in a relatively small country, but it bears testimony to the party’s vast reach in 
society. 
 Needless to say, a party like Euroroma has nothing even remotely approaching the 
vast-reaching organizational structure of the MRF. While the party’s website lists a 
number of “regional coordinators” for different parts of the country, these are not full-
time employees with a local structure operating underneath them. And despite the fact 
that the education of the Roma is central to the party’s platform, the party does not appear 
to possess either the resources or the willingness to provide scholarships for promising 
Roma students in the way that the MRF has. The party does not even have an associated 
youth organization. 
 3. Nature of party organization 
 Aside from its wide scope and its capable leadership, what about the MRF’s 
organizational structure makes it successful? 
 The MRF’s organizational structure can best be described as highly centralized 
and rigidly hierarchical. Two scholars I interviewed told me that their research into the 
charters of Bulgarian parties revealed that the MRF fares exceptionally poorly in intra-
party democracy and the transparency of decision-making. This is confirmed by various 
political figures I interviewed, including former and current members of the party. One 
former (non-MRF) MP characterized the party as “strongly centralized,” and its members 
as “highly disciplined” with “leader worship” tendencies. He later referred to dissident 
voices within the party being silenced “by a system that works with the iron discipline 
similar to the military discipline of [the Committee for] State Security.” 
I had the chance to interview one of these dissenting voices—a former high-
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ranking party member who was once touted as a possible successor to Dogan as leader, 
but who was removed from the party for requesting transparency regarding Dogan’s and 
other party members’ past involvement with State Security and for calling for intra-party 
reform in various areas. He described party leadership as one utterly incapable of 
tolerating criticism or even entertaining the notion of debate on any significant question. 
When I asked one current MRF member how he was able to criticize Dogan and others 
within the party over the years, he explained that the only reason he got away with it was 
that he was popular in his electoral district and was able to carry a lot of votes for the 
party. (Needless to say, however, this member did not advance up the leadership ranks.)60 
 With such anti-democratic intra-party decision-making attitudes, how is the MRF 
able to recruit aspiring politicians? The answer has to do with the fact that most people 
entering the ranks of the party are primarily concerned with personal advancement and 
career development, not with standing up for particular values and ideas. For them, the 
MRF is merely an instrument they can use to become wealthy and successful. Numerous 
observers—both inside and outside the party—agreed that those members who prove 
themselves to be both gifted and loyal are eventually rewarded with promotions up the 
ranks. (One example of this occurred during the course of my field research, as the leader 
of the Youth MRF was appointed as a Deputy Minister). While decision-making in the 
MRF may be a top-down affair, Dogan was careful to ensure some fluidity in 
appointments to high-ranking positions in order to offer rewards to those who prove 
themselves to be loyal and useful to the party. As pointed out by one former MP, the 
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party has even committed to changing 20% of its parliamentary delegation after every 
election cycle. 
 These two aspects of the MRF’s organizational structure—its strong-armed 
suppression of dissenting voices and the possibility of advancement for loyal and 
competent individuals—have contributed to the party’s success. The former strategy has 
prevented any serious schisms and divisions like the ones that have plagued many 
Bulgarian parties, and it has succeeded in preventing discussion of the party’s shady past 
and corrupt practices among its target ethnic group. By limiting intra-party democracy, 
the MRF has been able to perpetuate the myths that it tells about itself, regarding both its 
origins and its current role in Bulgarian politics. However, in pairing this intolerance of 
internal criticism with a tolerance of internal advancement, the party has ensured that its 
best and brightest cadres remain with the party and work hard to prove themselves useful 
to it. 
 Abandoning either one of these two components could have led to the party’s 
demise. Had the MRF been hostile to both dissent and personal advancement, with high-
ranking positions perpetually occupied by a set elite, the party may have suffered from a 
brain-drain, complacency, staleness and a failure to adapt with the times. Had the party 
tolerated both criticism and personal advancement, it could have been torn apart as 
rapidly-rising reformers clashed with the old guard. It appears that the genius of the party 
lies in combining these two elements in its organizational structure.   
 VII. Conclusion 
The analysis of Bulgaria’s ethnic politics presented in this chapter has yielded 
several notable findings regarding ethnic minority party formation and success. 
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First, it is clear that we cannot begin to understand the nature of ethnic minority 
political engagement without first examining the historical backgrounds of the country’s 
main ethnic groups, and the effects of those backgrounds on their social identities. Both 
Turks and the Roma experienced tremendous persecution and repression at the hands of 
the country’s Communist regime. The Revival Process is widely believed by experts to 
be the single most important reason for the establishment of the Turkish and Muslim-
minority Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and there is no reason to doubt its 
significance in this regard. Yet the fact that Roma parties have not even come close to 
approximating the success of the MRF suggests that government repression is not in itself 
sufficient to inspire ethnic party formation. Rather, it is evident that the Turkish 
minority’s historical heritage along the three dimensions proposed in this work—
historical presence, territorial attachment and dominance/autonomy—produced in that 
group a sense of  entitlement to fair treatment and cultural autonomy, which, when paired 
with the dehumanizing policies of the Communist regime, paved the path for the 
formation of the MRF. In contrast, the Roma minority’s historical background did little to 
inspire a similar sense of inherent group rights; since mistreatment had been the historical 
norm rather than the exception, government persecution did not generate the same level 
of outrage and indignation, nor did it instill a sense of the necessity of collective political 
action. 
With respect to the influence of the political opportunity structure, the findings 
here are somewhat more ambiguous. On the one hand, it is clear that Bulgaria’s major 
political parties have generally adopted flawed and feeble approaches to make inroads 
with Turkish and Muslim communities. On the other, the experiences of parties 
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(including rival Turkish/Muslim EMPs) that employed a more concerted and systematic 
approach to attract such voters, suggest that breaking the monopoly of a successful 
minority party over its consistency is exceedingly difficult. The MRF was able to quickly 
consolidate support in the early 1990s as a consequence of the Turkish community’s 
pressing need for political representation in a post-Communist Bulgaria, and retained that 
support thanks to its competent leadership. It seems unlikely that Bulgaria’s major 
political forces in the transition period could have altered this course of events by making 
appeals to the Turkish and Muslim communities. Similarly, the total lack of effort the 
country’s major parties have exerted in attracting the Roma vote via programmatic 
appeals has not resulted in the formation of a successful Roma party. 
 I do, however, find evidence for the influence of two other domestic-level 
variables—the presence of a right-wing populist party and a clientelistic political 
culture—on the electoral fortunes of the MRF. While the party has enjoyed impressive 
electoral performances since its inception, it is no accident that it enjoyed by far its 
strongest showings in election years when it was 1) competing against the nationalist 
party Ataka and 2) coming off a spell in government. There was widespread agreement 
among the subjects interviewed that Ataka’s incendiary rhetoric has helped fuel voter 
turnout among ethnic Turks and Muslims, and that the MRF has been able to utilize its 
vast clientelistic networks to great effect as a consequence of its position as a pivotal 
partner in coalition government. 
With respect to international influences, it appears that support from Turkey and 
international organizations may have helped the MRF survive constitutional challenges in 
the early 90s, and that the lack of such international support allowed the Bulgarian state 
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to snuff out efforts at Roma party formation in the same period; however, since the 
evidence for such outside influences is largely anecdotal, we must take it with a grain of 
salt and not overstate its significance. On the other hand, I find no evidence that the EU 
contributed to the party’s strong electoral performance beyond this foundational period. 
Additionally, I find that while the existence of a neighboring kin state in Turkey has 
helped boost the MRF’s electoral performance somewhat, this a consequence of 
geography rather than geo-politics. The Movement has simply benefited from the 
proximity of a sizable group of ethnically Turkish Bulgarian citizens of residing in 
Turkey. There is little evidence to suggest the Turkish government itself has assisted the 
MRF in any significant way. 
Lastly, I find that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been aided in its 
electoral success by its extensive, professional and rigidly hierarchical organizational 
structure that nevertheless offers opportunities for intra-party advancement, as well as by 
the quality of its leaders. By simultaneously cracking down on internal dissent and 
rewarding loyal and capable cadres, the MRF has been able to attract top political talent 
while preventing fractionalization and splintering. In contrast, parties of the Roma have 
suffered the consequences of a weak organizational structure with low 
professionalization, paired with serious deficits in the educational attainment and political 
acumen of their leaders. 
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V. Conclusion 
This dissertation has made several significant contributions to the fields of ethnic 
politics and niche parties, and more specifically to the study of the determinants of ethnic 
minority party emergence and success. 
First, I have developed and tested an original theoretical framework explaining 
the presence and absence of successful parties representing the interests of ethnic 
minority groups. Incorporating insights from history and social psychology, I have 
argued that the particular historical experiences of ethnic minority groups endow them 
with a group psychology that may or may not be favorable to the establishment and 
support of an ethnic minority party. I proposed that possession of three historical traits—
historical presence, territorial attachment and experience with autonomy—should 
substantially increase the likelihood that an minority group will 1) seek to establish a 
party of its own to represent its interests and 2) be able to generate the electoral support 
necessary to obtain legislative representation. 
In testing this theory via a large-N, quantitative cross-national analysis of 
European elections, I discovered that two of the historical variables—historical presence 
and dominance/autonomy—are the two strongest predictors of both ethnic minority party 
entry and success. Remarkably, these variables prove to be so influential that they even 
eclipse the influence of ethnic group size (as a share of total population) on the two 
dependent variables. In contrast, I found little support for the influence of the other 
historical factor, territorial attachment. However, as I pointed out in Chapter III, this null 
finding is less-than-conclusive, especially in the analysis of EMP success, due to the 
small number of observations of minority groups that possess historical presence but not 
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territorial attachment. What we can be fairly confident in is that historical background 
matters in minority groups’ political strategies, and their capacities to successfully 
execute those strategies. Groups that inhabited the territory of their present-day state prior 
to the formation of that state, and groups that have enjoyed a period of autonomy on the 
lands on which they currently reside, are more like to establish ethnic minority parties 
and to obtain legislative representation through them. 
The case study presented in Chapter IV sheds additional light on the relationship 
between history and minority group political engagement in several respects. First, it 
serves as a sort of sensitivity analysis, revealing that historical variables outside of the 
framework presented in this work can play a role. In the case of Bulgaria, the omitted 
variable was a history of unjust repression at the hands of the state, which undoubtedly 
contributed to the emergence of a strong and unified Turkish minority party. However, 
the failure of the Roma community to establish a party with even a fraction of the 
success, despite the fact that it suffered similar (if not more severe) treatment from the 
Communist government, suggests that his cannot possibly be the only historical factor at 
play. Instead, I argue that the Turkish minority’s possession of the three favorable 
historical characteristics is what made that group perceive the Revival Process of the 
1980’s as an outrage that demanded political action—in other words, there was an 
unmistakable sense in the Turkish community that based on their background, they 
deserved better treatment. In contrast, the Roma (who possess neither territorial 
attachment nor experience with self-rule) viewed government repression as the norm and 
were not moved to widespread collective political action. Thus, the second take-way from 
the Bulgaria case study is that historical variables—including those outside my 
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framework—can interact with one another in ways that can be especially favorable to 
ethnic minority parties. 
In addition to my central thesis regarding the influence of historical variables, my 
work has contributed a rigorous and comprehensive empirical test of alternative 
explanations for the emergence and success of ethnic minority parties. 
Following Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), I applied Kitschelt’s (1985) formulation 
of political opportunity structure theory to the study of EMP entry, making some 
important adjustments in operationalization to more accurately capture the expected 
effect. Ultimately, I found that there is no relationship between the attitudes of major 
political parties toward ethnic minorities and the likelihood of those minority groups 
forming a political party of their own to contest national elections, corroborating 
Bernauer and Bochsler’s earlier null finding. However, I am not entirely convinced that 
the failure of empirical tests to establish a connection between the two variables is 
indicative of the absence of such a relationship. As mentioned in this work, there are 
considerable methodological challenges in testing this thesis. Although I believe I have 
offered an improvement in this respect, the major challenge seems to be that we are 
limited in our ability to measure party attitudes toward particular ethnic minority groups; 
instead, we are forced to use attitudes toward minorities in general—itself a limited 
variable, since it is based on what parties say rather than what they do—as a proxy. It is 
possible that this imperfect operationalization may be masking an actual relationship. 
What the Bulgaria case study has demonstrated, however, is that major political parties 
have a limited influence on the fortunes of ethnic minority parties, especially once those 
parties have proven themselves to be electorally viable. 
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In addition to the influence of mainstream parties, I proposed and assessed the 
role of two additional variables measured at the country level. First, I argued that the 
presence of a successful right-wing populist (RWP) or nationalist party is likely to 
contribute to the electoral success of ethnic minority parties by stoking fear and 
apprehension among minority groups, driving them to turn out in greater numbers on 
election day to support their respective parties. My cross-national analysis confirms the 
existence—albeit of a modest magnitude—of such a relationship, while the case of 
Bulgaria reveals in greater depth and detail the psychological effect the nationalist party 
Ataka has had on the country’s Turkish voters, creating widespread unease and concern 
over the possible erosion of ethnic rights, and the ways in which the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) has capitalized on these moods to secure unprecedented 
electoral gains. Additionally, I proposed that a clientelistic (rather than programmatic) 
political culture is likely to be more beneficial for the electoral performance of EMPs due 
to their unique and almost exclusive access to built-in patronage networks within a 
particular ethnic minority group. While I did not find support for this hypothesis in my 
quantitative analysis, this may be partly due to the well-known challenge of accurately 
operationalizing clientelism. In contrast, my study of ethnic politics in Bulgaria revealed 
that no Bulgarian party has profited from clientelistic politics as much as the MRF. 
Overall, what my analysis reveals is that political culture and political system variables 
such as these can help tell part of the story of ethnic minority party success, even if they 
are not the primary drivers of it. 
Another group of explanations tested in this work were those pertaining the 
influence of international actors. First, I examined the possibility that candidacy to the 
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European Union may increase the likelihood of minority party entry, as the accession 
candidates should be eager to signal commitment to the liberal values espoused by the 
organization, and therefore less likely to impose substantial barriers to entry for 
ethnically-based parties. In my quantitative analysis, I found only a very modest 
relationship between candidacy for EU accession and EMP contestation of national 
elections. When examining the question in greater detail in my Bulgaria case study, it 
appears that international influences may have played some role in Bulgaria allowing the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party to contest national elections while 
initially banning other ethnically-based parties, although evidence of overt pressure on 
the part of international organizations is lacking. Second, I considered whether nearby or 
neighboring kin states can contribute to the formation and success of parties representing 
the ethnic group in question. Once again, there was limited support for this thesis in my 
quantitative analysis. In contrast, the case study in Chapter IV suggest that while the 
Turkish government itself has had no role in boosting the MRF’s success in Bulgaria, the 
party has benefitted from the ability to mobilize dual-nationals living in Turkey to turn 
out in national elections. Overall, it seems that international organizations such as the 
European Union can play some limited role in easing barriers to entry for ethnic minority 
parties, and in some cases EMPs can get a modest boost in electoral performance from 
the presence of a nearby kin state. However, it does not appear that international 
influences play nearly as strong of a role in determining ethnic minority party outcomes 
as those factors pertaining to the group’s historical background. 
Lastly, in Chapter IV I examined the role of several party organization variables 
that have been proposed to explain a party’s success. I found, as has been hypothesized, 
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that the high level of professionalization of the MRF has contributed to its success while 
the lack thereof has hindered Roma parties from accomplishing much in Bulgarian 
politics. But perhaps most interestingly, I found that the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms has benefitted from a unique organizational structure combining low intra-
party democracy and low tolerance for dissent on the one hand, and abundant 
opportunities for intra-party advancement on the other. This combination of 
organizational characteristics has enabled the party to simultaneously maintain unity and 
discipline under a rigidly hierarchical structure and at the same time recruit and retain 
exceptionally capable politicians to its ranks. It therefore seems to me that while Chandra 
(2004) is correct in stressing the role of intra-party advancement for ethnic parties, this 
may not be the whole story. It seems that a great amount of fluidity in party leadership 
positions on its own can result in internal disorder that can be destructive to an ethnic 
party’s fortunes, unless it is also accompanied by a rigidly hierarchical and highly 
disciplined approach to internal decision-making. 
Ultimately, my work demonstrates that an ethnic group’s decision to form a 
political party of its own to contest national elections is primarily a function of that 
group’s historical background, as well as its size as a share of total population. Groups 
possessing a historical background entailing a long-standing connection to the territories 
they inhabit and experience with self-rule are significantly more likely to form ethnic 
minority parties, provided that the numerical size of the group in question is sufficient to 
make legislative representation seem achievable. Minority groups—even large ones—
that lack this historical background are more likely to engage the politics of their state by 
alternative means. In contrast, the actions and attitudes of domestic political actors (such 
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as mainstream parties) do not appear to influence the decision of whether or not to form 
an EMP in any significant way. International actors (such as foreign governments and 
international organizations) may play a modest role in certain cases by persuading 
governments to permit the establishment of parties representing ethnic interests. 
Similarly, the primary drivers behind the success of ethnic minority parties—
measured as their ability to obtain legislative representation—are the historical 
background of the ethnic group and its share of total population, in that order. Larger 
groups with a more favorable historical background (along the two dimensions discussed 
above) tend to consistently win seats in their national legislatures via their EMPs. 
Additionally, the presence of right-wing populist or nationalist party in the country’s 
party system can aid minority parties in mobilizing their electoral base, leading to 
stronger performances in elections. As the Bulgarian case reveals, EMPs may also be 
more adept than other political parties at exploiting a political culture characterized by 
clientelism and patronage. While international influences play a modest role in minority 
party entry, they do not appear to affect the electoral fortunes of such parties. Lastly, 
based on the Bulgarian case study, there may be certain party organization characteristics 
that facilitate electoral success for such parties, with the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms’ model of low intra-party democracy couple with ample opportunities for intra-
party advancement proving to be a highly effective one. 
These findings help to shed considerable light on the puzzle with which this work 
began—if ethnic minority parties have proven to be such effective representatives of 
minority interests in so many cases, why have many minorities either not availed 
themselves of the opportunity to form one, or attempted to form such a party but failed? 
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The answer in the first place is that the prospect of an EMP is simply more 
appealing to some groups than it is to others, as influenced by their social psychology, 
which is in itself influenced by historical factors. Ethnic minority parties offer a special 
form of political representation that is grounded in a well-developed sense of group 
rights, as opposed to merely individual rights. Groups that by way of their historical 
experience feel entitled to group rights are much more likely to opt to form EMPs, which 
simultaneously communicate the belongingness of the group to the state (its equal right to 
political representation) and its separateness from it (its unique character that developed 
separately from the development of the national idea). In contrast, predominantly migrant 
groups are willing to accept a certain degree of assimilation and are primarily concerned 
with the protection of their rights as individuals. To such communities, it makes little 
sense to establish separate political formations precisely because they communicate a 
“separateness” that runs counter to the group’s goals. Instead, it makes sense for 
predominantly migrant groups to assimilate politically into their states, just as they 
assimilate socially. Other structural factors will exert at best a modest influence on a 
group’s decision of which political strategy to pursue, so it is not a question of finding the 
“right conditions” to engender EMP emergence. The right conditions are largely 
determined by centuries of historical experience and cannot be easily augmented—some 
re-imaginings of history are possible, but not ones of this magnitude. It thus appears that 
the ethnic minority party strategy may not be useful for Western Europe’s burgeoning 
migrant communities. The primary reason we do not see parties representing such groups 
is that these minorities do not have a particularly strong interest in establishing them. 
On the other hand, it is evident that merely possessing the right historical 
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characteristics is no guarantee of ethnic minority party success. There are many minority 
groups—particularly the Roma—that are attracted to the ethnic minority party idea, but 
fail in its execution. What is common to such groups is that they tend to either 1) lack one 
of the two favorable historical traits or 2) are numerically small in size. The former of 
these challenges seems plausibly—if not easily—surmountable by emphasizing the 
favorable historical characteristics that the group does possess. The latter problem, it 
seems at first, can only be remedied over time by demographic changes. But we should 
not underestimate the role that an effective party organization can play in mobilizing 
electoral support so as to overcome demographic challenges. We have in the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms a perfect example of a party whose highly effective 
organizational structure has enabled in to “punch above its weight” in recent elections. If 
the MRF can obtain 14% of the vote while having an electoral base comprising 8% of 
total population, then it seems that a party representing a small minority group can, with 
the right strategy, obtain legislative representation despite its demographic limitations.  
Having outlined the main contributions of this work, I now turn to discuss the 
opportunities it suggests for future research. First, it must be said that while empirical 
tests have not been kind to the political opportunity structure explanation of EMP 
emergence, we should not dismiss the possibility of such a relationship. The theoretical 
reasoning behind this relationship—that the actions and attitudes of dominant political 
actors in a state should influence the political strategies pursued by minority groups—is 
sound, and it is possible that we have simply failed to accurately capture the independent 
variable of interest. The focus therefore needs to be on how we can better operationalize 
mainstream party attitudes. I have made here some contributions to this pursuit, most 
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notably the idea that what we ought to be concerned with is how favorable the most 
favorable “major” party in a state is toward a particular minority group. But actually 
measuring this favorability is difficult, and content analysis may not be best way of 
accomplishing this. Perhaps the employment of other, more time- and resource-intensive 
methods such as elite or mass-level surveys would allow us to get a better sense of which 
parties (if any) genuinely appeal to minority voters, and therefore provide a better test of 
the political opportunity structure thesis. For now, however, we must remain skeptical of 
the proposed effect. 
My work has revealed that international actors may play some modest role in 
facilitating the electoral entry of ethnic minority parties. However, the precise channels 
through which this influence generally occurs are not clear. The only in-depth analysis 
presented here is of the Bulgarian case, which may be considered to be sui generis due to 
the country’s ethnic party ban, and even there we do not see any “smoking gun” that 
directly and unambiguously links international pressure with EMP emergence. But since 
the cross-national analysis suggests international influences (particularly by the European 
Union) may exist in Europe in general, it seems worthwhile to explore other cases 
qualitatively and with the proper level of detail. 
Similarly, several of the factors my research suggests contribute to ethnic 
minority party success deserve to be studied more comprehensively, either cross-
nationally or with the help of additional case studies. First, it appears that there are good 
theoretical reason to believe that EMPs ought to fare better in clientelistic (rather than 
programmatic) political seasons, and the Bulgarian case presents some compelling 
supporting evidence. Yet the null finding of the cross-national analysis suggest that a 
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more accurate means of operationalizing clientelism is necessary to capture this effect; 
the challenge, then, is to develop such an operationalization. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, we still have a limited understanding of what party organization 
characteristics facilitate the success of ethnic minority parties. My study of the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms suggests that a combination of low intra-party 
democracy and ample opportunities for intra-party advancement may be beneficial by 
allowing a party to remain unified while attracting top-level talent. This idea needs to be 
tested in other settings—either through cross-national quantitative analysis (which is 
challenging due to the scarcity of party organization data, especially for small parties), or, 
more plausibly, through further case studies.  
It should be noted that the theoretical and empirical advances presented here bear 
a significance beyond the mere study of ethnic minority parties. For instance, my findings 
regarding party organization have relevance to the broader study of niche parties. Small 
parties can ill-afford internal dissent and splintering, as such developments can seriously 
threaten their ability to secure legislative representation. Therefore, all niche parties may 
benefit from adopting the organizational framework of the MRF, which strongly 
encourages and enforces conformity while keeping its members content and hopeful with 
the promise of internal advancement. Similarly, the idea that right-wing populist and 
ethnic minority parties play off of one another to their mutual electoral benefit could 
translate to other diametrically opposed party dyads as well. 
Perhaps most importantly, I hope that my work has demonstrated that we cannot 
disentangle the broader study of ethnic politics from the study of the historical 
development of ethnic identities. It is evident that history and one’s perception of it play a 
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major role in establishing the character, claims and concerns of ethnic minorities, and in 
turn these groups’ political strategy. Here there is ample opportunity for further research. 
First, while an empirical relationship between history and political strategy has been 
established, we have much to learn about the precise process through which this 
relationship develops. We need to look more closely, on the one hand, at the influence of 
history on ethnic identity, and on the other, on the influence of ethnic identity on political 
action. I have merely theorized about this middle part of the relationship, I have not 
tested it empirically; it could well be that the relationship between history and political 
strategy operates through different or more complex channels than the ones I have 
hypothesized. Second, it is possible that there are other historical factors that play a role 
in a minority group’s political decisions. My case study of Bulgaria revealed one such 
factor—a history of extreme government repression of the ethnic group in question; there 
may be others. 
Ultimately, my hope is that this work has communicated the necessity of taking 
into account historical factors in the study of political science in general, and especially 
into quantitative political research, where historical context is often ignored. This is 
certainly not the first study (quantitative or qualitative) to consider the role of history, yet 
it seems that many researchers today rush to treat political systems and attitudes as if they 
emerged ex nihilo at the point in time at which one’s dataset begins. I hope to have 
demonstrated the peril of this approach.  
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VI. Appendix A 
 
This appendix presents a detailed account of the reasoning behind my coding of 
the three Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) variables—historicity, territoriality and 
dominance/autonomy. I address here only those ethnic groups that I felt were the least 
straightforward to code on one or more of these dimensions, and whose coding would 
therefore be most likely to raise objections. Where necessary, I have included references 
to the historical sources informing my decisions. 
 
The contents of this appendix are organized alphabetically by country and then by 
ethnic group within each country, from smallest to largest. I first state when I consider 
the modern form of the state in question to have been established, since this has bearing 
on my coding decisions for the historicity and territoriality variables. I then examine each 
relevant ethnic group residing within the state on the three HSP dimensions. 
 
Table A.1 presents a summary of my coding decisions for each ethnic group in the 
dataset. 
 
   
Table A.1: Ethnic minority groups and their historical characteristics 
STATE ETHNIC GROUP (% of 
population) 
Native Territorial Dominant/ 
autonomous 
Albania 
Greeks (4 %)    
Roma (1.4%)    
Austria 
Muslims (4.2%)    
Turks (3.2%)    
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Serbs (31.5%)    
Croats (17.3%)    
Bulgaria 
Turks (9.4%)    
Roma (4.9%)    
Croatia Serbs (4.5%)     
Czech 
Republic 
Moravians (4.9%)    
Slovaks (1.4%)    
Denmark 
Muslims (4%)    
Turks (1%)    
Estonia 
Russians (25.6%)    
Ukrainians (2.1%)    
Belarusians (1.1%)    
Finland Swedes    
France 
Muslims (9%)    
Algerians (3.1%)    
Moroccans (2 %)    
Germany 
Muslims (5.4%)    
Turks (5%)    
Greece Albanians (4.3%)    
Hungary 
Roma (5%)    
Germans (2.4%)    
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Table A.1 (cont.) 
Italy Muslims (3.9%)    
Kosovo 
Serbs (7%)    
Roma (2.3%)    
Bosniaks/Muslims (2.2%)    
Turks (1%)    
Latvia 
Russians (26.9%)    
Belarusians (3.3%)    
Ukrainians (2.2%)    
Poles (2.2%)    
Lithuanians (1.2%)    
Lithuania 
Poles (6.1%)    
Russians (4.8%)    
Belarusians (1.5%)    
Macedonia 
Albanians (22.7 %)    
Turks (4.0 %)    
Serbs (2.1 %)    
Roma (2.2 %)    
Montenegro 
Serbs (28.7 %)    
Bosniaks/Muslims (11.9 %)    
Albanians (4.8%)    
Netherlands 
Muslims (5.5%)    
Turks (2.3%)    
Indonesians (2.3%)    
Moroccans (2.1%)    
Surinamese (2.1%)    
Norway Muslims (2%)    
Romania 
Hungarians (6.6%)    
Roma (2.5%)    
Serbia 
Hungarians (3.9%)    
Bosniaks (1.8%)    
Roma (1.4%)    
Slovakia 
Hungarians (8.5%)    
Roma (2.0%)    
Slovenia 
Serbs (2%)    
Croats (1.8%)    
Bosnians (1.3%)    
Spain 
Catalans (17%)    
Basques (2%)    
Sweden 
Finns (5%)    
Muslims (5%)    
Iraqis (1.3%)    
Switzerland 
Muslims (4.3%)    
Serbs (2.5%)    
Portuguese (2.4%)    
Spaniards (1.2%)    
Turkey 
Kurds (18%)    
Arabs (2.1%)    
Ukraine Russians (17.2%)    
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Table A.1 (cont.) 
United 
Kingdom 
Scots (9%)    
Welsh (4.1%)    
Irish (2.4%)    
Blacks (2.8%)    
Muslims (2.7%)    
Indian (1.8%)    
Pakistani (1.3%)    
 
 
 
 
I. Albania 
 
 The modern Albanian nation-state was founded in 1913, with the establishment of 
the Principality of Albania. 
 
 A. Greeks 
 
  1. Historicity. Albania’s Greek population is concentrated in southernmost 
part of the country, which coincides with the northernmost part of the ancient Epirus 
region. Ethnic Greeks have inhabited Epirus since as early as the 19th century BC1 and 
the region was ruled by various Hellenic states until its conquest by the Ottoman Empire 
in the middle of the 15th century. The first reliable Albanian national census, conducted in 
1945, reveals that Greeks constituted 2.5% of the state’s population. It appears highly 
unlikely that the ethnically Greek share of the population was any smaller three decades 
earlier, when the Albanian state was formed. The Greek share of the population declined 
over the decades following the 1945 census, with Greeks constituting 1.8% of the state’s 
residents in 1989, shortly before the collapse of Albanias’s Communist regime. It 
therefore appears safe to assume that Albania’s Greeks are of a native—rather than 
migrant—background. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Nearly all of present-day Albania’s Greeks reside in, and 
have historically inhabited, the northernmost part of the Epirus region that is today the 
southernmost part of Albania. The Albanian government even recognizes a Greek 
“minority zone” that encompasses only part of this region. Figure A.1 below presents 
both this zone (signified by a blue border) and the larger area of northern Epirus where 
Albania’s Greek population is heavily concentrated. With nearly 30 centuries of 
geographically concentrated presence on this portion of the territory of modern-day 
Albania, ethnic Greeks can clearly be viewed to possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 Hammond, N.G.L. “Ancient Epirus: Prehistory and Protohistory” in M.V. Sakellariou, ed. Epirus, 4000 
Years of Greek History and Civilization. Athens: Ektdotike Athenon, 1997. 
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Figure A.1 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greeks_in_Albania#mediaviewer/File:Albania_minorities.png 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The territory of northern Epirus (today southern 
Albania) has been under some form of Hellenic rule for much of recorded history. In pre-
Roman times, it was controlled by the Chaonians and later the Epirotic League, and in the 
middle ages it was part of the Byzantine Empire. More recently, the region was under 
Greek control in the Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus in 1914, and during the 
Greek occupation of Albania during World War II. Since there are numerous historical 
examples of Greek autonomy and dominance within the territory of present-day Albania, 
I consider the country’s Greek minority to possess the trait of historical 
dominance/autonomy. 
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II. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 The modern independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in 
1992, declaring independence on March 3rd and receiving international recognition in the 
following month. 
 
A. Serbs 
  
  1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav population census, conducted in the 
year prior to the establishment of the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reported 
that 31.2% of the future state’s population consisted of ethnic Serbs. Indeed, Serbs had 
constituted a plurality in the region as late as 1961, according to the census conducted 
that year. Therefore, ethnic Serbs are clearly native to the country. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.2 below is a map of ethnic Serbs as a percentage 
of total population by settlements, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav census. 
Examining the map, it is evident that Serbs were heavily concentrated in the northwestern 
and eastern parts of the future state. Population maps produced as early as 1910 report a 
similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic Serbs can be considered to have territorial 
attachment within Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Figure A.2 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina#mediaviewer/File:BiH_-
_US_N_1991.gif 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the 
most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that 
existed between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multi-
national state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, 
Belgrade held “the upper hand” in its creation and governance.2 The post-World War II 
Socialist Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region 
what can at the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. I 
therefore consider Serbs in the region to have a historical background of 
dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 99 
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 B. Croats 
 
  1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav population census, conducted in the 
year prior to the establishment of the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reported 
that 17.4% of the future state’s population consisted of ethnic Serbs. Additionally, Croats 
had constituted upwards of 20% of the region’s population during the first half of the 20th 
century. Therefore, ethnic Croats are clearly native to the country. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.3 below is a map of ethnic Croats as a 
percentage of total population by settlements, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav 
census. Examining the map, it is evident that Croats were heavily concentrated in the 
southeast, along the border with Croatia. Population maps produced as early as 1910 
report a similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic Croatians can be considered to 
have territorial attachment within Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Figure A.3 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina#mediaviewer/File:BiH_-
_UH_N_1991.gif 
 
 
 
208 
 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The medieval Croatian kingdom controlled lands 
including modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina between the 11th and 12th centuries.3 
Although Croatian dominance in the region was both brief and historically distant, we 
must keep in mind that what matters here is the influence of this historical period on the 
social psychology of the modern day population. The extent of the medieval Croatian 
kingdom is still viewed by some as a basis for Croatian irredentism.4 In any case, Croats 
certainly enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy and a co-equal status in the post-World 
War II Yugoslav state. I therefore consider Croats to have a dominant/autonomous 
historical background. 
 
 
 
III. Croatia 
 
 The modern independent state of Croatia was established in 1991, declaring 
independence from Yugoslavia in October and obtaining international recognition in 
January of the following year. 
 
 A. Serbs 
 
  1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav census, conducted in the year in which 
Croatia declared independence, reports that 12.2% of the future state’s population was 
comprised of ethnic Serbs. Earlier censuses reveal that the region’s Serb population was 
slightly larger (in the neighborhood of 15%) for much of the 20th century. Thus, it seems 
evident that Serbs should be considered a native minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.4 below is a map of ethnic Serbs as a percentage 
of total population by settlements, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav census. 
Examining the map, it is evident that Serbs were heavily concentrated along the borders 
with Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia. Earlier population maps from the 20th century 
report a similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic Serbs can be considered to have 
territorial attachment within Croatia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15-17. 
4 Ibid, 15. 
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Figure A.4 
 
Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbs_of_Croatia#mediaviewer/File:Serbs_in_Croatia_1991_(modern
_administrative_division).jpg 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the 
most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Croatia under the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that existed 
between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multi-national 
state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, Belgrade held 
“the upper hand” in its creation and governance.5 The post-World War II Socialist 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region what can at 
the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. Additionally, the 
establishment of the war-time Republic of Serbian Krajina in 1991 offered the group a 
brief period of self-rule until its demise in 1995. Thus, it seems appropriate to classify 
ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina as dominant/autonomous. 
                                                           
5 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 99 
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IV. Hungary  
 
 The modern Hungarian nation-state was established in 1918, following secession 
from Austria-Hungary and the formation of the first Hungarian republic, although this 
state did not assume its present territorial scope until it lost substantial territories in 1920 
with the Treaty of Trianon. 
 
 A. Germans 
 
  1. Historicity. Ethnic Germans settled in land controlled by the Hungarian 
crown over the course of several migration waves from the 11th to the 18th century. Thus, 
Germans had become an established minority group on Hungarian territories well before 
the formation of the modern Hungarian nation-state. In 1910, the last census conducted 
before the emergence of modern Hungary reported that Germans constituted 7.3% of the 
population within the territory of present-day Hungary. The country’s German population 
would go on to decline substantially over the course of the 20th century, but those who 
remained can undoubtedly trace their origin to a native population. For this reason, I 
consider Hungary’s Germans to be a native minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Although Germans enjoy a rich historical presence on 
Hungarian territory, they never settled in particularly concentrated geographic patterns, 
instead remaining largely scattered. Figure A.5 below is an ethnographic map of the 
territory of present-day Hungary in 1910.6 Areas in orange indicate a German-majority 
population. The map reveals that on the eve of the modern Hungarian nation-state, 
Germans were not concentrated in particular regions, and that German settlements existed 
in various parts of the country. I therefore consider Germans in Hungary to lack the trait 
of territorial attachment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
6 It should be noted that this map includes substantial territories ceded by Hungary in 1920. 
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Figure A.5 
 
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethnographic_map_of_hungary_1910_by_teleki_carte_rouge.jpg 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The German people have never exercised 
autonomous self-rule within the territory of present-day Hungary within peace-time. The 
only historical period that even approximates German dominance/autonomy within these 
lands was World War II, when Hungary was a member of the Axis powers and under 
strong influence from Nazi Germany. However, this alliance did not result in ethnic 
Germans ruling within Hungary, nor did it lead to German autonomy within its borders. 
Therefore, I do not consider Hungary’s Germans to possess the trait of historical 
dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
 
V. Estonia 
 
 The modern state of Estonia was established in February of 1918 with a 
declaration of independence from Russia, and officially recognized by the international 
community two years later.  
 
 A. Russians 
 
  1. Historicity. The historical background of Estonia’s Russian population 
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is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, ethnic Russians had settled in the territory of 
present-day Estonia following its conquest by the Russian Empire in 1721. Thus, 
Russians enjoyed a presence in the region for the nearly two centuries preceding the 
establishment of the modern Estonian nation-state. The 1922 Estonian census, conducted 
shortly after independence, reveals that ethnic Russians comprised 8.2% of the state’s 
population. However, Estonia’s Russian population would explode in the aftermath of 
World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of 
collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a 
significant number of ethnic Estonians and the mass settlement of ethnically Russian 
people in the region.7 As a consequence of these population movements, Estonia’s 
Russian population increased from 91,109 in 1922 to 474,834 in 1989, two years prior to 
the restoration of Estonian independence. As a percentage of total population, Russians 
increased from 8.2 to 30.3%. Since this staggering increase was largely driven by 
migration, it is safe to assume that a majority of the Russians inhabiting Estonia on the 
eve of its independence  from the Soviet Union were of migrant—as opposed to native—
origin. I therefore code Russians in Estonia as a non-native minority group. Truthfully, 
the historical background of this group is most accurately described as mixed. However, 
the logistical complications involved in introducing such a category into my quantitative 
analysis imposes a cost exceeding that of the benefit from an increased accuracy of 
operationalization. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since I categorize Russians in Estonia as a non-native 
ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial 
attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, 
Estonia’s Russians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and 
for the second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest 
cities, having migrated there to take advantage of the Baltic region’s burgeoning 
industrial centers.8 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Ethnic Russians have ruled the territory of 
present-day Estonia in two separate spells totaling nearly 250 years. These lands first 
came under Russian control following the conclusion of the Great Northern War in 
1721,9 and remained under Russian rule until the Estonian declaration of independence in 
1918. Over the course of World War II, Estonia came under Soviet occupation and was 
incorporated into the Soviet Union until its re-established independence in 1991. During 
both of these periods, the territory of present-day Estonia was governed by ethnic 
Russians. Both imperial and Soviet Russia introduced “Russification” policies that 
favored Russian residents to the exclusion of those from other ethnic backgrounds.10 I 
therefore consider Estonia’s Russians to possess a history of dominance in the region. 
 
 
 
                                                           
7 O’Connor, Kevin. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 127 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, p. 29-30 
10 Ibid, 53-67; 125-59 
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 B. Ukrainians 
 
  1. Historicity. Ukrainians are not native to lands of modern-day Estonia. 
Although the 1922 Estonian census (the first following independence) did not include 
“Ukrainian” as an ethnicity or nationality option, the subsequent census of 1934 did. It 
reported that Estonia’s Ukrainian residents numbered 92 people in all, or less that 0.1% 
of the total population. Estonia’s Ukrainian population increased dramatically in the 
aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet 
policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation 
of a significant number of ethnic Estonians and the mass settlement of Slavs from other 
Soviet republics (including Ukraine) in the region.11 As a consequence of these 
population movements, Estonia’s Ukrainian population increased to 48,271 in 1989, and 
the group comprised 3.1% of the republic’s population. Since this significant increase 
was clearly driven by migration, I classify Ukrainians as a non-native minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since Ukrainians are not native to the territory of present-
day Estonia, they do not possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Ukrainians have never been able to exercise 
autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the 
territory of present-day Estonia. Throughout their presence in the region, they have either 
been part of a sate dominated by ethnic Estonians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or ethnic 
Russians (1940; 1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Ukrainians to possess a history 
of dominance/autonomy. 
 
VI. Greece 
 
 The modern Greek nation-state was established in 1830, when the First Hellenic 
Republic was officially recognized by the international community. 
 
 A. Albanians 
 
  1. Historicity. While ethnic Albanians had settled in the Greek region of 
Epirus as early as the 13th century, they were few in number and many of them fled from 
the region when the tides turned in World War II. Other smaller indigenous historical 
communities exist in Thrace and Northwestern Greece. However, the vast majority of 
Greece’s current Albanian population migrated to the country over the course of the past 
two-and-a-half centuries in pursuit of economic opportunity.12 Thus, the case of 
Albanians in Greece is similar to that of Russians in the former Baltic states, in that they 
are both of mixed, though predominantly migrant origin. As in the case of Russians in the 
Baltics, I make the judgment to consider Albanians in Greece to be a migrant ethnic 
group. Ideally, this group would be classified as being of “mixed” origin, but the 
logistical complications involved in introducing such a category into my quantitative 
                                                           
11 O’Connor, Kevin. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 127 
12 Clogg, Richard, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002, p. 204 
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analysis imposes a cost exceeding that of the benefit from an increased accuracy of 
operationalization. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since I consider Albanians to be a non-native minority 
group, I do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Albanians have never been able to exercise 
autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the 
territory of present-day Greece. Although Albanians benefited from a somewhat 
privileged status during Ottoman rule when compared to the empire’s Christian 
population, there were very few Albanians living within the territory of modern-day 
Greece, and most of the country’s present-day Albanians do not trace their lineage to 
those settlers. Thus, it is difficult to argue that Albanians have enjoyed autonomy on what 
is currently the territory of Greece. I therefore do not consider Albanians to possess a 
history of dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
 
VII. Kosovo 
 
 The modern state of Kosovo was established on February 17th, 2008 and 
subsequently obtained recognition from 106 United Nations members. 
 
 A. Bosnians/(Slavic) Muslims 
 
  1. Historicity. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census Bosniaks and other 
Slavic Muslims constituted 3.4% of the population of what would later become the 
Republic of Kosovo. Earlier censuses conducted in second half of the 20th century (when 
the category for Slavic Muslims was first introduced) reveal a similarly sized population. 
Therefore, we can consider Bosniaks/(Slavic) Muslims to be a native ethnic group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.6 below is a map of the ethnic composition of 
Kosovo, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav census. We can see that Slavic Muslims 
were heavily concentrated in the southernmost parts of the region. Earlier population 
maps from the 20th century report a similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic 
Bosniaks and Slavic Muslims can be considered to have territorial attachment within 
Croatia. 
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Figure A.6 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo#mediaviewer/File:SRB_-_KiM_-_ES_N_1991_1.GIF 
 
3. Dominance/autonomy. As part of the Muslim confessional community 
under the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, Slavic Muslims enjoyed considerable 
cultural autonomy along with privileged status among other conquered peoples 
within the empire. In my judgment, this fact provides a sufficient amount of 
historical capital to promote the legitimacy of self-rule for this people-group. I 
thus consider Bosnians/(Slavic) Muslims to have a historical background of 
autonomy. 
 
 
 B. Turks 
 
  1. Historicity. An ethnic Turkish presence in the lands currently 
comprising Kosovo has existed ever since the conquest of the area by Ottoman forces in 
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1389. The Yugoslav census of 1953 reveals that 4.3% of the region’s population was 
Turkish. By the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Turks had declined to 0.5% of the 
population, although they did grow in the following decades. Clearly, the Turkish 
minority is of a native—rather than migrant—background. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Kosovo’s ethnic Turks reside almost exclusively in the 
southern city of Prizren and its surrounding villages.13 Prizren is recognized as the 
historical, political and cultural center of Kosovar Turks.14 With no other significant 
historical Turkish settlements of note, I consider ethnic Turks to possess territorial 
attachment to the Prizren region. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Turks were the dominant ethnic group within the 
Ottoman Empire. Not only did they belong to the most favored confessional community 
in the empire, but they were also the ethnic group that dominated the Ottoman Porte. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to classify ethnic Turks as having a dominant historical 
background. 
 
 
 
VIII. Latvia 
 
 The modern Latvian state was established in 1918 after declaring independence 
from Soviet Russia, and was internationally recognized in 1921.  
  
 A.Russians 
 
  1. Historicity. The historical background of Latvia’s Russian population is 
decidedly mixed. On the one hand, ethnic Russians settled in the territory of present-day 
Latvia following its conquest by the Russian Empire in 1721. Thus, Russians enjoyed a 
presence in the region for the two centuries preceding the establishment of the modern 
Latvian nation-state. The 1925 Latvian census, conducted shortly after independence, 
reveals that ethnic Russians comprised 10.5% of the state’s population. However, 
Latvia’s Russian population would explode in the aftermath of World War II and the 
country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, 
industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of 
ethnic Latvians and the mass settlement of ethnically Russian people in the region.15 As a 
consequence of these population movements, Latvia’s Russian population increased from 
193,647 in 1925 to 905,515 in 1989, two years prior to the restoration of Latvian 
independence. As a percentage of total population, Russians increased from 10.5 to 34%. 
Since this staggering increase was largely driven by migration, it is safe to assume that a 
majority of the Russians inhabiting Latvia on the eve of its independence from Soviet 
rule were of migrant—as opposed to native—origin. I therefore code Russians in Latvia 
                                                           
13 O’Neill, William G., Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace (: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 56. 
14 Kosovo Communities Profile, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2010) 
15 O’Connor, Kevin. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 127 
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as a non-native minority group. Truthfully, the historical background of this group is 
most accurately described as mixed. However, the logistical complications involved in 
introducing such a category into my quantitative analysis imposes a cost exceeding that 
of the benefit from an increased accuracy of operationalization. 
 
   2. Territoriality. Since I categorize Russians in Latvia as a non-native 
ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial 
attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, Latvia’s 
Russians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and for the 
second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest cities, 
having migrated there following the conclusion of World War II to take advantage of the 
Baltic region’s burgeoning industrial centers.16 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Ethnic Russians have ruled the territory of 
present-day Latvia in two separate spells totaling nearly 250 years. These lands first came 
under Russian control following the conclusion of the Great Northern War in 1721,17 and 
remained under Russian rule until the Latvian declaration of independence in 1918. Over 
the course of World War II, Latvia came under Soviet occupation and was incorporated 
into the Soviet Union until its re-established independence in 1991. During both of these 
periods, the territory of present-day Latvia was governed by ethnic Russians. Both 
imperial and Soviet Russia introduced “Russification” policies that favored Russian 
residents to the exclusion of those from other ethnic backgrounds.18 I therefore consider 
Latvia’s Russians to possess a history of dominance in the region. 
 
 B. Belarusians 
 
   1. Similarly to Russians, the historical background of Latvia’s Belarusian 
population is mixed. The 1925 Latvian census, conducted shortly after independence, 
reveals that ethnic Belarusians comprised 2.1% of the state’s population, although that 
number dropped to 1.4 in the 1935 census. However, Latvia’s Belarusian population 
would grow significantly in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s 
incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization 
and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Latvians 
and the mass settlement of Slavs from other Soviet republics (including Belarus) in the 
region.19 As a consequence of these population movements, Latvia’s Belarusian 
population increased to a 4.5% share of the republic’s population by 1989. Since this 
significant increase was largely driven by migration, it is safe to assume that a majority of 
the Belarusians inhabiting Latvia on the eve of its independence from Soviet rule were of 
migrant—as opposed to native—origin. I therefore code Belarusians in Latvia as a non-
native minority group. Truthfully, the historical background of this group is most 
accurately described as mixed. However, the logistical complications involved in 
introducing such a category into my quantitative analysis imposes a cost exceeding that 
                                                           
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, p. 29-30 
18 Ibid, 53-67; 125-59 
19 O’Connor, Kevin. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 127 
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of the benefit from an increased accuracy of operationalization. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since I categorize Belarusians in Latvia as a non-native 
ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial 
attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, Latvia’s 
Belarusians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and for the 
second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest cities, 
having migrated there following the conclusion of World War II to take advantage of the 
Baltic region’s burgeoning industrial centers.20 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Belarusians have never been able to exercise 
autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the 
territory of present-day Latvia. Throughout their presence in the region, they have either 
been part of a sate dominated by ethnic Latvians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or ethnic 
Russians (1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Belarusians to possess a history of 
dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
 C. Ukrainians 
 
   1. Historicity. Ukrainians are not native to lands of modern-day Latvia. 
The Latvian census of 1925 reported that Ukrainian residents numbered 512 people in all, 
or less that 0.1% of the total population. Latvia’s Ukrainian population increased 
dramatically in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the 
Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification 
motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Latvians and the mass 
settlement of Slavs from other Soviet republics (including Ukraine) in the region.21 As a 
consequence of these population movements, Latvia’s Ukrainian population increased to 
92,101 in 1989, and the group comprised 3.5% of the republic’s population. Since this 
significant increase was clearly driven by migration, I classify Ukrainians as a non-native 
minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since Ukrainians are not native to the territory of present-
day Latvia, they do not possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Ukrainians have never been able to exercise 
autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the 
territory of present-day Latvia. Throughout their presence in the region, they have either 
been part of a sate dominated by ethnic Latvians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or ethnic 
Russians (1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Ukrainians to possess a history of 
dominance/autonomy. 
 
  
 
                                                           
20 Ibid. 
21 O’Connor, Kevin. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 127 
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D. Poles 
 
  1. Historicity. Ethnic Poles have lived on the territory of modern-day 
Latvia since the 16th century.22 In Lativa’s first post-independence census of 1925, Poles 
constituted 2.8% of the state’s population, and it seems safe to assume that they 
comprised a similar (if not larger) proportion prior to the emergence of the modern 
Latvian state. Over the course of the following nine decades, the Polish share of the 
population remained fairly constant, ranging from 2.2 to 2.9% according to census data. 
Therefore, it seems straightforward that Poles should be coded as a native ethnic group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.7 below is a map of ethnic concentration of 
ethnic Poles within Latvia. There are two regions of the country in which ethnic Poles 
enjoy a substantial presence—the southeastern part of the state, along the Lithuania and 
Belarus borders, clustered around the city of Dugavpils, and in the central part of the 
state, along the Lithuanian border and clustered around the city of Riga. These 
concentration patterns are not recent developments, but a consequence of centuries-old 
settlement patterns and the proximity to formerly Polish-controlled territories. I therefore 
consider Latvia’s Poles to possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
Figure A.7 
 
Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poles_in_Latvia#mediaviewer/File:Ethnic_Poles_in_Latvia_share_2010.png 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
controlled the Inflanty region, where present-day Poles are concentrated, between 1561 
                                                          
22 Plakans, Andrejs. The Latvians. Hoover Institution Press (1995), p.38-39. 
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and 1600.23 Thus, Poles in the region do have some (although distant) historical 
experience with autonomous self-rule. I therefore consider Poles in Latvia to have a 
dominant/autonomous background. 
 
 E. Lithuanians 
  1. Historicity. Ethnic Lithuanians have lived on the territory of modern-
day Latvia since the 16th century.24 In Lativa’s first post-independence census of 1925, 
Lithuanians constituted 1.3% of the state’s population, and it seems safe to assume that 
they comprised a similar proportion prior to the emergence of the modern Latvian state. 
Over the course of the following nine decades, the Lithuanian share of the population 
remained fairly constant, ranging from 1.2 to 1.7% according to census data. Therefore, it 
appears straightforward that Lithuanians should be coded as a native ethnic group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Although Latvia’s Lithuanians tend to live in the southern 
portion of the country, along the border with Lithuania, they are so few in number that 
they do not constitute a significant share of the population in any Latvian municipality. 
Further, an examination of history reveals no regions or territories within present-day 
Latvia that Lithuanians appear to be attached to or particularly associated with. I 
therefore do not consider Lithuanians to possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
controlled part of the lands comprising modern-day Latvia between 1561 and 1629.25 
Although the Commonwealth was formally to be a federal state with two distinct and 
equal components, in reality it was dominated by Poland, the larger of the two states.26 
The fact that the region was predominantly under Polish rule (with a Polish monarch and 
Polish-dominated Sejm), combined with the temporally distant character of these events, 
leads me to conclude that Lithuanians in Latvia do not have a genuine historical 
experience as the dominant ethnic group in Latvia. 
 
 
 
IX. Lithuania 
 
 The modern Lithuanian state was established in 1918, following the conclusion of 
World War I. 
 
 A. Poles 
 
  1. Historicity. Poles lived on the territory of present-day Lithuania for 
centuries prior to establishment of the modern nation state, dating back to the days of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In Lithuania’s first post-independence census in 1923, 
                                                           
23 Ibid, 38-39. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, 37. 
26 Gierowski, Jozef Andrzej. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XVIIIth Century: From Anarchy 
to Well-Organized State. Polish Academy of Sciences, 1996. 
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Poles constituted 3.2% of the state’s population. However, this census did not cover the 
Vilnius region, which was controlled by Poland in the interwar period but subsequently 
became part of the Lithuanian Sovereign Soviet Republic (SSR).27 In the Soviet census of 
1959, Poles accounted for 8.5% of Lithuania’s population. Their share of the republic’s 
total population declined gradually over the course of the 20th century. Since most Poles 
in Lithuania live in the Vilnius region to which they have deep historical ties, I consider 
them to be a native ethnic minority. 
 
  2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, most of the Poles 
in present-day Lithuania have historically resided in the Vilnius region. Figure A.8 below 
is a map of the concentration of ethnic Poles in Lithuania, which confirms the notion that 
Poles are geographically clustered in this southeastern region of the country, along the 
Polish border. Since this clustering is not the consequence of recent migration patterns, 
but of centuries-old settlements, I consider Poles to exhibit territorial attachment. 
 
Figure A.8 
 
Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poles_in_Lithuania#mediaviewer/File:Poles_distribution_in_Lithuania,_2001_cen
sus.png 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The Vilnius region, which today is home to a 
majority of Lithuania’s Poles, was under Polish control in the period between World War 
I and World War II.28 Thus, ethnic Poles in the region have had an experience with 
autonomous self-rule in a state in which they constituted the dominant ethnicity. For this 
reason, I consider Poles in Lithuania to possess the autonomous/dominant historical trait. 
                                                           
27 O’Connor, Kevin. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 110 
28 Ibid, 87. 
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 B. Russians 
 
  1. Historicity. The historical background of Lithuania’s Russian 
population is mixed. On the one hand, ethnic Russians (mostly persecuted Old Believers) 
settled in the region as early as the 17th century. The 1923 Lithuanian census, conducted 
shortly after independence, reveals that ethnic Russians comprised 2.5% of the state’s 
population. However, Lithuania’s Russian population would increase substantially in the 
aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet 
policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation 
of a significant number of ethnic Lithuanians and the mass settlement of ethnically 
Russian people in the region.29 As a consequence of these population movements, 
Lithuania’s Russian population increased from 50,460 in 1923 to 344,455 in 1989, two 
years prior to the restoration of Lithuanian independence. As a percentage of total 
population, Russians increased nearly four-fold, from 2.5 to 9.4%. Since this tremendous 
increase was largely driven by migration, it is safe to assume that a majority of the 
Russians inhabiting Lithuania on the eve of its independence from the Soviet Union were 
of migrant—as opposed to native—origin. I therefore code Russians as a non-native 
minority group. Truthfully, the historical background of this group is most accurately 
described as mixed. However, the logistical complications involved in introducing such a 
category into my quantitative analysis imposes a cost exceeding that of the benefit from 
an increased accuracy of operationalization. 
 
   2. Territoriality. Since I categorize Russians in Lithuania as a non-native 
ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial 
attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, 
Lithuania’s Russians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and 
for the second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest 
cities, having migrated there following the conclusion of World War II to take advantage 
of the Baltic region’s burgeoning industrial centers.30 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Ethnic Russians have ruled the territory of 
present-day Lithuania in two separate spells totaling nearly two centuries. These lands 
first came under Russian control in the late 18th century, and remained under Russian rule 
until World War I. Over the course of World War II, Lithuania came under Soviet 
occupation and was incorporated into the Soviet Union until its independence was re-
established in 1991. During both of these periods, the territory of present-day Lithuania 
was governed by ethnic Russians. Both imperial and Soviet Russia introduced 
“Russification” policies that favored Russian residents to the exclusion of those from 
other ethnic backgrounds.31 I therefore consider Latvia’s Russians to possess a history of 
dominance in the region. 
 
                                                           
29 O’Connor, Kevin. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 127 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, 53-67; 125-59 
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 C. Belarusians 
 
  1. Historicity. Belarusians do not have an extensive historical presence on 
the lands of modern-day Lithuania. The country’s first post-independence census reveals 
that only 4,421 were of Belarusian ethnicity, making up 0.2% of the total population. The 
Belarusian population increased dramatically in the decades following Lithuania’s 
incorporation into the Soviet Union, with the group growing to 63,169 people and 
accounting for 1.7% of the total population at the Soviet census of 1989. It is therefore 
safe to assume that a large majority of Latvia’s present-day Belarusian population is from 
a migrant—rather than native—background. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since Belarusians are not native to Lithuania, no 
territorial attachment could have occurred. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Belarusians have never been able to exercise 
autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the 
territory of present-day Lithuania. Throughout their presence in the region, they have 
either been part of a sate dominated by ethnic Lithuanians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or 
ethnic Russians (1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Belarusians to possess a history 
of dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
 
X. Macedonia 
 
 The modern Macedonian state was established on September 8th, 1991 and 
officially recognized in April of 1993. 
 
 A. Albanians 
 
  1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav census, conducted in the year that 
Macedonia declared independence, reveals that 21.7% of the future state’s population 
was ethnically Albanian. As early as 1948, Albanians in the region already constituted a 
substantial ethnic minority (17.1%) of total population. Therefore, it seems 
straightforward to classify Albanians as a native group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Historical population maps throughout the 20th century 
reveal that the northwestern portion of the present-day state of Macedonia has long been 
an Albanian stronghold, with Albanians constituting upwards of 50% of the population in 
many settlements. This indicates that ethnic Albanians are territorially attached to that 
region of Macedonia. 
 
  3. Dominance/Autonomy. As a consequence of their conversion to Islam, 
Albanians enjoyed considerable privileges within the Ottoman Empire, becoming 
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entrenched in the Ottoman bureaucracy and army; they produced no fewer than 42 Grand 
Viziers over the course of the empire’s existence.32 Ethnic Albanians (including those in 
the region of Macedonia) clearly enjoyed not only cultural autonomy, but also privileges 
over and above what the empire’s Christian subjects received. I therefore consider 
Albanians to have a historical background of autonomy/dominance. 
  
 B. Turks 
 
  1. Historicity. An ethnic Turkish presence in the lands currently 
comprising the Republic of Macedonia has existed ever since the conquest of the area by 
Ottoman forces. According to the Yugoslav census of 1991, conducted in the year 
Macedonia declared independence, Turks constituted 3.8% of the population. Earlier 
censuses throughout the 20th century reveal and even more substantial Turkish presence 
in the region. Clearly, the Turkish minority is of a native—rather than migrant—
background. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Classifying ethnic Turks on the territoriality dimension is 
somewhat difficult. On the one hand, it is clear that the strongest concentration of ethnic 
Turks is to be found in the West-central part of the state, where Turks constitute a 
majority in the municipalities of Plasnica and Centar Zupa. On the other hand, there is a 
smattering of Turks elsewhere in the country, most notably in the southwestern region. 
These present-day characteristics are representative of much earlier settlement patterns. 
While it is difficult to make a judgment in this case, ultimately I classify the Turkish 
minority as territorially attached, due its strongholds of Plasnica and Centar Zupa. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Turks were the dominant ethnic group within the 
Ottoman Empire. Not only did they belong to the most favored confessional community 
in the empire, but they were also the ethnic group that dominated the Ottoman Porte. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to classify ethnic Turks as having a dominant historical 
background. 
 
 
 C. Serbs 
 
  1. Historicity. Serbian settlement in the area predates the formation of the 
modern Macedonian state. Serbs constituted 2.1% of the region’s population at the last 
Yugoslav census in 1991, and had constituted as much as 3% earlier in the 20th century. 
Thus, Serbs can be viewed as native to the Republic of Macedonia. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Although Serbs can be found in other parts of the 
country, they are mostly clustered along the northern border with Serbia; almost all of the 
municipalities with a substantial Serb population either border Serbia or are within a very 
short distance from it. This concentration is a long-standing artefact of Serb settlement in 
the Black Forest of Skopje region. I therefore classify Serbs as exhibiting territorial 
                                                           
32 The Grand Vizier was second-in-command after the sultan in the Ottoman Empire, and occasionally 
more powerful and influential than the sultan himself. 
225 
 
 
attachment. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the 
most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Macedonia under the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that existed 
between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multi-national 
state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, Belgrade held 
“the upper hand” in its creation and governance.33 The post-World War II Socialist 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region what can at 
the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. I therefore 
consider Serbs in the region to have a historical background of dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
 
XI. Montenegro 
 
 The modern state of Montenegro was established in 2006, as the results of a 
referendum held in May of that year which led to a declaration of independence from 
Serbia. 
 
 A. Bosniaks/Muslims 
 
  1. Historicity. According to the 2003 Montenegrin census, conducted three 
years prior to the formation of the Montenegrin state, 7.8% of the region’s population 
consisted of Bosniaks, with an additional 4% declaring themselves to be (Slavic) 
Muslims. Thus, the combined Slavic Muslim population of the state was 11.8%. On this 
basis, I consider Bosniaks and (Slavic) Muslims to be a native minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.9 below is a map of the largest ethnic group in 
each of Montenegro’s municipalities in 2003, with predominantly Bosniak and Muslim 
regions colored in green. It is evident that this group is concentrated in the Plav and 
Rozaje municipalities which border Albania and Kosovo respectively. There are few 
Bosniaks/Muslims in regions outside of these two municipalities. Earlier (20th-century) 
ethnic structure maps reveal that this population concentration pattern is not the result of 
recent migration but a consequence of long-standing settlement patterns. I therefore 
consider Bosniaks/(Slavic) Muslims to be possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
33 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 99 
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Figure A.9 
   
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Montenegro#mediaviewer/File:Crna_Gora_-
_Etnicki_sastav_po_opstinama_2003_1.gif 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. As part of the Muslim confessional community 
under the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, Slavic Muslims enjoyed considerable cultural 
autonomy along with privileged status among other conquered peoples within the empire. 
In my judgment, this fact provides a sufficient amount of historical capital to promote the 
legitimacy of self-rule for this people-group. I thus consider Bosniaks/(Slavic) Muslims 
to have a historical background of autonomy. 
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 B. Albanians 
 
  1. Historicity. According to the 2003 Montenegrin census, conducted three 
years prior to the formation of the Montenegrin state, 5.0% of the region’s population 
consisted of Albanians. On this basis, I consider Albanians (who currently comprise 
approximately 4.9% of the state’s population) to be a native minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.10 below is a map of the largest ethnic group in 
each of Montenegro’s municipalities in 2003, with predominantly Albanian regions 
colored in brown. It is evident that this group is concentrated in the Ulcinj municipality in 
the southernmost part of Montenegro, bordering Albania. Other border areas with 
Albania and Kosovo also exhibit significant concentrations of this ethnic group.There are 
few Albanians in regions outside of these border regions. Earlier (20th-century) ethnic 
structure maps reveal that this population concentration pattern is not the result of recent 
migration but a consequence of long-standing settlement patterns. I therefore consider 
Albanians to be possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
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Figure A.10 
   
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Montenegro#mediaviewer/File:Crna_Gora_-
_Etnicki_sastav_po_opstinama_2003_1.gif 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. As a consequence of their conversion to Islam, 
Albanians enjoyed considerable privileges within the Ottoman Empire, becoming 
entrenched in the Ottoman bureaucracy and army; they produced no fewer than 42 Grand 
Viziers over the course of the empire’s existence.34 Ethnic Albanians (including those in 
the region of Montenegro) clearly enjoyed not only cultural autonomy, but also privileges 
over and above what the empire’s Christian subjects received. I therefore consider 
Albanians to have a historical background of autonomy/dominance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 The Grand Vizier was second-in-command after the sultan in the Ottoman Empire, and occasionally 
more powerful and influential than the sultan himself. 
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XII. Romania 
 
 The modern Romanian state has its roots in the United Principalities of Moldavia 
and Wallachia in 1862. The union of the two principalities would later come to be known 
as Romania, and in 1881 it became the Kingdom of Romania. However, the regions of 
Moldavia and Wallachia constitute only a small portion of what is today (and was for 
most of the 20th century) recognized as Romania. Even more relevant for my purposes 
here, these territories did not include a substantial Hungarian minority, which was only 
added with the transfer of Transylvania from Austro-Hungarian rule. I therefore consider 
the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, in which Hungary ceded control of Transylvania, to be the 
starting point of the modern Romanian state. 
 
 A. Hungarians 
 
  1. Historicity. Magyar (Hungarian) tribes have lived within the borders of 
present-day Romania since the 9th century, and had settled the region of Transylvania, in 
which they would go on to enjoy their strongest territorial concentration, by the 10th 
century. Ethnic Hungarians maintained a continuous historical presence in the region 
over the centuries. In the 1930 census, the first conducted following the incorporation of 
Transylvania into the modern Romanian state, Hungarians constituted 7.9% of the 
country’s population. By 1948, this percentage had increased to 9.4 due to Romania’s 
less of several territories where there were few (if any) ethnic Hungarians. However, by 
1991 the Hungarian share of the population had declined to 7.1%. Thus, it is clear that the 
Hungarians who live within Romania’s borders today can trace their descent to a 
historically native population. 
 
  2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, Romania’s 
Hungarian population has historically been heavily concentrated in the Transylvania 
region. Figure A.11 below is an ethnographic map of Romania based on 1930 census 
data. The regions colored in green are those where ethnic Hungarians constituted a 
majority of the population. It is evident from this map that Hungarians had a significant 
presence within Transylvania, and almost no presence in other parts of the country. For 
this reason, I consider Romania’s Hungarians to exhibit the trait of territorial attachment 
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Figure A.11 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Romania#mediaviewer/File:Romania_1930_ethnic_map_EN.png 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The Kingdom of Hungary conquered 
Transylvania in several stages, concluding in the early 13th century. The Hungarian 
crown retained control of the region for the next few centuries, before Hungarian 
influence waned with the rise of the Habsburg Monarchy but increased with the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which established the dual monarchy of Austria-
Hungary. Hungary did not cede control of Transylvania until the demise of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire following World War I. Thus, it is evident that ethnic Hungarians 
have centuries of historical experience in being the ruling ethnic group within the 
territories of present-day Romania that they inhabit. I therefore consider them to possess 
the trait of historical dominance. 
 
 
 
XIII. Serbia 
 
 Determining when the modern Serbian state was established depends on the 
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criteria upon which statehood hinges. On the one hand, an independent Principality of 
Serbia existed and was recognized by the Ottoman Porte as early as 1815. On the other, 
the Serbian state did not obtain full international recognition until the Treaty of Berlin in 
1878. I choose to view this latter date as the official beginning of the Serbian state, since 
it signifies the universal acceptance of the legitimacy of a fully sovereign and 
independent Serbian state. 
 
 A. Hungarians 
 
  1. Historicity. The Vojvodina region, which is today home to nearly all of 
Serbia’s Hungarian population, became a part of the Serbian-dominated Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Kingdom of Yugoslavia) in the aftermath of World War 
I. Hungarians had settled in the region as early as the 10th century and the territory had 
been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire since it had been won back from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1683.35 Thus, it is evident. 19th-century censuses report the ethnically 
Hungarian population of the region to range somewhere between 15 and 23% of the total. 
Thus, it is evident that Hungarians are native to the Vojvodina and consequently to the 
territory of modern-day Serbia. 
 
  2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, Serbian 
Hungarians have, and have always been, concentrated in the province of Vojvodina, 
encompassing the northernmost part of present-day Serbia. Presented below is the 
earliest-available demographic map of Serbia that includes Vojvodina, based on data 
from the 1961 Yugoslav census; Hungarian-majority and Hungarian-plurality areas are 
colored in dark and light yellow, respectively. It is clear that Hungarians are concentrated 
in the Vojvodina, and more specifically in its northernmost part, along the Hungarian 
border. There is no reason to suspect that this has not been the case historically. I 
therefore consider Hungarians in Serbia to possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
35 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27. 
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Figure A.12 
  
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Serbia#mediaviewer/File:Srbija_-
_Etnicki_sastav_po_opstinama_1961_1.gif 
 
   3. Dominance/autonomy. The Habsburg Empire seized control of 
Vojvodina from the Ottoman Empire in 168336 and subsequently reigned in the region for 
most of the following two-and-a-half centuries. It was only with the demise of Austria-
Hungary in 1918 that Vojvodina passed into Serbian hands. It is therefore evident that 
Hungarians within present-day Serbia have a long history of being the dominant ethnic 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
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group within the region of Vojvodina. 
 
 
 B. Bosniaks 
 
  1. Historicity. Most of Serbia’s present-day Bosnian population resides in 
the Sandzhak region, which itself was a part of the Bosnia elayet (administrative division) 
of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Sanzhak region is historically and ethnically closer to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina than to Serbia.37 It is therefore appropriate to view Serbia’s Bosnian 
population as native to the state. 
 
  2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, Serbia’s Bosnian 
population is heavily concentrated in the Sandzhak region. Figure A.13 below is the 
earliest-available demographic map of Serbia, based on data from the 1961 Yugoslav 
census; Muslim(that is, Bosnian)-majority areas are colored in green. The only majority-
Bosnian municipality is that of Tutin, in the Sandzhak region, and almost no Bosnians 
live outside of Sandzhak. Also as mentioned in the previous section, Bosnian settlement 
in the area is centuries-old and clearly pre-dates the formation of the modern Serbian 
state. I therefore consider Bosnians in Serbia to possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
37 37 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 227. 
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Figure A.13 
  
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Serbia#mediaviewer/File:Srbija_-
_Etnicki_sastav_po_opstinama_1961_1.gif 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. As part of the Muslim confessional community 
under the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, Slavic Muslims enjoyed considerable cultural 
autonomy along with privileged status among other conquered peoples within the empire. 
In my judgment, this fact provides a sufficient amount of historical capital to engender 
the legitimacy of self-rule for this people-group. Additionally, the region of Sandzhak, 
where Bosnians are concentrated, was long part of the Bosnia elayet (administrative 
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region) of the Ottoman Empire, which enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy than other 
parts of the Empire. I thus consider Bosnians in Serbia to have a historical background of 
autonomy/dominance. 
 
 
 
XIV. Slovakia 
 
 The modern Slovak state traces its beginnings to the formation of the 
Czechoslovak state following World War I. However, since Czechoslovakia did not 
recognize separate “Czech” and “Slovak” nationalities, and since Czechs were the most 
numerous and influential ethnic group within it, it is hard to view 1918 as the beginning 
of Slovakia. Alternative dates for the state’s origin are 1939, when the First Slovak 
Republic was established (although this was a war-time state) and 1993, when Slovakia 
declared independence from Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, the choice of date is rather 
immaterial with respect to the state’s ethnic minorities, since it does not alter their coding 
on the historical variables. 
 
 A. Hungarians 
   
  1. Historicity. Hungarians settled in lands within Slovakia’s present-day 
borders as early as the 10th century, and retained a continuous presence in the region over 
the centuries. According to the Czechoslovak census of 1921, Hungarians constituted 
5.5% of the state’s population, a percentage that was undoubtedly higher in Slovak lands, 
where vast majority of Hungarians were to be found. The 1950 Czechoslovak census 
reveals that Hungarians made up 10.3% of Slovakia’s population. Thus, is evident that 
ethnic Hungarians had a significant numerical presence within Slovakia even prior to its 
emergence as an independent state. I therefore consider Hungarians to be a native 
minority group in the state. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Figure A.14 below is an ethnic composition map of the 
territories of the present-day Slovak state in 1880. Territories where Hungarians 
constitute a plurality or majority of the population are colored in green. It is evident from 
the map that Hungarians were then (as they are today) geographically concentrated 
around Slovakia’s southern border with Hungary. I therefore consider Hungarians in 
Slovakia to possess the trait of territorial attachment.  
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Figure A.14 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Slovakia#mediaviewer/File:Census1880.png 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 
placed the territory of modern-day Slovakia under the Hungarian part of the dual 
monarchy that it established. Thus, Hungarians enjoyed the status of a dominant and 
ruling ethnic group within the region up until the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
in World War I. They exercised this status to great effect to stifle a fledgling Slovak 
nationalist movement.38 For this reason, I consider Hungarians in Slovakia to possess the 
historical trait of dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
38 Kovac, Dusan. The Slovak Political Programme: From Hungarian Patriotism to the Czecho-Slovak State. 
In M. Teich, D. Kovac and M. Brown (Eds.) Slovakia in History (pp.130-131). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
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XV. Slovenia 
 
 The nation-state of Slovenia was established on June 25th, 1991, when it declared 
independence from Yugoslavia. However, Slovenia was also part of the multi-national 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) between 1918 
and 1943. Since the Slovene people joined this state voluntarily, and since they 
constituted one of its titular ethnicities, I elect to use 1918 (rather than 1991) as the origin 
of the modern Slovene state. 
 
 A. Serbs 
 
  1. Historicity. Taking 1918 as the origin of the modern Slovene state, we 
must consider whether Serbs enjoyed a significant historical presence on Slovene 
territories prior to that year. Although it was conducted three years later, the first census 
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes can shed some light on this question. The 
census reports that Serbs and Croats combined constituted only 11,898 residents of the 
1,054,919 total for Drava Banovina (a province comprising most of present-day 
Slovenia), or 1.1% of the total. As late as 1948, Serbs only constituted 7,048 (0.5%) of 
the population of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. The vast majority of Serbs currently 
residing within Slovenia either migrated there over the second half of the 20th century, 
attracted by its higher economic development, or are descended from such migrants. By 
the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Serbs had increased to 47,401 persons, or 2.5% of the 
population. It therefore seems appropriate to view Serbs as a migrant, rather than native, 
ethnic group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since Serbs in Slovenia are a predominantly migrant 
ethnic group, no territorial attachment could have occurred. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the 
most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Slovenia under the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that existed 
between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multi-national 
state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, Belgrade held 
“the upper hand” in its creation and governance.39 The post-World War II Socialist 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region what can at 
the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. I therefore 
consider Serbs in the region to have a historical background of dominance/autonomy. 
 
  
 B. Croats 
 
  1. Historicity. Taking 1918 as the origin of the modern Slovene state, we 
must consider whether Croats enjoyed a significant historical presence on Slovene 
territories prior to that year. Although it was conducted three years later, the first census 
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes can shed some light on this question. The 
                                                           
39 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 99 
238 
 
 
census reports that Serbs and Croats combined constituted only 11,898 residents of the 
1,054,919 total for Drava Banovina (a province comprising most of present-day 
Slovenia), or 1.1% of the total. As late as 1948, Croats only constituted 16,069 (1.2%) of 
the population of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. A majority of Croats currently 
residing within Slovenia either migrated there over the second half of the 20th century, 
attracted by its higher economic development, or are descended from such migrants. By 
the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Croats had increased to 52,876 persons, or 2.8% of the 
population. It therefore seems appropriate to view Croats as a migrant, rather than native, 
ethnic group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since Croats in Slovenia are a predominantly migrant 
ethnic group, no territorial attachment could have occurred. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Croats living in present-day Slovenia have no 
historical experience with autonomous self-rule in the region; nor have they enjoyed a 
spell in which they have ruled the region as a dominant ethnic group. I therefore do not 
consider Croats to possess a background of dominance/autonomy. 
 
 C. Bosnians 
  
   1. Historicity. Taking 1918 as the origin of the modern Slovene state, we 
must consider whether Bosnians enjoyed a significant historical presence on Slovene 
territories prior to that year. Unfortunately, the first census which reported Bosnian (then 
designated “Muslim”) citizens was not conducted until 1931. The census reports that 
Muslims constituted only 927 residents of the 1,114,115 total for Drava Banovina (a 
province comprising most of present-day Slovenia), or less than 0.1% of the total. There 
is no reason to believe that the extent of this population was larger in earlier years. A 
majority of Bosniaks currently residing within Slovenia either migrated there over the 
second half of the 20th century, attracted by the republic’s higher economic development, 
or are descended from such migrants. By the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Muslims had 
increased to 26,577 persons, or 1.4% of the population. It therefore seems appropriate to 
view Bosniaks as a migrant, rather than native, ethnic group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Since Bosniaks in Slovenia are a predominantly migrant 
ethnic group, no territorial attachment could have occurred. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Bosnians living in present-day Slovenia have no 
historical experience with autonomous self-rule in the region; nor have they enjoyed any 
spell in which they have ruled the region as a dominant ethnic group. I therefore do not 
consider Croatians to possess a background of dominance/autonomy. 
 
 
 
XVI. Spain 
 
 The modern nation-state of Spain was established in 1812, with the introduction 
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of Spain’s first constitution. 
 
 A. Catalans 
 
  1. Historicity. The first uses of the term “Catalan” to describe the 
inhabitants of what is today the Catalonian region date from the late 11th century.40 
Although the region initially inhabited by the Catalan people was more territorially 
limited than what is today known as Catalonia, conquest and settlement in the 12th and 
13th centuries expanded Catalan presence to the lands that are today associated with this 
people group.41 It was also during the 13th century that Catalan began to replace Latin as 
the language of the court and the language of culture, suggesting a genuine cultural 
distinctiveness.42 Thus, it appears evident that the Catalan people are a genuinely native 
minority group, having settled territories of modern-day Spain well in advance of the 
establishment of the modern Spanish state. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Although the region initially inhabited by the Catalan 
people was more territorially limited than what is today known as Catalonia, conquest 
and settlement in the 12th and 13th centuries expanded Catalan presence to the lands that 
are today associated with this people group.43 To this day, ethnic Catalans in Spain reside 
primarily within the provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Terragona in the 
country’s northeastern corner. I therefore consider Spain’s Catalans to possess the trait of 
territorial attachment. 
  
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The Catalan people have a rich—if temporally 
distant—history of autonomous self-rule. The first genuinely Catalan state was a feudal 
one established by Ramon Berenguer I, Count of Barcelona, around 1070.44 It was this 
state, unified with the crown of Aragon, that successfully re-conquered much of Spain 
from Muslim control. By the 13th and 14th centuries, the Catalan state was so developed 
that it may have been “the one country to which it would be least incorrect… to apply the 
apparently anachronistic [term] of… nation state.” 45 Thus, we can consider Spain’s 
Catalan minority to possess historical experience with autonomy. 
 
 
 B. Basques 
 
  1. Historicity. The Basques were identified as a separate people-group 
possibly as early as the 1st century, and by the sixth century they had spread to most of 
the territories that today constitute the geographical region of the Basque Country.46 The 
                                                           
40 Balcells, Albert. Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 3 
41 Ibid, p. 1-8. 
42 Ibid, p. 8 
43 Ibid, p. 1-8. 
44 Ibid, p. 4 
45 Pierre Vilar, cited in Balcells, Albert. Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1996, p. 3 
46 Lecours, Andre. Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 
2007, p. 27 
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Basque people continuously populated these territories from the 6th to the 19th century, 
which saw the emergence of the modern Spanish state. Therefore, I consider Basques to 
be a native minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. Although during early Roman times the Basque 
population was largely confined to the modern province of Navarre, a 6th-century 
expansion resulted in Basques settling in other areas in northern Spain and southwestern 
France that are today collectively recognized as the Basque Country.47 This region has 
been a historical stronghold for the Basque people from the and to this day remains the 
area within Spain that contains by far the largest number of Euskara (Basque) speakers. I 
therefore consider Basques to possess the trait of territorial attachment. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. Although the Basque people’s experience with 
autonomous self-rule was brief and historically distant, it has proved sufficient to stoke 
the flames of Basque nationalism since the 19th century. Although the Basque-dominated 
Kingdom of Navarre came into existence in 824, it was not until the 11th century that all 
of what is today known as the Basque country came under the rule of a single Navarran 
king. This happened between the years of 1004 and 1035, during the reign of Sancho 
Garces III.48 The extent to which this was a genuinely “Basque” kingdom is debatable. 
On the one hand, Sancho was undoubtedly a Euskara (Basque) speaker, as were most of 
his subjects. On the other, he did not officially proclaim himself as the king of the 
Basques, but rather the king of Spain.49 But regardless of whether the Kingdom of 
Navarre was “Basque” in any meaningful sense, it is the way that the kingdom is viewed 
by the Basque people themselves that matters, since what we are concerned with here is 
the social psychology of the group. And when we put the question that way, it is clear 
that the historical experience of the Kingdom of Navarre has played a significant role in 
stoking the imagination of Basque nationalism.50 For this reason, I consider the Basques 
to possess the trait of historical autonomy. 
 
 
 
XVII. United Kingdom 
 
 The modern state of the United Kingdom was established in two stages. First, the 
Acts of Union 1707 led to the unification of the Kingdom of England and Kingdom of 
Scotland into the single kingdom of Great Britain. Slightly less than a century later, the 
Act of Union 1800 united the Kingdom of Great Britain with the Kingdom of Ireland to 
produce the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Although the United Kingdom 
would cede a substantial portion of Ireland in 1922 to form the free Irish state, it did 
retain the northernmost portion (today Northern Ireland). I therefore use 1800 as the date 
for the establishment of the UK. 
                                                           
47 Ibid. 
48 Woodworth, Paddy. The Basque Country: A Cultural History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 
p. 26 
49 Ibid, p. 27 
50 Ibid 
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 A. Scots 
 
  1. Historicity. There is no doubt as to whether Scots are native to the 
territory of the United Kingdom. Proto-Scottish people-groups inhabited northern Britain 
in pre-Roman times, and a united Kingdom of Scotland was established in the 9th century 
AD. 
 
  2. Territoriality. The question of the Scots’ territorial attachment is also 
rather straightforward, as they have historically been centered in northern Britain, the 
territory of the Kingdom of Scotland and the territory in which Scots predominate until 
today. I therefore consider the Scottish people to possess the trait of territorial 
attachment. 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. A unified Kingdom of Scotland existed from 
843 to 1707, when the Kingdom of Scotland united with the Kingdom of England to 
establish the Kingdom of Great Britain. While the Kingdom of Scotland’s territories 
expanded and contracted over time, it mostly ruled over the northern third of the island of 
Britain, the same territory in which today’s ethnic Scots are concentrated. I therefore 
consider Scots to have historical experience with autonomous self-rule. 
 
 B. Welsh 
 
  1. Historicity. Similarly to the Scots, there is no doubt about the native 
character of the Welsh in the United Kingdom. Celtic Britons settled the territory of 
modern Wales as early as the Iron Age. Following the retreat of the Roman Empire from 
Britain in the 5th century, linguistic and cultural splintering began to take place within 
Britain, with the Welsh constituting one of the largest sub-groups. By the 11th century, 
the Welsh were largely viewed as a separate ethno-linguistic group from other Britons. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Welsh should be viewed as a native minority group. 
 
  2. Territoriality. The Welsh have historically inhabited the western portion 
of central southern Great Britain, bordered by England to the east and by the sea in all 
other directions. Figure A.15 below presents the territory of Wales in 1688, 19 years prior 
to the establishment of the Kingdom of Great Britain. The territory very closely 
resembles that of modern-day Wales. I therefore conclude that the Welsh possess the trait 
of territorial attachment. 
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Figure A.15 
 
Source: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00maplinks/mughal/morden1688/wales1688.jpg 
 
  3. Dominance/autonomy. The Welsh people enjoyed autonomy under the 
Principality of Wales which existed between 1216 and 1536 and encompassed most of 
the lands of present-day Wales. This autonomy was most significant in the period from 
its foundation to its annexation to the English crown in 1284, when the Principality 
enjoyed a de facto independent status, similar to that possessed by the Kingdom of 
Scotland at the time.51 I therefore consider Wales to possess historical experience with 
autonomous self-rule. 
                                                           
51 Davies, John. A History of Wales. London: Penguin Books, 1994. 
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